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The Review of Metaphysics

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

ARTICLES • CRITICAL STUDIES • DISCUSSIONS • PROBLEMS
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RICHARD McKEON

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Basic Categories and Attitudes
of the Value Situation

'Existence': A Humean Point
in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*

On the Construction
of Whitehead's Metaphysical Language

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The Theoretical and the Practical
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Identifiable Individuals

Summaries and Comments

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ARTICLES

BEING, EXISTENCE, AND THAT WHICH IS*

RICHARD McKEON

MY SUBJECT IS, what is. In such an inquiry, the presentation of evidence to support a solution to questions raised is inseparable from the elaboration of reasons to justify involvement in the questions and their consequences. In some inquiries, a consensus of experts can be taken as a sign that the solution is acceptable in the light of available knowledge and the two questions concerning the warrant of the answer and the justification of the question are then merged in a third question concerning the competent judge. Since consensus is seldom broad and never unambiguous in basic philosophic questions, the subject I have proposed to discuss opens up thus into three questions: "What is?"; "What does 'to be' mean?"; and "Who is competent or impelled to raise questions about what is?" Any consideration of what is moves through these questions and suggests further questions concerning the interrelations of the properties attributed to the known, the statements advanced as knowledge, and the conceptions used by the knower. They are, moreover, the three questions which form one of the patterns of controversy in contemporary philosophy, for it may be alleged that the grounds and beginnings of philosophy are found exclusively in assumptions about "being," that is, in what is, or about "stated being," that is, in what is known or is said to be, or about "human being," that is, in what is encountered or is there. If these three questions are raised about what is, therefore, some of the controversial differences of philosophy may be used as indices to identify and clarify related problems. The *particular* formulation of a position concerning what is should provide a statement of *common* issues concerning which exclusive choices determine the incommensurable directions of controversial oppositions.

* The Presidential Address delivered at the eleventh meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America, Notre Dame, Indiana (March 18, 1960).

I am under no illusion that the statement of common issues will forestall controversy. On the contrary, one of the venerable devices of the experienced controversialist is to state all possible positions in his own terms. The three questions concealed behind the three terms in the title of this paper do not have a privileged or architectonic universality. They will not reconcile the oppositions of philosophic positions concerning the possibility, order, and relative importance of questions, and it is easy to anticipate reassortments they will undergo, if they are thought worthy of the effort, in the types of philosophy for which they find a place. My starting-point is "what is," rather than "being" or "existence," and I depart radically, therefore, from some of the dominant fashions of metaphysical discussion as well as from the fashions of non-metaphysical discussion of metaphysical issues. As a mark of that departure, I shall not base what I have to say on exposure of errors in Descartes or on refinements of insights in Hume or Kant, and I shall not express myself in neologisms constructed to retain, in English, distinctions or paradoxes derived from Descartes, Kierkegaard, or Nietzsche, or profundities grasped from the exegesis of the analogies of poets or from the etymologies of words used by Greek philosophers. If I were to choose a dictum for aphoristic elaboration or paradoxical propulsion, I should interpret a statement from Avicenna: "That which the understanding conceives first and best, and into which it resolves all other conceptions, is 'that which is,' 'thing,' and 'necessary'."¹ I should make this choice, not because I prefer or even understand Avicenna's position concerning that which is, but because I want to raise three questions which are suggested when Avicenna's statement is introduced in the context of problems of existence.

To start with that which is raises, first, a question about starting-points. Existence is made the starting-point of philosophy in a variety of ways, for the properties of existence may be sought by examining experience, or language, or events, and such inquiries into existence may either prepare the way for questions of being or render them unnecessary: these choices of starting-point and sequence depend on assumptions about what is which

¹ Avicenna, *Philosophia Prima* I, 6. *Opera*, Venice, 1508, 72 r b.

should be made explicit. A second question, about distinctions, arises from the first. There are fashions in errors as well as in starting-points. The errors we discover in philosophies which exceed experience, misuse language, or mix fancy with what is the case, have tended to be errors by reification of distinctions—bifurcations of nature, diremptions of reality, segregations of things into independent realms, like being and becoming, reason and experience, necessity and freedom, reality and appearance, body and mind, knower and known. To rectify errors by which distinctions are made into separations, we use distinctions which depend on assumptions concerning the bearing of distinctions on that which is, and these assumptions should be examined as well as the errors they undermine. The question of distinctions leads, therefore, to a third question, about unities. The unities of existence, or experience, or language, can be expressed in unified science or knowledge, and can be grounded in principles found in the perplexities of personal being, the references of true statements, or the persistences and indeterminancies of processes and situations. The encounter of distinctions among our unities suggests that there is a diversity among the modes of that which is and of the unities it discloses.

If that which the understanding conceives first and best is that which is, and if all other conceptions are resolved into that conception, to begin with that which is is to start on a series of questions which occur in all contexts of inquiry or action. The question "what is?" has priority in so far as it determines the criteria by which to identify the object of thought or the subject of discourse. It is distinct from the question "what is it that is?" since the latter question requires the use of methods to determine the truths which can be asserted of any given instance of that which is. The question, "what are the circumstances under which that which is is what it is?" turns to consideration of factual situation, experience, and causal dependence. Thus, to choose an illustration far removed from direct concern with metaphysical distinctions, when John Locke states the problem of the beginning of political societies, he touches on all three questions: he asserts that the political community must be *one* body with *one* power to act, that

is, that to be is to be one²; he argues that the community comes to be only through the consent of the people, that is, that it is characterized by a unique property³; and he adduces instances, which he calls "evident matter of fact," to refute the contention that no such consent was ever given.⁴ These questions are concerned respectively with that which is, with being, and with existence. The questions are distinct and require different data for their treatment, but their differences do not constitute three universes, and the distinctions of meaning attached to "that which is," "being," and "existence" should facilitate the use of all three terms in each question rather than suggest rigid prescriptions for their use. The three questions deal with modes of that which is: general modes which determine that which is, or beings, or entities, or things; specific modes which determine their being, or nature, or essence; and circumstantial modes which determine their existence, occurrence, or factual determination. It has often been observed that existence is not determined by essence; it has been remarked likewise, but in less memorable formulation, that essence is not determined by that which is.

The order of the three questions about that which is is an order of conception. That which is is conceived first and best because the inquirer or the knower, to recognize what is known and to treat what is to be known, must determine what is. To do this he must find a respect in which to characterize "what is" as the "thing" with which he is concerned and a respect in which it is "one" in his conception. But if it has a specifiable nature and a determinable unity, he must indicate ways in which to treat it in relation to other things, in relation to the truths asserted of it, and in relation to the values attached to it. These are conceptions which Medieval philosophers named the "transcendentals"—that which is, thing, one, something, true, and good—and distinguished sharply from other conceptions; and the same or similar conceptions were put to like uses before and later by philosophers who would have distrusted the implications of anything called transcendental. The use of such basic conceptions leads, finally, to

² John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government*, Ch. VIII, 96.

³ *Ibid.*, 96, 112, 119.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 100-103.

the differentiation of that which is into entities or things, and all other conceptions are resolved into the conception of that which is, for the knower not only encounters a known but also elaborates what he knows in a system of statements which he holds to be true, and he orders his activities according to preferences which guide him in specifying values. The general modes of that which is provide grounds for distinguishing physical entity, logical entity, and value entity.

The ancient distinction of philosophy into physics, logic, and ethics, which Kant recalls and commends, is based on determination of what is. The controversial differences which separate proposed answers to the question, "what is?" are clarified when that question is made explicit. The various forms of the thesis of physicalism hold that only what are conceived to be physical entities are, that truth is established by reference to them, and that values are preferences and feelings of men, who in so far as they are, are physical entities. The various recurrent forms of platonism hold that that which is is both intelligible and intelligent, and, properly an Idea, and therefore that hierarchies are found in what is, and that a thing is true and good in the degree that it is. The bifurcations of that which is often take the form of separating a realm of nature from a realm of morals and then finding a more formal locus for the logical relations applied in each. I have raised the question of what is, however, not to clarify controversy but to support a different solution from those of reduction, transcendence, or separation. The conceptions of the understanding provide means by which to distinguish among things which are. To determine a thing by its nature and its unity is to enter the variegations of what is which are familiar to thought. Thing, one, and that which is, are three separate conceptions applied to a single object of knowledge. What is is "something" in distinction from other "things" because another conception is applied to the same object of knowledge, and the distinction is significant of that which is without requiring the establishment of separate realms of things and somethings. In much the same fashion, to vindicate the truth of a statement depends on thought processes and verbal formulations, but when they are successful, the true and what is coincide in their application to the same object of knowledge; and values

depend on emotional reactions and voluntary actions which find coincidences for the good and what is.

What is exceeds the limiting prescriptions of sense or intellect, emotion or will. It is the totality to which conceptions are applied to distinguish the varieties of things, and that is possible only if different conceptions can be applied to each thing without the danger of multiplying things with the diversification of concepts. The question, "what is?" is the question of the relation of entitization, verification, and valuation, for it is in what is that we seek many forms of what is—one and many, *ens ratum* and *ens rationis*, that which is actually and that which is potentially, that which is necessarily and that which is contingently, that which is desired and that which is desirable, that which is asserted and that which is true. This is the kind of inquiry that still deserves the name "wisdom": its province is what may be called "ontic questions" concerning principles, and problems of principles are encountered, today as in the past, in efforts to relate truth, value, and being.

The second question, "what is it that is?" requires inquiry or knowledge employed to establish the truth of statements about what is. The inquirer or knower may need to return from time to time to questions of principle and of what is, but his task is to discover grounds in posited statements for statements to be established, and his inquiry is into connections, sequences, and consequences. The object of *knowledge* is specific modes of that which is, and inquiry concerning them is involved in *categorial questions* which explore connections as distinguished from the *ontic questions* in which *wisdom* seeks beginnings or principles. The conception of being, as C. S. Peirce argued, arises upon the formation of a proposition;⁵ and categorial questions are questions of being as distinguished from questions of what is. The connection may be sought in strings of statements composed of identifiable elements and transformed according to rules. They may be stated in formal terms in pure science, but such formal structures are explored in models which embody and exhibit instances of structure and by operators who construct and interpret in accordance with rules.

⁵ "On a New List of Categories," 1.551, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*. Ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931, vol. I, p. 291.

The differences of structure which mark off the categories of being and of knowledge are based at once on relations established in an artificial construction, on relations found in a pattern of natures and their properties, and on relations established in an intelligible use and interpretation; and categorial questions concerning how to characterize what is depend on principles of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, or on like principles, by which to establish the sequences of what is asserted, done, or made.

The ancient distinction between theoretical, practical, and productive sciences is based on determinations of being in response to categorial questions. It may be argued that the structures and the laws discovered in the various sciences differ according to the purposes of the sciences. Laws are statements of what is and what will be in patterns of covariation and causation, when the purpose is to provide evidence for true statements about natures and processes; laws are prescriptions of what ought to be in patterns of values and responsibilities, when the purpose is to develop attitudes and institutions to improve the actions and relations of men; laws are canons of expression and sensibility in patterns of forms and contents, when the purpose is to advance the arts of making and the appreciation of what is made. But any such classification of ways in which the questions, "what is it that is?" and, "how is it known?" are answered is involved in controversial differences concerning the object and purpose of knowledge. It may be argued that all knowledge is theoretic in so far as it is knowledge, that questions of nature, action, and art are treated inseparably in a common dialectic, and that practice is the application of theory; or that all knowledge is practical since meaning and truth are discovered by examining consequences, and that questions of nature, action, and art are examined by a single critical scrutiny and opposition of statements, purposes, and feelings; or that all knowledge is productive, since science too is a construction, but that the constructions of science differ from merely arbitrary constructions in that they are made to express or represent encountered structures.

To raise categorial questions, however categories are conceived and enumerated, is to identify and relate subject matters as they are treated by different methods and in different disciplines.

Within the structure of any one method or discipline, that identification traces a continuing thread of meaning or conception through the variant forms of a sequence of statements. The specific modes of that which is are the subject matter of the true statements established in disciplines, and they do not lose their status of being if they are shown to be essential in the inquiry of one discipline and accidental in that of another, or if they are presented as distinct and independent in one discipline but amalgamated and interdependent in what is as it is characterized in another discipline. In their use, categories can be arranged in an order of conception, and in that order later categories depend on and cannot be prescind from earlier categories. The distinctions which are thereby established in that which is as it is known in a discipline do not require the supposition that the natures and properties they isolate would be encountered or recognized without use of the method of the discipline. A category provides the conception or meanings by which to relate statements in inquiry or proof, and the differentiation of elements or natures or essences in the structure of knowledge brings structures of statement, of thought, and of subject matter into contact in the constitution of specific modes of being.

The specific modes of that which is are ordered according to the conceptions employed by a knower in the development of knowledge. Knowledge is in that process at once a construction of statements, a schema of conceptions, and a pattern of natures and processes. But what that which is exceeds restriction to the limitations of knowing, or doing, or making, for categorial distinctions not only separate subject matters but also clarify the relations among the varieties of what it is that is and even the relations of being to that which is and to existence. The moral prescriptions which an inquirer into moral values seeks are distinct from the psychological and sociological laws which govern human behavior and from the esthetic and literary canons which are recognized in the poetic presentation of human feeling and thought. Yet the relations of ethics to science and to art and the relations among the uses which moralist, scientist, and poet make of common problems of action, are themselves categorial questions bearing on the natures uncovered and stated by the inquirer's

method and categories. In like fashion, questions of being, such as those raised in the inquiries into prescriptions of action, laws of nature, and canons of taste, are distinct from questions of existence and from questions of what is. Yet categorial questions concerning the lines of relation that can be based on causation, responsibility, and communication, as well as categorial questions concerning the interplay of such relations, are not wholly dissociated from inquiries into facts about how men have acted and do act, or from inquiries into principles of moral conduct and into what values are. These are not categorial questions in a strict sense, but even the inquirer who is strongly committed to his method and categories must occasionally pause to relate his conclusions to what is the case and to refute the errors of professed inquirers who start from different and mistaken principles.

The question, "under what circumstances is that which is what it is?" is third in order of conception, since the sequences of connection, which the understanding explores in special modes of that which is, depend on principles established in general modes of that which is, and categorial conceptions are used to order the connections encountered in experience and existence. What agglomeration of characteristics constitutes a fact or an event, and what antecedent processes and attendant circumstances are relevant to its occurrence are *circumstantial* questions as distinguished from ontic and categorial questions. The object of *experience* is existence encountered in a pattern of occurrences, and the man of experience procures information concerning what led to what and concerning who did what, where, when, how, by what means, and why. The facts of existence may be ordered in terms of coexistences or successions in time and space, or of connections perceived, constructed, or imagined, or of influences traced back to causes and intentions. The grouping of characteristics and facts brought together in a related set of occurrences may be stated in concrete terms, but even the report of the eye-witness is based on assumptions concerning what is and concerning what is relevant to it, and the history which recounts what happened makes recourse to the art of determining what may have happened and to the science of determining what must have happened. The differences of pattern which mark off the contexts which determine the character of

agents and the tendency of events are based on observation and records, on imagination and analogies, and on reason and grounded connections; and circumstantial questions concerning what occurred or what is the case depend on perception supplemented by considerations of probability, possibility, and necessity.

The ancient distinction between history, poetry, and philosophy or science is based on determinations of existence in response to circumstantial questions. History assumes different forms in the discussion of such determinations, ranging through factual, mythical, and scientific presentations, and it retains some accretion of the ways of establishing probable and necessary connections proper to each of these perspectives in which connections are attested as occurrences, presented as plausible consequences, and traced as instances of the operation of a scientific law. Whereas categorical questions trace the connections of statements back to the principles or conceptions on which those connections are based and depend, circumstantial questions trace the connections of statements to the applications in experience and existence in which they assume concrete significance. To raise circumstantial questions is to identify and relate facts and occurrences encountered in the bunchings and successions of experience, reconstructed in the contents and forms of art, and investigated in the variables and constants of science. The circumstantial modes of that which is are the subject matter of warranted or plausible statements of fact and event, and they do not lose their hard factual status in existence if it is observed that histories must be rewritten and facts must be restated from time to time, that artists find new probabilities in recounting plots they borrow from myth and history, and that the semi-mythical careers of Oedipus, Orestes, Faust, and Hamlet provide patterns to be applied in the analysis of men's minds and motives. The connections discovered in that which is, as it is encountered in experience, do not require the supposition that the facts and occurrences they relate can be stated in only one formulation or can be ordered only in a unique constellation. A context and its circumstances and topics provide the objects among which are discovered connections previously experienced, newly imagined, or systematically reasoned. The circumstantial modes of that which is are ordered according to the structures of state-

ment and knowledge applied to what is known; and the circumstances under which that which is is found to be what it is exceed restriction to the perceived, the imagined, or the reasoned, for circumstances and topics not only compose the patterns of sensible, imaginary, and rational experience, but also distinguish and relate the connections of fact, art, and science.

The order of the questions concerning that which is is an order of conception. It is an order which runs from questions about entities or things, to questions about natures or essences, to questions about facts and occurrences. Each is a mode of that which is; and as general, specific, and circumstantial modes of that which is, things, natures, and facts may differ in conception alone or in conception and object. That which is is distinguished into modes because of distinctions in conceptions, and each of the words used to describe that which is takes on a different significance in application to the different modes. That which is is "one"; but in the general modes, to be one is to be, and a thing can be identified only if it has a unity in what it is and how it functions; in the specific modes, to be one is to have specific properties, and a nature can be identified only if it has a unity which persists through the successive statements which are made about it; in the circumstantial modes, to be one is to be compendent and correlated, and a fact or event can be identified only if it has a unity in causes or sufficient reasons to establish its possibility and probability. That which is is "true"; but in the general modes, to be true is to be, and a thing can be identified only if what is true of it is what it is; in the specific modes, to be true is to be in the manner specified in well-grounded statements, and a nature can be identified only if the statements made about it express mutually consistent truths; in circumstantial modes, to be true is to be in a manner that can be alleged to be or to have been the case, and a fact or event can be identified only if evidence for it is plausible and probable. In this sense that which is is what the understanding conceives first and best, and in the successive modes, other conceptions are reduced to the conception of that which is. The questions should be differentiated not in order to establish agreement on the uses of terms like "thing," "nature," and "fact," but in order to establish the senses in which

thing, nature, and fact are not the same whatever terms are used to express their coincidences and differences.

The order in which the understanding conceives that which is, moreover, despite its metaphysical interest, is not the unique order found in what is. The priority of the conception of that which is is consistent with the discovery and use of other beginnings of inquiry and proof and of occurrence and fact. What the understanding conceives first and the order in which conceptions are developed do not determine what is established first in the statements of knowledge and the order in which statements grounded on it are organized; nor are they the same as what is established first in the occurrences of experience and the order in which what is held to be the case is unfolded. I have identified the problems of that which is with problems encountered when the knower forms conceptions to face what is to be known, to distinguish them both from problems of being which are encountered when the knower elaborates methods to develop and ground knowledge and also from problems of existence which are encountered when what is thought to be knowledge in any sense is applied to situations discovered in what is to be known. But I have begun with what is in order to establish distinctions by which to relate what is, being, and existence without entanglement in unilluminating semantic paradoxes or unnecessary metaphysical diremptions.

If one begins with being, or the statements of knowledge, instead of with what is, or the conceptions of the understanding, the starting-point leads to the sequences of statements established in discourse, inquiry, or operation. Three questions arise in considering discursive sequences in language, thought, and action which differentiate kinds of being similar to the three modes of what is. The connections of being are connections of discourse in this broad sense, and the kinds of being may be differentiated according to the connections which may be set up in a single inclusive set of terms or elements. One begins with *discursive being* when the terms are arranged in statements and sequences of statement. Discursive or ordered being includes not only connections of covariation or causation, but also connections of prudential policy, moral prescription, political responsibility, and poetic creation. The relations among the terms in a statement are, in

senses which vary with the kind of connection, essential or accidental, universal or indefinite or particular, necessary or contingent; in the sequences of statements terms are related as antecedent, consequent, or incompatible one to another, and statements are determined in their truth and falsity as well as in modality, including the varieties of modalities employed in the discourse of moral choice, social responsibility, and artistic recognition and discovery. The sequences and courses of discursive being are grounded in a second kind of being which is explored by examining different connections among a different selection from the same terms. These connections establish the being of that which is and the principles of the connections of being. The kind of being that is signified when it is asserted that p implies p , or that what is is one and what is one is, may be called postulated or *conceived being* to distinguish the reciprocal predication employed in stating them from the truths and falsities attributed to the consequents in discursive being. Still a third set of connections is explored in the factual or *circumstantial being* which determines the clusters of terms brought together to describe what has occurred and what is seen, heard, and experienced.

Finally, if one begins with existence, or with the perspectives and circumstances of experience, the order of questions is the reverse of questions about what is. That which is experienced first is existence, and if the observational, or experimental, or historical survey is complete it contains not only the connections on which proofs and other consequences are constructed in exploration of being, but also the principles appropriate to all modes of that which is. The juxtapositions and successions encountered in sense, memory, and experience, and explored in art, science, and wisdom are all places or *contexts of existence*. The facts of existence are differentiated as one moves through three major contexts which experience opens up. The first and direct context of existence is the immediate impressions of sensible experience, the proper sensibles and the common sensibles or the secondary and primary qualities, by which *facts* and data are characterized. In the second context of existence *objects* and natures and artifacts are experienced rather than sensible qualities, and secondary and even tertiary qualities assume some existential and ontological status, at

least in so far as the significances of language, the state of knowledge, and the expectations that characterize a person or a time are themselves existences which affect the characteristics encountered in other existences. In the third context of existence we experience *things* in the existence in which the color experienced in the first context of existence and the beauty experienced in the second are related to the entity experienced in the third as what is, what is beautiful, and what is colored.

At the beginning of this inquiry, I argued that assumptions about what is are involved in questions of starting-point, of distinctions, and of unities. In the course of examining what is, we have encountered these questions as distinct but related questions of principle. Our examination of the three questions may therefore be summarized in conclusions proposed concerning the relevance of consideration of what is to the determination of principles. I have argued, with respect to starting-points, that other starting-points are found in existence and being, in the encounters of experience and the formulations of statement, but that they present problems in their respective modes, and in the relations of that which is in the different modes, which can be treated only by starting with that which is. The facts of existence which are first in experience are understood last among the things conceived relative to principles of that which is, and therefore connections in being and identities in that which is are also experienced facts which take their place in the configurations of existence. What is stated first in knowledge or discursive exposition is connections of being which depend on principles of that which is; and therefore connections of principle in that which is and connections of occurrence in the data of experience are involved in the determination and use of categorial connections. What is conceived first is that which is, and the specification of what it is and the encounter of what actually is under determinate circumstances depend on that conception of what is. Questions about being and existence and about their starting-points are clarified when a starting-point is made in what is. The differences of what is are exhibited in statement, conception, and occurrence; and the differentiation of what is depends both on the possibility of distinguishing things by use of the same

concepts and of using different concepts to determine the same thing.

In the course of arguing for the importance of a metaphysics of that which is to provide a starting point, I have made distinctions which depend on the differences I have traced in the modes of that which is, but which are involved in complex controversies when those differences are ignored. The general modes of that which is provide criteria for differentiating things by means of distinct conceptions which are none the less applied to one and the same thing. The specific modes of that which is provide lines of connection in natural causes, moral responsibility, and literary plot which differentiate natures, characters, and persons by means of distinct statements which none the less continue a single line of connection. The circumstantial modes of that which is differentiate facts and occurrences by means of distinct circumstances which none the less are susceptible of more than one formulation. The problem of the universal has been a center of controversy in the history of thought when these three distinctions are collapsed into one question concerning whether universals are things, ideas, or words. The complexities of the positions that are developed in that controversy arise from the need to treat three problems as one—the problems of the uses of reciprocal terms with respect to what is, of universal terms with respect to being, and of common terms with respect to existence. Problems of universal and particular merge thus with problems of whole and part, of one and many, of reality and appearance or processes; and each of them, in turn, would be clarified by like distinctions.

These distinctions, in turn, are made within unities which become apparent in that which is. The basic distinction with which I began the examination of what is, was the distinction of knower, knowledge, and known, and the unity of what is appeared in those distinctions since I argued that what is cannot be isolated in the known but reveals its characteristics in the connections of knowledge and the conceptions of a knower. I sought a unity in the general modes of what is, against contentions that what is is rational and value-laden, or that it is physical and value-free, or that it is divided into separate realms of nature and value, cognition and emotion. Instead I argued for a broader use of the term "things"

to include things we say and things we seek as well as the things we know, which are unified by the principles which bring the true and the good to coincidence with what is. I sought a unity in the specific modes of what is, against intimations that the connections of being are found in the verified statements of science, or that they are indicated in the statement of persistent human aspirations and questions, or that they are expressed in the revelations and paradoxes of creative statement. Instead I have argued for a broader use of categories to include natural institutions affecting action and natural creations expressing value as well as natures moving and being moved, coming to be and developing, which are unified in theoretic, practical, and poetic formulations of the connections between knowledge, behavior, and art. I have sought a unity in the circumstantial modes of what is, against tendencies to reduce the patterns of existence to those based on sensible experience, or on imaginative projection, or on rational analysis, arguing instead that the probabilities of history, art, and science, are distinct, and that the existences in which they are traced are brought together in the common existence in which consideration of them occurs. Each of the terms of the distinctions used assumes perspectives of meaning, thus, from the unifying whole in which it is placed and each is defined by the others and by its relations to what is. Knowledge states a structure; it is found by the knower; it expresses the known; and all the additional differentiations—of thing, language, and value; of knower, doer, and maker; of sense, imagination, and reason—are pertinent to knowledge.

The treatment of principles in all three senses—as starting-points, as basic distinctions, and as foundations of unity—requires the investigation of what is. What is is the starting-point from which differentiations and identifications take their meaning and status. The distinctions of thing, essence, and fact as well as distinctions among entities, categories, and occurrences are distinctions of what is. The unities encountered recurrently among the diversities of what is relate, and provide the grounds for, both the distinctions of statement and conception and the separations of things, natures, and facts. That which is is conceived first by the understanding and provides principles for being and knowledge and for existence and experience.

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BASIC CATEGORIES AND ATTITUDES OF THE VALUE SITUATION

DE WITT PARKER *

HOWEVER IN THE END we may interpret them, values are not isolated from the general frame of our experience, or from the world in which we live. This may be asserted without fear of contradiction even on the part of those who would locate them in some supernatural, eternal realm; for, as possessing validity for us, and as the goal and reward of our striving, they must somehow fit into a universe of which we and they are members. And for those of us who believe that the values to which we in our world give allegiance could not possibly exist merely in another world, the sharing by these values of the general nature of the one universe becomes self-evident. Yet this truth finds scant recognition at this moment in the development of thought. Naturalistically-minded philosophers are no exception. For, on the one hand, the materialists among them assert that values are, as they call them, emergents, a new species of being whose categories contrast sharply with those of the physical world within which they strangely arise. For such thinkers, values are in the world, but not of it, in a way that suggests the supernaturalism which they claim to have outgrown. On the other hand, many psychologists and sociologists, including some philosophers, who place values in the context of the animal and social worlds, describing them in terms of the categories of these realms, fail to relate them to what is universally characteristic of all reality.

Now one of the aims of this treatise is to show that values are an essential factor in reality, and how therefore their most general traits are reflections of the pervasive characters of all being, so far

* This paper was Chapter I of an unfinished manuscript left by Parker in 1949, and is published now at the instance of Andrew J. Reck. The rest of the manuscript, except for one or two incomplete chapters, was published in 1957 under the title *The Philosophy of Value* by the University of Michigan Press—William K. Frankena.

as known to us. We shall not neglect the fine, individual nuances of values, but equally we shall try to reveal how they lie embedded in a more inclusive matrix. It will be the special topic of this chapter to establish and describe this matrix. In doing this, we shall be pursuing what may well be called a metaphysic or ontology of values.

The standpoint from which we shall start is that of experience. We adopt it because experience is certain and close at hand. Of many aspects of his experience, each person can be completely sure, and wherever we may finally locate them, values can be known to us only as they enter our experience, or may be inferred from our experience of them. So far, we do but follow the great insight of Descartes. There is, to be sure, much concerning our experience that we do not know, and we may not be very skillful in describing what we do know, but that experience is, and that it has certain characteristics, is indubitable. Some features of which we can be certain so far as they touch problems of value, we shall summarize in this chapter. By contrast, we are not so certain of the entities postulated in the physical sciences, or even in the biological sciences. We are sure that they are, that they have certain effects in our experience, and that we bear certain relations to them; but we are not certain of what they are like in themselves. We know that there are things which we denote by the term "electron," and we know their effects in our experience—a flash of color, a shift in a spectral line; but what it feels like to be an electron we do not know. Similarly, we know that there are what we call "endocrine glands," and we know that they cause a visual and tactile pattern in our experience, if we are anatomists dissecting them, as well as vaguer but no less real effects; but again what it feels like to be a gland—what a gland is for itself—we do not know. On the other hand, we do know what it feels like to be a human being: to be lonely, to be anxious, to be busy, to be both happy and unhappy, to love and to be loved. We are both sure that we are, and in large measure sure of what we are like. We shall never know that we are not, and however much we may change, we shall never be unaware of what our changed selves are, so long as we are capable of reflection.

Moreover, because of what is universal in man's situation in

his world, certain moods or attitudes are established in him. They are not inborn, and they do not belong to human nature as an entity by itself, but they do belong to it as belonging to a world such as ours. They grow up in him as he grows, and are there even when he is not reflectively aware of them. They are usually correlated with more than one of the basic facts to be studied in this chapter. They constitute a kind of *a priori* in man, not in the sense of being independent of experience, but in the sense of coming universally out of experience such as ours in such a world. These attitudes we shall record in connection with the basic facts with which they are connected.

1. The first universal fact which I wish to consider because of its crucial importance for values is the centricity of reality, including, of course, experience. By this is meant that reality is not an undivided, continuous, homogeneous mass, but is centered or knotted. With the qualifications to be noted, it has an atomistic structure. It is customary to express this truth, with regard to experience, by saying that there is no experience in general, but only such as is "mine" or "yours." Even the infant's or the animal's experience is centered, although neither knows, as man may know, that it is so. An atom's reality is also centered, for it, too, has its own standpoint which is not that of any other atom's. A child, an animal, an atom: these are not a single intermingling flux. Although the adult recognizes this truth, either explicitly or by implication (as when, for example, he says, "But my views are very different from yours," or "My feelings are not your feelings,") knowledge of it comes gradually, yet surely. As indicated, each person comes to know that he hears a sound that another does not hear, feels an impulse or a pain that another does not feel, remembers what no one else can remember, commits a deed and therefore bears the guilt of which another is innocent.

Furthermore, these various items, the sound, the impulse, the memory, the act, that are mine not yours, or yours not mine, are not just here with me rather than there with you, or there rather than here. The centricity of experience does not mean merely that what is in one place is not in another, say in one brain or organism instead of in another. It does not just mean that space is dotted over with different qualities, as the surface of a balloon may be

decorated here with red and there with blue or orange—a spotted world. That to be sure is true, but not the whole truth. The rest of the truth, unpictured in our image, is that the various items which are here and mine, not there and yours, are interwoven together in a peculiarly intimate fashion. This is the case despite the fact that they may have different causes: the sound has a different cause from the perfume that I smell or the pain that I feel, and may accordingly appear or disappear at different moments. In spite of this, the sound of the birds on my left, and the honk of the horn on my right, the pain in my head, and the shape of the seen leaf yonder, are all compresent and interpenetrated with what is usually called my “ego” or “identical self” (which we shall call the matrix self,) and but let me sleep soundly or die and they will all be abolished together. Centricity is unity as well as atomicity; it is awareness of experience as one in being mine, and in being mine as not being yours; and to be aware of this is loneliness.

2. The second character of experience to which I wish to call attention is its precariousness. This again is not anything that we could know independent of experience, but is something of which the knowledge comes inevitably and universally from experience and reflection; perhaps gradually, perhaps in a flash. By this I mean that what is personal in experience is the kind of thing that can be abolished, extinguished, without remainder. We do not learn this by noting the appearance or disappearance of items within experience, say the passage of a tone which we now hear, and now do not hear but only remember. Perhaps we might learn this lesson from such facts, but we do not because we think that what disappeared may again appear; hence was not really abolished. After all, if you strike the same key you may hear the same tone again. Even so, I do not learn the lesson by losing some treasure, a watch or a pocketbook, for that too may be recovered. All such things, tones, colors, perfumes, utensils, these are indeed precarious, but they are not utterly precarious, irretrievable. At the least a memory of them may be retained, and the universal which they illustrate may come again into experience. There is a difference between the disappearance from my experience and the disappearance of my experience. The world is dangerous because

in it I may lose everything; it is terrifying because I may lose myself. And only when face to face with the prospect of death do I realize that I myself may disappear. That is the difference between death and disaster: the latter is the loss of something that I love; the former is the loss of my love itself. Or the difference may be expressed in still another way: there are losses that I may experience—possessions, friends, good name, youth and happiness, but there is one loss that I shall never experience, the loss of myself, with the memories of the things that I have lost. Yet, although I cannot experience it, I can know that it will occur, and in knowing this I know terror.

Finally, I may learn the same lesson again when I watch a child fall asleep. I watch his eyes close and I know that he does not see; I watch his little limbs relax and I know that the varied and constant stream of his sensations of motion has stopped; I call his name and he does not answer, so I know that he does not hear me. On his face, just before he went to sleep, was a happy smile, which remains there for some time, but now is gone; the tiny gay soul is for the time being extinct. Of course I am not sad, for I know that he will awake; yet sometimes I am frightened, for a thought comes to me which I try to repress, that death is a sleep which even he, so young, cannot escape, and from which perhaps there is no awakening.

3. Closely related to the two attributes of experience just considered is a third, its privacy, its shut-in-ness. One way that we learn this is by telling others how we feel and by finding them surprised. We discover, too, that we can mislead them intentionally about our thoughts, motives, or plans. Or we try to communicate our sentiments to them, and they do not understand. In parallel fashion, we discover that their inner life is as deeply hidden from us as ours is from theirs. We can live a whole life with husband or wife without knowing, except with regard to superficial everyday matters, what is in their minds. And having learned that this is so, we can see how it must be so. Because of the centricity of experience, no two minds can quite cover each other; hence although each may learn much, it can never learn all about another. By an imaginative extrapolation from my own experience, or by means of a creative synthesis of its elements, I

can go far, but there will always remain a dark corner into which I cannot make ingress. With regard to it, I am like one who, while he can look over his garden wall into his neighbor's grounds, cannot be there amidst the shrubs and flowers.

Yet such is the complexity of experience that over against the three traits so far considered, there are two others, of roughly opposite character. The first of these is our fourth, sociability; the other is the conservation of experience.

4. The sociability of experience. The individual is indeed alone, but he is alone in the midst of others—a mitigation and at the same time an accentuation of his loneliness; the one because they are here with me, the other because I contrast myself with them, and wish to be closer to them than I can get. Beginning with Descartes, the debate has gone on and has not ended as to which is more fundamental, my loneliness or my sociability. If it were true, as Descartes is credited with having believed, that I am certain only of my own existence, the former would be primary, not only logically, but also emotionally. Because if I am only the least bit uncertain of the existence of other persons, that small doubt must haunt me and increase my loneliness. To some small degree also it will tend to diminish the value of all my undertakings in so far as they involve other persons, as almost all of them do. For why should I concern myself deeply with them, when perhaps they do not exist at all? Why pity them, help them or do my duty by them? Few philosophers, I believe, who have held that I can be certain only of my own experience have realized how catastrophic would be the implications of this belief.

The reason why they have not realized this is because they have never in fact seriously believed that they were alone in the world, or that there was the least doubt of the world's existence. As many have remarked, the doubt has been purely theoretical, a philosopher's pretense. It does not occur to anyone, except a philosopher, to entertain even for a moment such a doubt. Not that the absence of doubt on the part of ordinary folk is itself a sufficient proof of the existence of a not-self. For once such a doubt has been suggested, it must be treated with respect and a way found to eliminate it.

Two phases of the doubt concerning the existence of a not-

self must be distinguished: the more general matter of our existence in a world which contains us, and the more special matter of the existence of other persons in that world. But first some consideration of the question as to how the doubt arises. It arises I believe from two misconceptions of one's own self, the one materialistic and the other from the opposed standpoint. If we identify ourselves with our bodies conceived in the old-fashioned way of materialism, it is hard to see how we could be sure of an enclosing world. For according to that conception, each self is an encapsuled entity, like a pea in a pod, directly aware of only what is within its skin (or its brain, if the self is located there rather than in the whole body,) hence dependent upon ideas, never verifiable with any certainty, in order to get knowledge of what is occurring outside. In such a situation no pea in the pod could ever know for sure of the existence of the other peas. Exactly the same difficulty occurs if we conceive of the self in Cartesian fashion, not as a material but as a spiritual substance, equally encapsuled and separated from other things in the world. The truth, however, is the contrary. There is no sharp separation, either in a substance or by way of boundaries, between oneself and one's world. It is very evident that one shares in the tensions, the needs of the organism. My hunger is my body's hunger; my love is my body's love; and as I perceive the body I find it a part of the greater perceptual image of the world. I look around me; I see myself in the midst of the world: in the valley, in the woods, in my house or out among the mountains. This is no mere illusion. For this perceptual image is determined by controls with which I am in direct contact: I call them "countercontrols" because they limit the controls which I exert from within. When I hear a thunder clap I experience a shock which is the direct impact of the force in the external world which causes it, or when I press my finger against the table, the resistance felt is an experience in which the impulse to press is in contact with the impulse from without meeting and equalizing it. The existence of a more than ourselves enclosing us is no mere inference, therefore, but a datum. We are as certain of this "more" as we are of ourselves. Apart from this anchorage a world hypothesis is a mere wish dream of "animal faith." We must first know that a world is, before we can interpret it. And

who that has stood on the beach, watching the tide advance and hearing the boom of the incoming waves, or who at night that has felt the weight of the stars pressing upon him or listened to the stillness that is yet no real silence, hanging over a mountain lake, has not been certain that he was not alone, but in the presence of a vast uncomprehended drama, carried on by innumerable actors, of which his life is only a tiny episode?

The same assurance of the existence of centers of experience not ourselves arises in us when we find ourselves in the midst of a crowd of talking, gesticulating persons, or when (to use ordinary language) we "see" or converse with some intimate—friend or wife or child. For is not their joy given to me in their smiles, their sorrow in their tears, their thoughts in the words they say to me—a sorrow that is not mine, who am happy—or a joy not mine, for I am miserable, thoughts not mine, being far wiser and more learned than mine? When in my ignorance I ask a question, the answer comes to me, one that would have taken years for me to work out for myself, but which, behold! now flashes in upon me by way of sounds which I hear. Or it may happen in the other way: questions are asked of me, the answers of which I have long known, opinions are suggested childish and foolish, decades past outgrown by me. Am I then asking myself these questions, saying to myself these answers too wise or too foolish to be mine—how strange, how preposterous!

Yet the sceptical philosopher will not be so easily put off. He might say: "The person you suppose you see is only a visual phantasm in your own experience, the foolish questions asked are only iterations of questions you yourself asked as a child; the opinions you attribute to another and characterize as silly are, it is true, signs of a division within yourself, yet are yours nevertheless; and that wisdom that comes to you by way of sounds heard is yours, also. Have you never heard of regression to infantilism? Or of inspiration? Have you never found that ideas arise spontaneously, when you are expecting them least and working for them not at all? Be not so modest—you are far wiser, and also more foolish, than you know."

Whether this suggestion of the sceptic is flattering or not is hard to tell. On the one hand, to credit my ego with a creative

activity sufficient to account for all the works of genius that I know—to make of me a Newton, an Einstein, a Plato, a Shakespeare, a Sophocles, and a Rembrandt (and so many others) all in one, is a staggering compliment. But, on the other hand, what would become of my poor ego, so utterly divided against itself? Would there be any distinctive and integrated person that I could call myself? And do I not know which are my own views and sentiments, and which belong to others? Do I not even prefer to be my own distinctive if humble self, rather than the amorphous if magnificent monster you credit me with being? How lonely I should be in that magnificence! I am lonely enough as it is. Yet there is a basis in fact for the sceptic's thesis.

The basis is this. What I actually see or hear when I am listening to or looking at another person consists, as alleged, of visual and auditory structures within my own experience. They are, if you wish to call them such, phantasms of my own. Moreover, the feelings and ideas attached to them as their meanings are mine in the sense that they occur "in me," in my experience. When I read the wise man's book or hear him talk, the thoughts he utters are, as I receive them, as completely mine, in the sense indicated, as completely in me, as are my own poor ideas and opinions.

However, two equally evident facts are overlooked, which make scepticism impossible. One is that the new ideas I receive along with the word sounds I hear are as much externally determined as are the sounds themselves. Moreover, this external determination is as directly experienced in the case of the former as in the case of the latter. I experience the constraint, the shock of them, equally. What occurs then is the building up in my own mind of answers to the questions I ask by some existence external to myself, answers which I could not work out for myself, but which satisfy my intellectual needs. Other needs are satisfied in the same way. I need money, so I telegraph for it; after an interval there appears in my experience expressed in the seen words on a return telegram, the meaning "sending money immediately," whereupon, after performing certain acts, the money comes. The inference is inevitable that there is a being not myself which at once

understands my needs and also satisfies them. Such a being is another self.

The second point I wish to make is that there is nothing we know about mental processes rendering impossible the direct apprehension of another's feeling or meaning. Many persons do not see this for the reason already given: they locate the mind in a body and then, seeing two bodies, ask, "How can the gap between them be crossed?" Or, "How can one meaning be present in two places at once," as if a meaning were like a body! The answer is, that just as when I read something I wrote a year ago and still mean what I had then said, that is to say, my meaning is the same now as it was then (the same at two different moments of time), so the words you utter when you say to me "There is a cold war on" may have the same meaning for you that they have for me (the same in two parts of space). The conviction that when I converse with you, I may be in direct contact with your mind, may be no illusion.

The examination of the grounds for believing in other persons may seem to some readers out of place, but is, on the contrary, quite in place. For, as has already been stated, if there were even the slightest doubt as to the existence of other persons besides one-self, our sense of values would be profoundly affected. On the other hand, the certainty that we are in a world, which contains persons similar to, yet diverse from ourselves, who know us even as they are known by us, is itself crucial for values. It has the effect of mitigating the feelings that accompany the egocentricity of values—loneliness, precariousness and shut-in-ness. For, living in the presence of other persons, we realize that we are not utterly alone; that however precarious be our situation personally, there are powers sustaining us, by whom what we value may be conserved; and, although there is a citadel of the mind into which none can penetrate, the larger part of what we are can be understood by others. So, balancing fright, there is trust; balancing loneliness, there is companionship; balancing selfishness, there is love.

5. The conservation of experience is the opposite of its precariousness. We shall have to show how both are true of it, without contradiction. There are three modes of conservation of

experience, through memory, through the universal, and through the self.

Memory is the most obvious vehicle of conservation. Consider a flash of experience in somebody's mind, in mine, for example, say the scent of violets. Here it is now; then it disappears. But does it wholly disappear? *Prima facie* no; for I remember that I had it, and in remembering I seem to nullify its evanescence.

*Music when soft voices die
Vibrates in the memory;
Odors when sweet violets sicken
Live within the sense they quicken.*

Yet in what way are they; in what way can they be preserved? The first suggestion would be that they are preserved, as the poet supposes, as sensations, presumably in the form of what are usually called *images*. However, it is not strictly true that a sensation survives in the image that may supplant it. Although sometimes they are so much alike that I cannot tell which is which, in most cases I can distinguish them, and their difference has often been tabulated by psychologists: If one considers a more complex experience of sense than a perfume, this becomes entirely certain. Suppose instead of the memory of the scent of violets, I consider my recollection of the visual appearance of the house I used to live in as a child, as I saw it from the street. The image that attends this recollection lacks the vividness, the detail of the original; even when I try to make it clear and full, it remains confused and fragmentary. The image is a kind of substitute, or surrogate of the sensation, but does not preserve it, as such.

Nevertheless, in making this analysis, I have forgotten something, *myself*. The odor, or the visual appearance of my home, was not an abstract sensuous quality, but a factor or item in my experience. It was a perfume that I smelled, a visual panorama that I saw. And if I who am now remembering the one or the other did really smell it or see it, something at least has been conserved of the experience past—myself. For I was then when I smelled the odor of the violet and I am now at this moment when

I am remembering that I smelled it. I was a live factor in the total experience of smelling, and since I still exist now, something of the past experience was conserved—myself.

Any simple cases of memory, such as those I have been citing, are evidence of the conservation of myself in experience, but memory provides evidence in another way, also. For if memory is reliable at all—and who would doubt that it has some reliability?—when I remember any whole of experience as it was some time ago, and compare it with the present whole, I find that something was the same. For example, suppose I wake in the morning and compare my experience with what it was before I fell asleep—I will find that something has carried over from one to the other moment, namely, myself. Even apart from memory I can notice this. For let me watch any pulse of experience within which there is a coming and going of various items, as when I play the piano, striking one key and then another, and hearing one note and then another in the same “specious present.” In such a case also, I notice that something has remained constant, carried alongside of the rise and fall of the tones. And that something is, of course, once more—myself.

What the self is, I do not inquire here, since I shall undertake that later in this essay. But we can see right away how important the fact is that it is conserved. For unless it were, many of our most important values would be based on illusion. It has often been noticed that the negative value, guilt, would be illusory unless personal identity were real. Equally illusory would be the feeling of rightness: the feeling that I now did the thing that I should have done. But moral values are not the only ones that would be based on illusion if personal identity were a mistake; all the values of achievement, including notably the feeling of pride, would be in the same case, since they are based on the proposition that the plan *I* then had is fulfilled now in *my* experience. What would be the sense of Harry Truman's triumph if it were not true that the man who took the oath of office January 20, 1949, was the man who, against odds thought hopeless, waged his far-flung tour of speechmaking? Going even deeper perhaps into the roots of value, one might ask, “Why should I concern myself about the

future unless I am to be there when the future comes, instead of somebody else?"

We must, however, interpolate a caution. It would be a mistake to think that the values themselves would be, in a literal sense, illusory, either with the meaning of unreal or with the meaning of false. On the contrary, the feelings that we had would be the feelings that we had, as real as any feelings could be. And they would not be false, for only judgments are false, and they are not judgments. Yet since they are based on a judgment, namely the judgment that the self now is the same as the self that existed then, we could not have them if we knew that it was false. If we knew that personal identity was an illusion, we could never experience the values of pride and achievement or take any concern for our own welfare. That the Humean sceptic does experience them despite his theory that personal identity is non-existent is proof that he does not believe what he thinks he believes.

The third and last vehicle through which experience is conserved is the universal. There are numerous ways by means of which this can be illustrated. Suppose today I read the first line of Shakespeare's sonnet,

Shall I compare thee to a summer's day?

I have, of course, often read the sonnet before. Inevitably each time that I read it my experience is somewhat different, and yet I recognize it as being somehow the same, and not merely because of the sameness of myself. One reason why its sameness cannot be merely that, is because of the fact that you also read the sonnet and recognize the line as being the same line that I read. The sameness is between you and me, not merely between different states at different times within me; and it lies in the *content* of the experience of the poem rather than in the self that has this experience, a sameness in what the line means to me as of today and as I remember it as of yesterday; and between what it means to you and what it means to me. This kind of sameness is what we call a universal.

A simple and banal illustration may serve to demonstrate that this kind of sameness exists. Suppose that I am making out my income tax. I will make an original and a copy. On each will

appear a row of visual shapes designating the exemption of each of my children, like this ... \$600. Now despite the fact that there will be two such rows, one on each sheet, they will have a single meaning—six hundred dollars. They will have this one meaning when I re-read the sheets in order to correct any mistakes I may have made—the same meaning now that they had when I made them out—and the same meaning for the man in the tax office who reads and verifies them. Two rows of visual shapes, two experiences of my own in reading them; two experiences of the clerk, yet through all, *one* meaning. I am not saying that there exists a single meaning apart from the various experiences, but I am saying that there does exist one meaning *among* them. This oneness of meaning is a universal.

It is through the universal that the cultural treasure of a people is preserved, its treasure of law, tradition and art. The constitution of the United States has no existence apart from experience; neither has Shakespeare's *King Lear* or Beethoven's *Eroica*; but as universals they live on undying despite the manifold alterations in interpretations to which they are subject. Even such humble things as the chairs and tables in our homes have this kind of conserved existence. The blue of the tapestry that covers the chair in my study is never exactly the same in full quality as the sunlight shifts and the dyes change; yet as *blue* it remains invariant. Its texture despite all variations is still *soft* through the years. And, as has been noted, although our memory images, as whole individual facts, are not identical with the sensuous qualities which things had that we remember still, when I recall the taste of the quince I ate as a boy, there is an invariance of tang, a generic sameness, which is the partial justification for the conviction that memory is the survival of the past. Yet, let me repeat, not the past in its individual wholeness survives—if it did, there would be no passing away and all events would be eternal—but the universal in the past may survive. Perhaps that is not enough. Yet it is much—and it is all.

In our discussion so far we have used, or implied the use of, several pairs of basic notions, the recognition of which, as I shall try to show, is essential to a valid theory of values. These pairs are: activity-passivity; fulfillment-frustration; cooperation-con-

flict. About these cluster other, derived, but important concepts.

The first pair has had a distinguished, but checkered career in the history of philosophy. Aristotle viewed it as important enough to place it among his ten (sometimes eight) "categories." By the use of his illustration "to hit"—"to be hit" he showed how language gives these concepts significant recognition through the distinction between the active and the passive voice. For Aristotle what we now call "causation" is a "transaction" between active and passive elements or agents, as a result of which the form actually embodied in the active is imposed on the passive, where it is but potential. Thus the sculptor as active gives the form of Aphrodite to the clay, which is passive. While in the thought of Aristotle the contrast between active and passive was very important, for Leibniz, who owed much to the Greek master, both terms tend to be assimilated to each other as complementary species of activity, passivity becoming a kind of activity, namely reactivity. In the course of the empirical tradition following Hume, we find an effort to rid philosophy of both concepts, under the supposition that all one observes in a transaction are changing states or qualities in the parties to it, never activity, and if never activity, then never its correlate, passivity. More recently, in the philosophy of science, as pursued by the positivist Ernst Mach, the notion of activity has become, one might say, veritably tabu. Force, which had been understood to imply activity, was interpreted as a mere symbol in an equation, shorthand for mass multiplied by acceleration, as in the expression $f = ma$. And if activity appeared to be coming back into its own when the concept of energy began to dominate physical thinking, we were reminded that the equation $e = 1/2 mv^2$, shows that, like force, energy is a mere symbol for purely configurational spatial and temporal concepts, such as mass, velocity, and acceleration. The Einsteinian equation $E = mc^2$ where c is the velocity of light, would appear to confirm this view. The story in psychology has been similar to the story in physics. In general, activity is explained away as changing sensory configurations, especially those involving kinaesthetic material. And if the concept seems to be revived in the use of terms such as "drive," we are apt to discover that "drive" means "tissue tension," whereby the concept is shifted from the psychological to the physiological plane.

Here, however, it is not allowed to rest; for one is likely to be informed that "tension" means "energy gradient"; and how finally the story ends would seem, therefore, to depend on what we should do about the physical concept of energy.

However, history teaches that many concepts long attacked and thought to have been buried with due ceremony, possess a strange capacity for resurrection. This capacity rests on two foundations: first, intuitive certainty, and second, the playing of an important role in thought. I will now show that activity, and its correlate, passivity, possess both of these supports.

In order to demonstrate the intuitive character of the concept of activity, it is necessary to show that whatever is meant by "activity" is inseparable from whatever is meant by "drive." Consider the case of a man who takes a great deal of exercise or engages in many pursuits; such a man is called an "active" man; but when he becomes a sedentary invalid or "retires," we may say of him that he is "no longer active." But if we should suppose that he did the same things, only without interest or initiative, as an automaton, as a very highly complex machine, such as the electronic brain, we should no longer call him "active." Or, more simply, if someone moves my arm up and down, as in so-called passive exercise, I should not be said to be active. I would be called active only when such movements (changing postural configurations) express some impulse or desire within myself. Or consider another case: when in revery or dreaming, a flood of images streams through my consciousness, I may refer to myself as passive because there is no obvious control by plan or desire, as there is, for example, when I am trying to solve some pressing practical or theoretical problem. However, once I realize that even the revery is directed by a subconscious wish, I recognize that I was active, after all. The chief reason why modern thought has abandoned the concept of activity is the dehumanization of nature, a process which began with the Greek atomists and was carried to a conclusion by Descartes and his followers. When we do ascribe "activity" to natural events, as when a clinician reports "great activity" on the part of the cells of a microscopically examined tissue, we are reverting to a more primitive attitude to nature. This attitude is difficult to destroy with regard to bio-

logical events, because of their homogeneity with our own actions. In the eighteenth century an attempt was made to destroy it with regard to animals; it remained for certain behaviorists to complete the process by dehumanizing man himself.

The concept of activity, then, implies impulse in one or another of its multiple aspects. It implies also that impulse is determinative of changes, that alterations in sensory and physical configurations are under its control. That is what the concept of activity implies; but, of course, to define the concept is not to establish that it has any application. To prove that it does, we must show two things: first, that impulse is a fact, and second, that it is determinative of change. It turns out, however, that the two are one, for the reason that the experience of the determination of change is the same as the experience of impulse. For example, if I am walking from my home to my place of business, say the campus of my college, the experience of activity in the process is the experience that "I" am determining the sequence of events: that my various steps, the changes in the spatial relation of my body to other things, ending with my arrival, occur both as I plan and because I plan them. If someone carried me to my destination against my will, I should not have the experience of activity; on the other hand, if someone carried me there because I wanted to get there, I should have it. That we have such experiences is a fact; I at least have them.

The argument to prove that this intuition is a hoax is as follows: First, it is said that I really do not experience more than a sequence. When I raise my hand voluntarily my only experience is that certain visual and kinaesthetic sensations follow upon my resolve; nothing more. Second, it is said that my resolve cannot cause my sensations because, if I am paralyzed, I shall not get them, no matter how "hard" be my resolution. Other illustrations would serve to the same effect. Third, it may be alleged that my resolve itself is caused by factors outside myself. For example, if I am a child at school, my raising of my hand was caused by hearing my teacher tell me to do so. Fourth, it may be asserted that my entire experience is caused by various "tissue tensions" in my brain, sensori-motor tracts, and viscera. Fifth, it may be argued

that even these bodily events are not causally related, but simply simultaneous or sequential.

As to Point One, there is, I should claim, a clear difference between the experience of a movement exercised by me, willed by me, and one that takes place when I passively submit to it. And in general, I have no difficulty in distinguishing between happenings that occur *as* I do or do not want them, without my own intervention, and similar happenings that take place *because* I want them. In the latter cases, I experience my own initiative and direction of the events. In moral matters, I know well what I am responsible for and what I am not responsible for; with regard to what acts I feel guilty and with regard to which I feel innocent. The experience of being a cause is as clear and certain as that of blue or fragrant. Point Two proves no more than that in order for certain events to happen many causes are necessary; it does not disprove the fact that I am one. Point Three. Even if it be true that activities have causes, as I should suppose was certain, it does not follow that they themselves are not causes. If you ask me to raise my hand and I do so, you are part cause of my wishing to since I desired to please you and should not have acted otherwise, but in consenting, I am a cause as well as you. The only situation where the causality of my wish would be cancelled, would be one where its individuality was entirely lost, when *you* would act, not I, as sometimes seems to happen in hypnotism. But in voluntary action there is no evidence that this is the case—even when I do something under the suggestion of your request, what I do carries the stamp of my individuality. And in general, the whole life of the mind has its conditions, but, given that it exists under these conditions, it exerts its own characteristic impact on the world. Point Four, as stated, is somewhat ambiguous. If it means only that my impulses have bodily conditions, it has already been disposed of in the discussion of Point Three; but if it means that desires are mere "epiphenomena," pale shadows of "tissue tensions," which are the real causes, something new is asserted to which the answer is that it is no scientific fact and has no basis other than a predilection for metaphysical materialism.

It thus becomes unavoidable to come to terms with the materialistic hypothesis. But before proceeding with the discussion,

I wish to re-iterate that there can be no question of the dependence of the mind on the body, or for that matter, on the physical environment of which the body is a part; no sane man, least of all myself, who has placed the precariousness of human values in such emphasis, could deny this. It is obvious that without the "consent," so to speak, of the physiological and physical context, they cannot be at all. What we are disputing is that, given these conditions, human impulses, plans and purposes are not in their own right factors in the determination of the course of events. I am asserting no more for impulse than I would for the body; the latter, too, has its conditions of existence, such as food, heat and air, without which it could not exist; yet it is admittedly determinative of events.

With so much clearly understood, we may proceed with our argument. The thesis we are considering, let us remind ourselves, is that "tissue tensions" in the viscera or the brain or other parts of the body, are effective in our conduct, not, as seems *prima facie* to be true, our desires. The first step in the debate is to try to determine what is meant, what can be meant, by a "tissue tension"? Now in order to understand the meaning of "tissue tension" we must obviously try to understand the meaning of "tissue." What is a tissue? Say the brain or the stomach? It cannot be what is given to sight or to touch when an anatomist or surgeon lays the tissue bare with a knife. In such a situation only certain visual or perhaps tactual configurations in one's own experience are given. Now these configurations could hardly be the determinants of one's whole experience, for they exist only under the special, transitory conditions specified, namely when the surgeon or the anatomist operates! On the other hand, a tissue may very well be the entities, whatever they are, which control configurations of this kind, and presumably exist even when not observed. But, I ask, does the psychologist or physiologist know what these entities are like? He knows that they exist, but not their intrinsic character. But may it not be true that the entities at (or in) the brain are the very impulses we experience, which according to his own account, are also located in the brain? Intuitively, these are not *under* control; they are *in* control. Of course, they are but some of a vast system of interacting controls covering the entire region of reality we call

the body—muscles, glands, viscera and the rest. There is no absoluteness of control by personal impulse; rather an autonomous sharing of control with a pattern. In sum, a "tissue tension" is such a pattern.

Finally, with regard to the last point, that even events in the body are not causally, but only sequentially interrelated, the first and obvious comment would be that, if it were true, nonsense would be made of the alleged dependence of the mind on the body; for the whole concept of dependence would be eliminated. But to abandon this concept is impossible for two reasons: first, our intuition of control and therefore of dependence, amply illustrated; and second, because if it were true, prediction, even mere probable prediction, would become impossible. For the underlying assumption of probable prediction, namely, that if an event has happened, it is likely to happen again, has no meaning unless it binds the future by being the sign of a "force for" that kind of occurrence. Otherwise, the second occurrence of the event would be completely independent of the first, and as likely not to happen as to happen.¹

Since most of the difficult problems concerning the pair, activity-passivity, have been treated in the discussion of its first member, the second member will not require detailed examination. We must begin by noting that the two always go together, and are correlative sides of a single process. Every activity confronts another activity, which either opposes it or cooperates with it—obstacle or aid—and in either case is passive, no matter how victorious, in its relation to the other. Control implies counter-control overcome; impulse, repulse. In the discussion earlier in this chapter, I have shown how this fact is the basis of our certainty of the existence of a world that includes us. In our perceptual experience we feel ourselves under constraint, passive, as undergoing stimulation; and our passivity is correlated with the activity of some entity. But we are never wholly passive even then, for as

¹ This way of stating the situation is confirmed by the so-called laws of chance, where each new event, say a throw of the dice, is assumed to be independent of preceding throws, and therefore unpredictable. Nevertheless we are able to make predictions regarding a *class* of such events which shows that the whole series is somehow bound together. But to prove this would take us beyond the scope of this chapter.

attentive and judging, we are active. In perceiving a rose, I am active in being attentive to it and in recognizing (judging) it to be a rose, but passive as receiving visual stimulations. In action, as distinguished from perception, we are active in driving forward, but passive in so far as we are helped or obstructed.

The activities which we identify as ourselves are under counter-control on three levels. The first is the countercontrol from within the region which we call the body. Both the qualities of our perceptual experience and our "bodily" desires are obviously under such control. The sound quality of our hearing is dependent on the controls active in that region of the brain we call the auditory tract; the desire for food is dependent on the activities located in the region we call the stomach. But the bodily region is itself under the control of the system of activities we call the physical world, and, in so far as this is the case, our experience is subject, indirectly, to its control also. The sound quality of our experience is dependent not only on the auditory region, but also on vibrations in the air; our hunger not only on the stomach, but on the chemical imbalance caused by the loss of certain chemical agents in the body, which is corrected when we eat. So far as we know, the physical world impinges on us only by way of the body. Finally, our own activities are also affected by other human activities, as when someone speaks to us. But (again, so far as we know) such determination is by way of the organism and the physical system. If we picture our own activities as being "on top," and so "highest" in this sense, which implies no evaluation of any sort, then it is clear that they are determined by a "lower" biological level (again, lower in this sense only) which in turn is determined by a "lowest" level—the physical system.

However, although determination of an upper by a lower level is absolute in the sense that, without the lower, the higher cannot, so far as we know, exist at all; nevertheless, not all that occurs on the higher can be explained through the lower. Living processes cannot be reduced to physical processes, nor can personal processes be reduced to somatic processes. One may use the analogy of a football game. Football cannot be played without a ball, a field, and goal posts, but these do not determine the details of the course of a game—the strategy of the plays, say, or which side will be

victorious. We must grant all that has been claimed for our dependence on glands, enzymes, food and vitamins, the sense organs and the effector nervous system, but no one has yet reduced the most important mental activities such as reasoning, decision, artistic creation and appreciation, initiative and the "moral sense" to these factors, or explained them completely in their terms. Even the simplest qualities of sensation cannot be reduced to their physical correlates and causes. There is, therefore, a certain autonomy of process on the higher level as well as a measure of causal efficacy from the higher to the lower. To think otherwise is a sign, not of scientific enlightenment, but of dogmatism.

Yet we must not for a moment think of these levels, or of any system on any level, as being isolated. The organism is immersed in the wide sea of the physical world. Its materials are the same chemical elements to be found in that world. That same sea flows over into the body's spatial confines; the air in our lungs is the same air outside; the electric currents that course down our nerves and muscles are the same. And, as we have taken pains to show, the psyche is not encapsuled, but dwells in symbiosis with the body.

Our theory of value cannot, however, be fully stated or understood without some further exposition of the view we adopt concerning the relation of the mind to the body. We have already emphasized their mutual dependence. But the relation is more intimate than that. We can best describe it, I believe, by the use of the word "sympathy." If I have a pain in the stomach, my pain is symptomatic of something wrong there; it is an "echo" of that wrong. If I am hungry, there is a tension there which is mirrored, in a rather literal sense, in my drive for food. If I am afraid my whole body vibrates in unison with my fear. If, on the other hand, I feel well, that feeling is a reflection of bodily equilibrium. The pleasure I feel in a soft blue is the echo of the eyes' adaptation to a certain kind of vibration rate. In certain areas of the brain, it may well be the case, as we have hinted, that sympathy becomes identity. One thing at least is clear, that when we speak of "bodily" values we are expressing ourselves with a certain literalness. Moreover, the body is no mere instrument of the mind, but its companion. To feed the

body is to feed its mind; to love the body is to love oneself, and in loving the body of the beloved we love her, too; and in loving her, we love her body. We have all known these facts, but certain philosophers, the Cartesians and the materialists being the worst, are loath to admit them.

Our next two pairs of basic concepts are fulfillment—frustration, and cooperation—opposition. These must be considered together, for the first members of each pair are interdependent. Obviously, one of two things may happen to an impulse: it may be assuaged or it may be frustrated. The process of assuagement is essentially value; the process of frustration is essentially evil. The full analysis of these processes will be given later; here I wish simply to note them as basic in experience, and to place them in the context of our other categories. It will readily be admitted that not only may an impulse be either assuaged or frustrated, but that it must be; there is no possibility of a kind of intermediate status. It can, of course, wait, biding its time for favorable circumstances; but if it waits too long it ends up in frustration. It may, moreover, be only partially realized, but that is still realization. Fulfillment and frustration are modes of impulse. It is notable that they are strictly categories of experience; they cannot apply to anything else. If there are any purely material forces or events, they are not subject to frustration or fulfillment. If a stone starts rolling down hill and one blocks its descent, it is not frustrated; if one removes the block and it continues its descent, it is not fulfilled. It is our expectation and wish that is now frustrated, then fulfilled. Only if, in some large sense (which I shall later maintain to be true), our tendency to objectify our expectations and wishes is more than a poetic fallacy, would these categories have universal application. It follows that there is no behavioristic equivalent of frustration and fulfillment. I may observe what I call the behavior of another person, noting that it appears to be successful or unsuccessful; but if by behavior I mean strictly what shows to the senses—changing visual configurations—although fulfillment and frustration may be suggested, they are not present there. Behavior becomes a sign of these modes of activity; but is not equivalent to them. This fact follows

immediately from our discussion of activity. If activity is present in experience only, its modes cannot be present elsewhere.

The basic facts of cooperation and conflict are learned very early in the life of the individual. The infant is not long in discovering that the assuagement of his hunger and thirst, and the relief of elemental kinds of distress depend upon the cooperation of someone else. There is even a kind of cooperation between the forces residing in such things as bottles and candy, and his wishes; and this, too, is soon discovered. Another discovery is that there must be cooperation between various parts of his body if his purposes are to be fulfilled, as between his hand and his mouth, which is not always forthcoming, as when mama ties his hand. Such experiences easily lead to the generalization that if any impulse is to succeed, there must be cooperation with other impulses. The existence of the good at any stage, or in any area, of the individual's existence, is impossible without collaboration among the activities of the body, between persons, and between persons and physical forces. The body itself, without whose integrity no value (so far as we know) is possible for man, is a shining example of forces working together among themselves, and with those of the environment. The man who makes a tool increases this cooperation with the environment; and all the changes effected by man on the earth's landscape, in mining coal, planting, sowing, and reaping, building houses and harbors, and the like, have this end in view. Taking advantage of the harmony already established between the organism and its environment, which is the condition of man's coming to be at all, the work of civilization consists in maintaining this initial advantage, and then pushing it farther and farther.

No less early the individual learns the basic fact of conflict. And he learns it, ironically enough, from the same sources that teach him the fact of cooperation. When he is ill or lame, his very limbs, instead of cooperating, may be in opposition to his purposes; the mother or nurse who usually helps him to have his way, may now and then oppose his wishes relentlessly; they may even, adding insult to injury, after putting obstacles in his path, punish him for surmounting them, as when, having bravely climbed up on to the high shelf, he has victoriously eaten of the forbidden sweetmeat. As he grows older, he discovers that his companions will

play against him as well as with him. As a result of such experiences, confirmed daily in his adult world, he comes to divide all things into three classes, friends, enemies and neutrals—those who cooperate, those who oppose, and those who are indifferent. Among those who are near him, he is not quite sure whether there are any neutrals; hence he is apt to say, "Those who are not for me are against me." In this he is perhaps right, from a strict philosophical standpoint; for the existence of neutrals rests on the doubtful supposition that there are genuinely parallel lines of force in the universe, never crossing one's path, to reinforce or to oppose. Yet, for all practical purposes, as we say, for the purposes of our finite lives in our finite time and place, there are such parallel lives, true neutrals.

On first view, cooperation and assuagement go together, and frustration and opposition. The child greets the former with smiles and love; the other, with tears and rage. Yet he learns in time that this conjunction is not always a fact. The opposition of nurse and mother, and even their punishments, may conduce to his eventual good; and not all opposition ends in frustration. Opposition can be overcome, and when this occurs, there may be new satisfactions added to those which have their source in the original drive—satisfactions in the feeling of power and the exercise of wit. Opponents may even be transformed into allies. On the other hand, the friends who encourage us in disastrous enterprises may turn out to have been our worst enemies. The revaluation of assistance and opposition is the end, if not the beginning of wisdom. Yet the distinction remains.

Evolution and Devolution. This pair is another that is obviously tied to fulfillment-frustration. One might indeed be tempted to identify evolution with fulfillment and devolution with frustration. Assuagement is itself a kind of evolution of an impulse from plan to fulfillment; and frustration is a kind of devolution from plan to disaster. And it has been proved over and over again that all talk of evolution and devolution apart from purpose is nonsense. Yet no such simple identification is possible, for more is implied. The missing concept is that of growth. A desire does not necessarily grow by being assuaged, nor does it necessarily deteriorate by being frustrated. But a plant or a child grows;

and so seemingly, does a man or a culture. Growth is one of the easiest things to recognize when it occurs, but one of the hardest to define. In the biological realm, no one can fail to recognize growth in the usual changes that occur in the plant from seed to flower, or in the child from fertilization of the egg to birth; and, when the biologic and the psychic are obviously in intimate connection, in the transformations taking place from babyhood to boyhood or girlhood. With regard to cultures, we are more faltering. Was the sculpture of the Periclean age progress or decline in relation to the archaic? Renaissance in relation to medieval painting; Stravinsky or Hindemith in comparison with Bach or Mozart; Victorian as compared with Elizabethan England? the New England of 1900 as compared with that of 1850? Here there is room for differences of opinion; and one will answer affirmatively, while another will answer negatively. It is more difficult to decide when the subject matter is whole periods, as in the case of the last two of our question; for we feel that there may be progress during a single epoch in one field, but decline in another. Yet sometimes, both with respect to single aspects of culture and also with respect to entire cultures, few will hesitate to give an answer one way or another. If we compare the Greek culture of the Periclean age with that of the Alexandrian age; or Viennese culture today with that of 1890-1910; or the Italian culture of the Renaissance with that of 1700-1800; or if you prefer, Italian painting of 1400-1500 with that of the same period, the answer seems indubitable.

Yet although I, for one, would not claim that I knew all the marks of growth, the following seem incontestable: differentiation and integration, without loss however of initiative or spontaneity, in some direction or directions which fulfill desire or purpose. Devolution, on the other hand, is characterised by a return to uniformity or chaos, accompanied by listlessness or the frustration of purposes. We must have the fulfillment of purpose to make evolution a value, and frustration to make devolution an evil. In postulating an ideal, we lay open the possibility of disagreement as to whether there is or is not evolution, for the ideal may be one which you adopt and I renounce. The same changing situation may, therefore, if complex, be regarded as evolution from the point of view of one ideal, and devolution from another. Few Catholics

would deny that Western civilization has progressed from the standpoint of industrial efficiency and science, yet from the religious standpoint, they would judge that there had been decline. On the other hand, few would deny that the normal growth of the child is evolution, for most everyone would wish for the child increasing complexity of experience, along with increasing integration and initiative.

Without a certain caution this definition of evolution would be very misleading: it must be emphasized that throughout we are thinking of an evolution of *experience*, an increased complexity and integration of wishes, involving an increase in sensitiveness to the environment, together with an organization of that sensitiveness; in other words, an increased awareness of one's world and concern with it. No mere mechanism, no supposedly mechanical or unconscious system, can show this. We do speak of the evolution of a machine, say, of the sewing machine or steam engine, but without meaning, except in so far as, first, they serve a purpose increasingly well, and in so far as, second, we feel ourselves into the mechanism, interpreting it as increasingly responsive to those elements of the environment which intensify and stabilize its power. The growth of the child is not a mere multiplication and systematization of elements as such, but of responses—interested awarenesses of the world.

The question as to whether the world as a whole is evolving or deteriorating belongs to our final chapter. But there can be no question that among its parts some are evolving, some deteriorating; the growing child is evolving, the senile old man and the regimented society are deteriorating; for in the first there is increasing responsiveness and organization, along with increasing initiative and fulfillment of purposes, both the child's himself and the parents'; while in the case of the second, responsiveness and organization are declining along with a gradual unfitness for the purposes of relatives and companions, and even of one's own, so far as one is still conscious of them; and in the last, even though the purposes of dictators are being fulfilled and organization becomes solid, there is a wide decline of initiative and responsiveness. Evolution depends on the increase of all three facets, res-

ponsiveness, organization and initiative, along with the realization of desire.

Our next concern will be with the ways in which values are intertwined with two of the most pervasive facts of our world, time and space. We have just discerned how values are involved in time in being involved in evolution; but that they are more directly and intimately temporal can be seen even before any definition of them has been decided upon. For, whatever be their nature, they are things which we wish to create; they are, as we shall see, *events*; or, even though they be in some sense eternal, they have to be copied or realized in this, our world and, having been created or realized, may be lost, threatened or destroyed; objects for defense or preservation, of hope or fear. But if these assertions about values are true—and who could deny that they are?—then they are tied in with the fundamental time facts, coming to be, passing away, and conservation. Creation of value (or if you prefer, realization in the human world) is coming to be of value; something that never was before, now flashing into existence: the new enjoyment, the new work of art, the heroic deed, the moral choice. On the other hand, values are precarious; they may pass away, fade out of existence, depart or be lost; but equally, they can be defended or preserved.

These are the fundamental time facts as related to value, but there are others. Values are things for which we wait: the victory painfully striven for, the prize carefully trained for, the wedding ardently looked forward to—value and anticipation hand in hand. But the anticipated is the future; phenomenologically, they are identical. Take anticipation from the world, and time would be but a series of presents, each as it came to be, supplanting and destroying its predecessor, the child devouring its parents. And also, values are things which, having lost, we remember, and remembering, mourn for or delight in recalling, or perhaps guiltily regret. Every value, we shall show, has not only its anticipatory, but also its memorial phase, as it lingers or is recalled. Thus, values are tied in with what we call the past; for the past is what we remember, or might remember.

Nevertheless, if much of value is in memory and anticipation, not all of it is there. Decision, the choice between alternatives

the realization of purpose then decided upon—anticipation turned into fact, the tingle of satisfaction itself: here also is value, which is neither past nor future, but belongs to what we call the present. In a narrow sense, the present *is* the decision in making, the plan in formation, the satisfaction being had. But it is wrong to speak of past, present, and future as *if* reality had these three parts of equal status; for the fact is that in the broad sense only the present is real, since the present contains within itself the past as the remembered and the future as the anticipated. Except as echoed in the present, the past does not exist; and except as pre-figured in the present, the future does not exist. The present and the existence are the same. But the present is big and rich, carrying with it, like a young pregnant woman, hope and fear, the reality of the future, the child not born but to be born; and, like an old barren woman, memories of the dead, the reality of the past. Time is nothing by itself just because it is everything; and when realization, anticipation, and memory are gone, everything is gone; so then time is gone.

"But," someone will object, "what you have been describing is personal time; cosmic or impersonal time still rolls on even when all that you have identified with it is lost in the death or deep unconsciousness of the individual." But just that, I would answer, is dogma or illusion. What is called cosmic time consists of the histories of other individuals still enduring while ours have burned out, with which imaginatively we identify ourselves. Time will last as long as such lives last, no longer. The conviction that most people have of an unending time is the same as the belief that there will be ever new lives springing into being as their forbears disappear, or the belief in an eternal being, God. No impersonal, but only an other-personal time exists.

There is another way in which value is deeply involved in time. "A bird in the hand is worth two in a bush," we say, partly because the one in the hand is certain, since we possess it, while the other has the uncertainty belonging to all future, contingent events; but also because there is some frustration, hence evil, involved in waiting. To be sure, this evil is compensated, and sometimes partly overcome by, the joy of anticipation, the two fighting against each other for mastery of the mind. Sometimes, more-

over, we do not want a thing right away, either because, being unripe for it, we could not enjoy it as much as we could later, or because its coming now would interfere with other pursuits (as when a young man wishes to postpone marriage); yet, in itself, there is always some disadvantage attached to waiting. The longer we have to wait, the greater it is, for uncertainty is deepened as the desired event recedes, since we may not be here to enjoy it, and even if we are, something may intervene to prevent its happening. Hence the breathless urgency of love, and all high undertakings,

*Come and kiss me, sweet and twenty,
Life's a stuff that won't endure.*

and our habitual haste to get things done. We will even pay in order to rid ourselves of the uncertainty and frustration involved in waiting, as when we discount a loan; and, as this same procedure illustrates, we expect to be paid for our willingness to wait. Evil, on the contrary, we wish to postpone as long as possible, because the longer we wait the more uncertain it becomes. Besides, since every event has consequences, if the evil event comes now, it might prevent enjoyments expected soon; therefore, the more of these we can have meanwhile, the better for us. This last consideration has especial weight when the evil is regarded as inevitable. That is the reason why we wish to postpone death; if it comes soon, all that we hoped for will be made impossible. The young do not fear death in old age because everything they want can come along before it happens. When the old do not fear it, they have nothing to look forward to or are resigned to the inevitable. When, on the contrary, we wish a lesser threatened evil to come soon, we desire to be rid of our fear of it, so that we may pass the rest of our lives in peace.

There is another aspect of time which, as we shall see, is important for value—duration, the longer or shorter lastingness of things. There is an old tradition to the effect that the longer a thing lasts the better, provided, of course, that it is good. We desire long life, permanence of possessions and affections, other things being equal. Few facts are more often lamented than the brevity of life. On the other hand, we prefer that waiting should

be short rather than long, and in general, that any evil should be brief. Yet it is difficult to disentangle duration from other aspects of being and define it. Of one truth regarding it, however, we may be sure; it is nothing by itself, no existence. Were there nothing, there would be no duration. In a sense, to be is to endure, yet by duration we must mean something other than mere being, since duration is measurable. We measure it in the following way: One event is longer than another if both begin together, but the latter ends before the former ends; or if the beginning of the latter is after the beginning of the former, and its terminus is earlier. The measure of the duration of anything is then the number of events that rise and fall between its appearance and its disappearance. Thus, to say that a man's life endures for seventy years is the same as to say that seventy times three hundred sixty-five revolutions of the earth on its axis occurred between his birth and his death. This method also enables us to determine the relative duration of things when one ends before the other begins as in the case of a father whose death precedes the birth of his son. So measured, the son's span of life may be greater than his father's. The seasons, day and night, the waxing and waning of the moon, the sundial, and now the clock, tomorrow perhaps the vibrating atom—all are ways of counting events that rise and fall between the beginning and the ending of something valued: how intertwined they are with our moods, sadness and haste, anxiety and relief!

Space. If value is mixed with time, it must be mixed with space as well, for time and space are themselves intermixed, as is universally recognized today. The effect of the mixture with space is very similar to the effect of its amalgamation with time; indeed, as we shall see, they are in some ways indistinguishable. There are three basic features of space: location or position (what Aristotle called place), distance, and order. None of these features is independent of things; hence space is no reality on its own account. Despite the authority of Kant, you cannot take away the world without taking away space with it. Thus, the place where one is is identical with one's neighborhood, and neighborhood is indistinguishable from neighbors. Difference in place is difference in the neighbors one has. For me to be in Ann Arbor and not in New York is the same as to have as neighbors certain people

(Sellars, Frankena, Stevenson, Langford, Burks, Copi), but not to have others (Edman, Randall, Schneider, Montague, Tillich, Nagel), Mason Hall rather than Philosophy Hall. Motion is exchange of neighbors. There just is no identifiable place as Ann Arbor or New York except as a set of neighbors or as neighborhoods. And what does it mean to have a neighbor? It means to come under his influence sooner, and without so many intermediaries, as under the influence of others. My neighbors are the people I can see and hear and talk with *now*; those who are not my neighbors are those whom I have to wait to see and hear and talk with. My close neighbors are obviously those who live in the same house with me, brothers and sisters, father and mother, my wife and my children; or the girl across the street or the boy next door; my house itself or my garden. My very nearest neighbor is my own body.

We see now how important for values place is; for, generally speaking, we take our values from our neighbors, especially our neighbors in childhood. To be born in and to grow up in Ann Arbor rather than in Cambridge, England, is inevitably to be a different kind of person, with different preferences. In large measure, the place makes the man. At the start, we are all provincials. The people and the physical elements that "get there first" with us, are the most decisive for us; no one can entirely escape the limitations of place.

As is clear from this account, place and distance are not separate features of reality. For our neighbors, who constitute our place, are at minimal distances from us. Yet we cannot *define* place wholly in terms of distance, for place is always individual, and its individuality, being constituted by the individuals who compose it, will contrast with that of other places constituted by different individuals. Far from being "the principle of individuation," one place is distinguishable from another only through the beings which, as we say, are there; two "empty" places could not be distinguishable at all. Yet it would not be quite true to say that beings by themselves make up a place, since, as we have seen, distance also enters into its definition. It enters in another way besides the one already indicated; for a place is definable not only through the beings that are at minimal distances from each other,

but also in terms of their distances from other places, or from certain other places. The neighbors at Ann Arbor are at a certain distance from the neighbors at Cambridge, Mass., or at Cambridge, England; and at a further distance from neighbors at Moscow or Canton. These facts enter into the definition of the place in question. And to be at a certain distance from other things means 1) that time and effort will be required to get into their neighborhood; and 2) that, other things being equal, the greater the distance, the greater the time and energy. In fact, so close is the correlation here, that distance is indistinguishable from these two factors, taken together.

With this definition of distance in mind, we can understand its significance for values. Distance has the effect of a screen or a wall. It makes the beings at a distance relatively inaccessible to us; or accessible only after others are accessible. They cannot be first in our lives, as our neighbors are; hence any influence they have on us must be strained through that of our neighbors. When we travel to other places, we have to start from our own place, which is, therefore, the base upon which any later structure of values has to be built. Finally, since distance is reducible to duration times effort, distance has the same impact upon values as duration. Contact with things far away takes time, hence any value that may result from this contact has to be waited for, with the frustration consequent upon waiting. One thinks of the lover hastening to a distant rendez-vous; he will have to wait for his beloved as long as if, living in her neighborhood, she had fixed the date of their meeting some days ahead! Distance spells separation in time between desire and fulfillment; therefore, longing and ecstasy are deferred. Again we see how distance has the effect of a wall or screen that has to be surmounted.

The significance of what has just been written is complicated by the third fact noted concerning space, betweenness. All places are arranged with reference to each other in an order of such a character that any one of them, say B, is between two others, A and C, which means that, by way of some route one must pass through B; and among such routes, one is the shortest. Thus by train travel over the Michigan Central Railroad from Detroit to Ann Arbor, one must pass through Ypsilanti; Ypsilanti is "between"

Ann Arbor and Detroit. Space consists of such routes of travel between neighborhoods, some of them shortest, that is to say quickest, routes (straight lines), in terms of a definite means of locomotion; upon these routes all places are arrayed. Or, instead of routes of travel, one may state the same facts in terms of routes of communications: if B lies between A and C, then in order to communicate with C, the message must be relayed through B. Light is not only the fastest means of travel, but also the swiftest means of communication; hence what we call space may be conceived of as a vast network of routes of communication by way of light. Communication is, of course, one kind of travel.

It follows that in travelling, one has to undergo the influence of the intermediary neighborhoods through which one passes. On arriving at one's destination, one is a changed man. It also means that one may never arrive, or that the value one anticipates may never be realized, because intervening events may destroy oneself or prevent what one wishes to happen. We notice again that distance has the same impact upon values as time interval: it renders them precarious. The same effect exists if distance is read in terms of communication instead of travel, in the ordinary sense. If I wish to communicate with my distant friend, I may telephone, but between him and me are the telephone, and the telephone wires; I may also telegraph, when the intermediaries will be the clerk at this end, the telegraph wires, the clerk at the other end, and the messenger boy. Now something may go wrong with anyone of these and my message may never be delivered.

Other interesting consequences follow from the suggested theory of space. One of them is what might be called the relative mixture of localities. It is clear that if distance is in relation to means of travel or communication, places which by one method would be far apart may be near, by another, so that with respect to certain features of a locality, we may be actually *there* while we are *here*. Thus, if a friend telephones me from Paris, I can hear his voice as effectively as if he were in the room with me; and, if he is a customer of mine, I can close a deal with him "on the spot." Our transaction will come before, and have all the advantages belonging to priority over, the deal that someone else might make who lives a few blocks away but whose telephone is out of order.

With reference to the purpose in hand, I am nearer my prospect than my competitor is. To be sure, this mingling of localities does not touch all features of them. The lover in Boston can hear the beloved's voice in Paris, but cannot embrace her; with regard to that activity and that value, she is still far away. Books are a wonderful means of bringing places together. Kant remained for years in Königsberg, but through the medium of books was constantly "in touch" (how accurate the vernacular sometimes is!) with the thoughts of scholars in the remote capitals of his age. Still, although it is metaphysically true (which means literally true), that our world is shrinking owing to rapid methods of communication and travel, it must be emphasized that, so far as we know, it has shrunk only with regard to certain aspects. For example, there has been no known shrinkage between a man's right and his left hand, or between his foot and his brain. But if, in all respects at once, the distance between localities should shrink, it is questionable whether there would be any shrinkage at all. Only differential shrinkage is meaningful.

One final pair of basic features of reality must be given consideration—freedom and determinism. Some study of this contrast has already been given by implication in our discussion of activity and passivity, and the relation of the mind to the body. We showed that the mind, although partially determined, both as to its existence and its nature by the body and the environment, was nevertheless itself a cause, moulding in its turn both the body and the environment. It follows that in some sense or senses both freedom and determinism are true. It remains for us to discuss more precisely the share of each, and to indicate the impact on values.

We shall find it advantageous if we depart from our usual procedure of trying to establish the facts and then considering their impact on values, if we reverse the order of discussion.

Since Kant, the larger tradition in ethics has assumed that moral values in the strictest sense are meaningless unless freedom is a fact. It is nonsensical, Kant held, to tell a man that he ought to perform an act unless he can perform it, and if his conduct is determined, not by himself, but by his past, or by factors external to himself, in his own "environment." Meaningless also would

be any feeling of guilt he might have for his failure to perform a right act, or for his performance of a wrong act; and meaningless as well any sense of rectitude for the performance of right acts. How pointless to say to the drunkard, "You should not drink," when it is impossible for him to stop drinking! And if his drinking was not his free act and deed, but was caused by the influence of parents in early childhood or by his present companions, then the guilt would be theirs, and we should tell *them* to stop their friend from drinking. On the other hand, if their influence on him was not their own free act and deed, then we should appeal to whoever was the cause of *their* conduct, and so on. But, of course, the problem would recur with regard to them also, so that in the end, moral imperatives would all become meaningless, as we sought vainly through the universe for the genuinely responsible being or beings. They would become obviously meaningless were we to fix responsibility on the man's "heredity," for how could we say, "You ought not," to his ancestors in their graves?

The favorite contemporary answer to this type of thinking is to hold that when I say to a man, "You ought," I am not really interested in questions of responsibility, or of praise and blame, but only in bringing about certain desired results. All these categories, it is said, are superstitious. I tell a man that he ought because I hope that my telling him so will cause him to do something I want him to do. It makes no difference to me whether he or I am the cause, so long as he acts as I wish. And when I blame him I am not presupposing any freedom on his part; I am only, in effect, threatening him with a punishment that will deter him from repeating an act harmful to me or my friends; when I praise him, I am moved by hope that my words, as a kind of reward, will cause him to repeat a useful act. A completely pragmatic, "persuasive" interpretation of ought, praise and blame, suffices.

Such an argument appears plausible and contains, as we shall see, certain elements of truth, but can it justify the feelings of guilt and rectitude? For since these feelings do not refer to the future, they have no obvious pragmatic significance. They are feelings with regard to deeds which I have done or am now doing, deeds in the past or present; they do not in themselves point forward. They may become the bases of deeds to come, but they

are operative only if I believe my self to have been the cause of the deed I am doing or have done. If my deed was wholly due to your influence or to the example and instruction of parents and teachers, or even wholly to my past, I cannot feel guilty or righteous. On the contrary, I will repudiate guilt or righteousness and say "You were to blame" or "You should have the praise," meaning by "You" whoever in the present or past caused me to act. The pragmatic interpretation will not even suffice as an interpretation of the imperative, because, as we shall see, the "ought" is not always spoken by other persons to me, but is sometimes spoken to me by myself, as when I say "I ought." Indeed, unless when you say to me "You ought," I say to myself in agreement with you, "Yes, I ought," the imperative has no significance for me. And, if when I say "I ought" I cannot do as I ought, the imperative is meaningless.

The assumptions of traditional ethics appear, therefore, to be essentially correct. But they need clarification to show how they can be correct. It must be shown how the self can be free and responsible and what it means to be free and responsible. The meaning includes the following: (1) an act, while partially determined by existents other than the self, is not wholly so determined; (2) it is partly determined by the self; (3) it is partly determined by the past; yet (4) it is not wholly so determined for there is a measure of creativity and indeterminism in the self, in the precise sense that there arise within it acts or aspects of acts which are novel and unpredictable, even if the whole past were known, events for which there are no *adequate* causes.²

Now what I want to claim is that all four of these assertions are true not only of the human self, but of all existents. The first two follow from what has been established regarding activity and passivity; every existent has its active and its passive side, and whatever it does is the resultant of both. It suffers the influence of its environment, yet bends in its own way; and even when bending leaves its mark upon the world. Never does it merely transmit an influence or take a shape which it has been no factor

² This statement contradicts the adage "No effect without a cause," only if this is taken to say, "No effect without an *adequate* cause."

in determining. (3) and (4) likewise, as I wish to claim, are universally true. (3) is true because the past of anything leaves its trace upon that thing; its present is organic with its past. If the past left no trace, it would be as if the past had not been at all. We know that (3) is true of the self; for memory is a witness, and even when events are forgotten, we are subtly different because of them. We are not wholly different, else we should cease to be ourselves, yet we have become what we are, colored or discolored by them.

(4) is not so obviously true and one might argue against it that although an act is, to be sure, not wholly determined by its past, it is wholly determined by its past and its environment, and since the latter is always changing, unlike the past which is fixed, each new act will exhibit novelty. Even habitual acts such as putting on one's shoes or eating breakfast in the morning are not quite the same twice, since their context is different each day. Is not the changing context of an act the sufficient ground of whatever novelty it possesses?

That at least most of what is novel in the acts of a man can be thus explained, cannot, I think, be doubted, but let us see how we come out if we try to explain all in this way. To this end let us generalize the hypothesis and try to make it explain not only novelty in the acts of the self, but novelty everywhere in the universe: Let us first restate the hypothesis: admitting that novelty cannot be explained by a thing's past, since that, being fixed and unalterable, could explain only uniformities such as habits and the routine of nature as we formulate it in so-called "laws," the sole possible cause of change in a thing must be its changing environment. Yet we now discover, as often heretofore, that we have only postponed the solution of our problem by driving it into a new locus. For how shall we explain the fact of a new environment? Suppose we try the following very simple explanation, the only one, as it seems to me, which could work, if it does work, without the admission of spontaneity. Let s represent any individual and e its environment. Then the action of e on s will change s into s_1 , and the action of s on e will change e into e_1 . But since s_1 is different from s , and e from e_1 , we shall get s_2 and e_2 in the same way. Hence, if we have any element and its environment

and let them interact, we shall be sure to have many novelties in s , without assuming any cause of novelty in s itself. Of course such changes will be increased, owing to the fact that new elements will enter into e from the outside, which will have their impact on s . Yet it is easy to see that the logic of this scheme compels one to admit changes in s coming from within, and not merely such as are determined from without. For s itself is complex; and in it each element x has a context c , wherefore both x and c will transform each other, and by so doing will transform s . Hence it will not do to attribute all change in s to its changing environment since the changes in the environment itself will be partly due to s .

Even so, however, would not this scheme be deterministic? In any case, at least this much would be saved for moral responsibility, namely, the causality of the self; for according to the scheme, the self is not passive in its relation to the environment, but active. The scheme is, however, only partly adequate to the facts, for it implies the separation of s and e , and within s , of the elements x and c . But it is obvious that within the self, where all constituents interpenetrate, there is no such separation; and we have argued that it does not exist even as between s and e , where, I would remind the reader, s is the self and e is the environment. The implication is clear that when e acts on s , or when x acts on c , or vice versa, s acts on s , and x on x , which is equivalent to a streak of spontaneity in e and in x . That is to say, change does not come entirely from the interaction of a thing with its context, but develops causelessly from within itself.

The result of this argument is the recognition of both determinism and indeterminism as facts. It remains briefly to indicate the impact of this conclusion on values. Further details will be given in our chapter on Moral Values, especially where we discuss the phenomenon of decision.

First of all, our study has vindicated the relevance of the concepts of individual responsibility and guilt, together with the feelings that are reflected in these concepts. Decisions are our own; we are not mere transmitters of forces in the environment, pushing us from the side; or of forces from the past, pushing us from behind. On the other hand, our acts are partially determined by the environment; for from it spring the occasions for acting;

and they are determined in part by our past, from which we inherit our capacities and the broad limitations of our freedom. Robert E. Lee's decision, long pondered, was his free act and deed; but it was not he who presented him with his fateful alternative, but the socio-political situation in which he found himself, and this situation became his because of his Virginian and West Point past. His matrix self, from which and within which his deed sprang, was partly the product of his world. Hence, responsibility and guilt must be divided between a man and his world. The parents share the guilt of the delinquent child, yet he cannot escape his own portion. To one who says, "The world has made me what I am," the answer is, "Yes, but you have partly made yourself, and in so doing, have made the world that made you."

Does it follow from what we have established that "I can because I ought?" In replying to this question we must be careful to recognize that freedom is not unlimited. It is obvious that I cannot do what I cannot will to do. All sorts of abstract possibilities may be presented to me by another person or by myself, but if they have no lure for me they remain impossible for me. I cannot turn a somersault or throw myself out of the window just because you suggest these acts to me, unless, indeed, I am eager to please you or have within me some unknown clownish or suicidal desire to do the one or the other. I can imagine myself performing other strange deeds not in accordance with my character, professional or personal, such as killing my best friend, insulting my students or joining the communist party; but none of these deeds is possible for me, unless the mere mention of them betrays a secret desire to do them. Since, as we shall show, the ego is a plan of and for our desires, anything outside of their scope is not within my scope. To be sure, the plan is subject to change, so that what is impossible today is possible tomorrow; but the possible at the moment is all that we need to consider. In coming to a conclusion in regard to this matter, it is essential not to confuse abstract with real possibilities; real possibilities exist only when some force exists acting in the direction of the abstract possibility. Thus when the cards lie in the pack undealt, it is abstractly possible for me to deal a hand all of spades, but no one knows whether that is really possible at the moment or not.

The application to ethics is simple. It is meaningless to say that I can because I ought unless the idea of the act which I ought to perform has some pull upon me. Unless it represents a real value for me, springing from a *bona fide* impulse of my own, I cannot perform it. The moralist must implant a desire for the performance of duty, or link it with desires already extant, if a man is to be capable of it. Otherwise, when he says, "You ought," he might as well be talking to the moon. It is different when a man says to himself, "I ought." For in his recognition of duty he is already feeling its lure. Now surely it is possible for him to do it, for within him there is a force in that direction. Now he is not bound by his past or by the urging of his fellows. Will he do it, however? That is his secret. It is highly probable if it conforms to his life plan as that has been revealed through similar deeds in the past or through the avowal of sentiments and principles; it is not so probable otherwise. Yet it is still possible. In any difficult choice we experience indetermination. When choice is easy, the intervention of the matrix self in favor of the alternative chosen could have been known beforehand by the man himself or by his friends; but when it is difficult, it could not be known. For in these cases, the matrix self is in process of reconstruction. Such was the case with Lee. Up to the moment of decision we know that each alternative is possible, because we experience it as such. But perhaps this experience is an illusion? Yet on what ground should we suppose so? According to the principle that every effect must have a cause? Yet is this principle more certain, I ask, than the experience of indeterminism? Have you, my reader, proved it? That it is true for the most part is borne out by experience; but in difficult choice it is not borne out. Here we find an exception. Not that there are no causes; in the case of Lee, his Virginian past was a cause. Yet his training at West Point, which made for loyalty to the Union, was also a cause—in the contrary direction. Come, then, let us admit the truth: there was no adequate cause of this event. Let us be true empiricists and recognize that each genuine decision is a creative, spontaneous event, *partly* uncaused. In view of recent advances in physics, not to admit spontaneity and creativity in the universe is a sign of "cultural lag" in one's thinking. And since there is creativity, absolute certainty with

regard to the future of a man or of the universe is impossible, even if we had complete knowledge. But, I would repeat, our uncertainty would be limited. The larger plan of the universe, like the core of the matrix self of each finite individual, together with the past of all things, is fixed, unchangeable. Not all events are possible, since God remembers and has spoken. Yet within limits, the world remains open, a world of anxiety, but also of hope!

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'EXISTENCE' : A HUMEAN POINT
IN ARISTOTLE'S "METAPHYSICS"*

W. VON LEYDEN

I BEGIN with three preliminary explanations:

(1) In view of the particular point I wish to raise I shall refrain from introducing any Greek quotations or technicalities other than those which can be applied to Aristotle and Hume alike.

(2) What I am going to say in connexion with Aristotle is about a topic that might also be discussed in connexion with Plato. But again for my immediate purposes I prefer not to mention Plato at all and to confine myself to points often stated by Aristotle more explicitly than by Plato.

(3) In Aristotle the concept of being or existence is almost always coupled with that of unity and much of what he says about the one can be said about the other and indeed about all logical or syncategorematic words such as 'same,' 'similar,' 'some,' 'all,' 'the,' 'not,' 'or,' and the like, which, as Aristotle clearly perceived, form a separate class. However, here I shall only discuss existence.

So much then for the limited object I have in view. Now we turn to Hume. He is generally regarded as the first to have effectively criticized the Ontological Proof by showing that 'existence' or 'to be' is not a predicate, attribute, or property, like being red or being square. This—to speak more accurately—was what Kant stated in connexion with his refutation of the Proof, but Hume clearly anticipated him. He held¹ that when we think of any object, even a mermaid, we think of it as existing, so that the idea of existence does not constitute a distinct characteristic additional to that of the object. Hence 'existence' for him is no descriptive word, nor does, when we believe in the existence of

* Paper read at the Joint Meeting of the Northern and Scottish Associations for Ancient Philosophy, Durham, 1959.

¹ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, I, ii, 6 and iii, 7.

something, the belief add anything to the simple conception of the thing. But, as Hume himself pointed out, there is a great difference between believing a proposition and not believing it, between an actual plot and conceiving of a plot. How then can we explain this difference and describe what happens when we believe in something or judge that it took place? According to Hume, a belief in x or the fact of x existing, while it does not alter what is presented by our idea of x , alters the way in which we think of it. What it adds to the idea of x is not a descriptive characteristic but force and vivacity in the manner in which the idea is entertained by me or crosses my mind.

This Humean doctrine struck at the root of the Ontological Proof as formulated by Anselm and Descartes in that it affected two of its premises: (a) that it is only the notion of God which logically involves that of existence since, (b), if by definition he is the most perfect being, his perfection must consist of the sum-total of all positive *attributes*, including that of existence. What Hume affirmed is precisely that when we conceive of *anything*, we necessarily conceive it as existing; and what he denied is precisely that existence is an attribute. "When I think of God, when I think of him as existent, and when I believe him to be existent, my idea of him neither encreases nor diminishes."²

This quotation from Hume bears a striking resemblance to the following two from Aristotle: "'One man' and 'existent man' and 'man' are the same thing, and the doubling of the words in 'the man is one and is a man' (and therefore 'the man is *existent* and is a *man*)"³ does not give any new meaning."⁴ Or again: "In 'one man' nothing more is *predicated*⁵ than in 'man,' just as being is nothing apart from substance or quality or quantity."⁶ The only one to have noticed this resemblance is Professor G. Ryle in his 'Parmenides' article.⁷ However Ryle does not there elaborate the point apart from a few very brief and tentative suggestions

² Ed. Selby-Bigge, p. 94.

³ My addition.

⁴ *Met.*, I 2, 1003 b 26-29.

⁵ My italics.

⁶ *Met.*, I 2, 1054 a 16-18.

⁷ *Mind*, 1939, p. 314.

in this direction.* Unfortunately, Ross and other commentators are unhelpful on this particular point, concentrating as they do on the metaphysical, rather than the logical, nature of Aristotle's views on existence.

What I propose to investigate is whether the quotations from Aristotle which I have cited and other passages in his *Metaphysics* and elsewhere in his work form part of the same type of doctrine as Hume's statements on existence. If we marshal all the available evidence we can, I think, broadly speaking, distinguish two lines of enquiry on Aristotle's part, both of which bring him very near indeed to the Humean point. The first line of enquiry consists of attempts to show what the word 'existence' is *not*, namely that it is not a characterizing or descriptive word, and therefore does not signify a material concept (to adopt Ryle's terminology). The second line consists of rather vague attempts to show what the word *is*, namely a logical word or a formal concept.

(I) Aristotle endeavours to bring out the non-descriptive nature of 'exist' by dissociating it from the most representative and fundamental of all the ordinary concepts which describe reality and which can be subject or predicate terms of propositions.

(a) In the first place he denies that 'existence' is a *genus*. The relevant passage is *Met.*, B 3, 998 b 20 sq., where he states that being cannot be a genus of things, because the differentiae of any genus must each of them have being, but a genus cannot be predicated of its differentiae, taken apart from the species. This seems a little difficult to interpret, not as regards the main doctrine but the reason given for it. Ross, and Cook Wilson,⁸ in trying (not very successfully) to explain Aristotle's *prima facie* puzzling statement that a genus cannot be predicated of its differentiae, draw no attention to a passage which sums up the point quite unambiguously. I mean *Met.*, Z 12, 1037 b 18-21, where it is stated that 'animal' (genus) does not share in its differentiae such as 'two-footed,' since, if it did, the same thing (i.e. the genus) would share in contraries, as the differentiae by which the genus is divided are contrary. This, I think, is all that is required for the

⁸ Pp. 149, 313, 324.

⁹ *Statement and Inference*, II, p. 698.

interpretation of our passage in B 3, unless we wish to add that it is impossible that what can be predicated of the whole of a genus should be predicable of single differentiae, precisely because these should have predicates which distinguish them from the genus. This then removes the difficulty of interpretation, though not I fear the obsolete nature of the reasons given. But no doubt Aristotle's doctrine of the difference between existence and the classificatory scheme of genera and species throws light on the positive or constructive part of his doctrine, namely that existence, unlike any material concept, applies to every inclusive genus and each of its progressively narrower subspecies *alike*. But this is an important reason for saying that existence is a logical word such as that it can occur in propositions about any subject-matter whatever.

(b) Next there is the relation between being and *substance* — 'the hardest inquiry of all, and the one most necessary for knowledge of the truth,' as Aristotle says in *Met.*, B 4, 1001 a 4 sqq. In his view, existence, though in one sense substantial by being the most fundamental and universal of all principles, cannot be, strictly speaking, a substance, precisely because nothing that is common or universal can be a substance (for this cannot be in many things at the same time but is peculiar to an individual), but being is present in many things at the same time.¹⁰ Two brief comments here. By dissociating being from substance, the principal category, Aristotle separates it from the most important class of terms which are descriptive of the ultimate structure of reality. The separation is particularly significant also in that substance has a certain logical pre-eminence over the other categories by being itself in a sense pervasive, for it is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition for the application of all the other category words: while it need not be itself qualified by a term from any of the other categories and indeed is capable of separate existence altogether, every term from each of the other categories presupposes the existence of a substance for its application. Sometimes Aristotle stresses this logical aspect of the notion of substance

¹⁰ Z 16, 1040 b 16-27; I 2, 1053 b 16-24.

in preference to the descriptive aspect of it, partly perhaps because the latter remains for him ultimately puzzling.

(c) Thirdly, there is the argument in *A 4*, 1070 b 4-8, that being cannot be an *element* in things, because what is an element differs from what is composed of elements, but being, like unity, can be predicated of compounds as well as of elements. The argument is not unlike that in *Met.*, B 3, 998 b 22 where Aristotle wished to show that being cannot be a genus of things. Here again the point is that existence is universally applicable, irrespective of the dividing lines of a classificatory scheme, such as between the generic and the specific or the simple and the complex.

(d) Finally, there is the argument in *Anal. Post.*, II 7, 92 b 13, that, since being is not a genus it is not the *essence* of anything and consequently does not enter into the definition of anything.¹¹ "What human nature is and the fact that man exists are not the same thing." And in *De Interpretatione*, 3, 16 b 22, commenting on 'to be' as a copula, Aristotle explains that by itself 'being' is not significant of any fact, unless something is added so as to form a judgment. The two points bring out clearly, I think, that for Aristotle the word 'to exist' does not give any description of what exists in the world, that it is not used in any particular department of knowledge as opposed to any other, but that it can be applied in connexion with every one of them.

The upshot of the various arguments so far is that existence is (a) the most universal of all terms, though without being a material or characterizing universal such as a *summum genus*, (b) the most substantial of all terms without being itself a substance or essence, and (c) the most fundamental term, though without being an element in things, or something materially fundamental. It remains to explain precisely what for Aristotle the verb 'to exist' means in addition to what it does not mean.

(II) Aristotle's attempts to show what 'exist' *does* mean never proceed further than to explain the point already implicit in all the previously discussed arguments, *viz.* that the word is applicable in connexion with every subject-matter and is not

¹¹ Cf. also *Met.*, H 6, 1045 b 2-3.

confined in its use to any one in particular. But we should mention here one of his most emphatic doctrines,¹² namely that there are many senses in which things are said to be. This doctrine, I think, is expressed by Aristotle in two forms, a more generic and a more specific one. The more generic form is that it is true *in several senses* that there are *several senses* in which things are said to be. What he has in mind is that the word 'to be' can be used to indicate (a) potential and actual existence, (b) what is true or false, and (c) being in an accidental sense and being *per se* or being in connexion with any of the categories. The generic form of the doctrine does not here concern us so much as the specific one which states that there are several senses in which things can be said to be *per se* or essentially, namely in connexion with any of the several categories. The fact that 'to be' can be applied in connexion with concepts of a different content shows, I think, that in Aristotle's view the term itself can have no content and therefore must be a formal concept or a logical word like 'and,' 'all,' or 'not.' It also shows why Aristotle thinks that it is incorrect if not futile to search for the elements of *all existing* things in the Platonic manner, as though existing things, by the mere fact that they are all existing, could have anything qualitatively in common.

But Aristotle, though appearing to be quite clear about the distinction between existence and non-formal concepts, is obviously by no means certain what to call a concept such as existence, or precisely what function a statement of existence has. In *Δ* 4, 1070 b 7, he calls Existence an 'intelligible' (τὸ νοητόν), probably because, in contrast with 'sensibles' which are all particulars, it is a most universal and, besides, an abstract term. In *Γ* 2 we are told that it is the work of one science to study all things that are *qua* being, and that part of its work is to discuss the same and the similar and 'other concepts of this sort,' obviously logical concepts. Further on some more examples of this sort of concepts are given, *viz.*, contrariety, completeness, being, unity, prior and posterior, genus and species, whole and part. In *Γ* 3 the enquiry

¹² *Met.*, *A* 9, 992 b 18 sq.; *Γ* 2, 1003 a 33 - b 36; *Δ* 7; *E* 2, 1026 a 33 sqq.; *Z* 1; *H* 2, 1042 b 25 sq.; *I* 2, 1054 a 13-19.

into axioms is added to this list, for like all the other members of it, axioms "hold good for everything that is, and not for some special genus apart from others." That is to say, these concepts form no part of any special enquiries, for instance those of a geometer or a biologist, for each one of these corresponds to a particular genus but never as such to 'being' and others of this group of formal concepts. That Aristotle, when he speaks of being speaks of it in a primarily logical, rather than ontological or metaphysical sense can perhaps be also made clear from his argument against Parmenides in A 5, 986 b 27 sq., where, as Ross points out (I. 154), he urges that Parmenides only proved that there is one single term which includes everything that is, viz. *ὅν*, not that there is only one thing, for the one term *ὅν* is applicable to many things.

On the other hand, it is true that Aristotle sometimes speaks of 'to be' as though it were a predicate.¹³ Yet, I think, all he means when he says that being and unity are the most universal of all *predicates* is that they are the most universal terms and that when these terms are applied to something they may well be called predicates, but then they would not be characterizing or descriptive predicates. He himself explains at the end of I 2 that "in 'one man' nothing more is *predicated* than in 'man,' just as being is nothing apart from substance or quality or quantity."¹⁴ But this appears to put it beyond doubt that, in his view, an existential statement does not take the form of saying something about a thing in the sense of predicating of it a characteristic additional to any of its others.

Yet, in conclusion, it should be stressed that Aristotle does not seem after all to state explicitly what function an existential statement *does* have, namely that it asserts, on the basis of experience, that the characteristics or predicates a thing may have are all exemplified or not exemplified, as the case may be. This at any rate is how Kant and modern logicians have interpreted it and this is how it has become accepted in philosophy ever since the introduction of Russell's instantiation symbol ' $\exists x$.' But neither

¹³ E.g. *Met.*, B 3, 998 b 21; I 2, 1053 b 19.

¹⁴ My italics.

does Hume appear to have stated the precise or correct function of existential statements, confined as he was to the psychological terms of his explanation. On his view, judging that something exists or believing in the existence of it consists in the *manner* in which we conceive it, i.e. in a specially vivid idea of the thing. The difficulty with this view of course is that, if a feeling or quality in an idea is a criterion for belief or for the existence of something, we could never say—what it is always possible to say—that a certain idea is very vivid and impressive and yet I do not believe it.

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ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF WHITEHEAD'S METAPHYSICAL LANGUAGE

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NOW THAT LANGUAGE is regarded as the proper differentia of metaphysics, Whitehead's redesigned terminology represents, for contemporary analysts concerned with linguistic reforms, both a hope and a despair: a hope in the sense that, if the web of Whitehead's fertile thought is unraveled, the insights concerning language construction might prove rewarding; a despair in the sense that his attitude towards language seems to give and take away in the same gesture. Whitehead appears to be in harmony with other reformers; he distrusts the subject-predicate form of logic; he affirms that language is the tool of philosophy and requires, as a tool, to be redesigned from time to time. Yet he repudiates the trust in language as "an adequate expression of propositions" and admits that words and phrases break down when "stretched towards a generality foreign to their usage." While he defines metaphysical sentences as descriptive and thus similar to the sentences of empirical science, they are also regarded as unique and are excluded from the formal rules of confirmation which are taken to be necessary in the consideration of purported factual statements; systematization is regarded as essential only for criticism, whereas the primary function of philosophy is the assemblage of generalities. In the light of Whitehead's complex attitude toward linguistic symbols, the present article proposes to say something about his metaphysical language. The questions have the dual role in the sense that although they are relevant to Whitehead's specific doctrine, they point beyond themselves to general contemporary linguistic problems.

If we disregard the so-called problem of the intelligibility of Whitehead's language,¹ not the least important of the remaining questions are: (a) What does Whitehead intend to do with a redesigned idiom? (b) Does the language containing the new ter-

¹ See, for example, Urban, Wilbur M., "Whitehead's Philosophy of Language and Its Relation to His Metaphysics," in *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*, edited by P. A. Schilpp, New York, 1951.

minology possess the marks of an "ideal" language? and (c) What is the function of a language?

I

The Nature of an Ideal Language. The construction of a metaphysical language presupposes that there is a set of data for which the language is being used as an expressive tool and that the language contains, therefore, certain terms or symbols which are regarded as adequate for the representation of "what there is." This amounts to saying that there is an extra-linguistic encounter with "what there is" and that the language in some sense is intended to "clothe" the basic intuition for the purposes of communication. What the real is like in itself is not determined, therefore, by the language. Rather, it is the case of the language being determined in some sense by the nature of the data because we regard the terms as adequate for the purpose for which they were designed.

The criterion of adequacy will be significant for any language with respect to the following: (1) How successful are the basic terms in the fulfillment of their intended purpose? Whitehead was fully aware of this problem when he drew attention to the fact that "words and phrases must be stretched towards a generality foreign to their ordinary usage."² We are asking, in other words, whether the term "fits" that which is regarded as the data. (2) What is the criterion of verification? A criterion of verification is generally considered relevant to the question: What formal properties must a structure of symbols have in order for the symbols to be regarded as a language? It is the apparent absence of a formal requirement that makes it possible to question the validity of Whitehead's metaphysical language.

The fundamental question related to the formation of an "ideal" metaphysical language is: How does one design a language for a special object-domain? Whitehead gives an answer in *Process and Reality*, where we find this statement: "Thus philosophy redesigns language in the same way that, in a physical

² Whitehead, Alfred North, *Process and Reality* (hereafter *P. R.*). New York: Macmillan, 1929, p. 6.

science, pre-existing appliances are redesigned."³ But is there any point of similarity, for example, between the manner in which the physical appliances of the Michelson-Morley experiment were designed (or redesigned) when contrasted with the derivation of the category of "creativity" as this is outlined in *Adventures of Ideas*? The obvious answer is that there is none, unless, of course, the physical apparatus is taken to be a surrogate symbolic structure.

What are the characteristics, therefore, of a redesigned or "ideal" language? It will be a language, (1) into which may be translated the sentences about a broad segment of human experience. In the case of Whitehead's language this is an essential condition, for he writes: "By this notion of 'interpretation' I mean that everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall have the character of a particular instance of the general scheme."⁴ Thus, the extensive usage of the categories presupposes that they are such that they will be adequate symbols of "what there is" for human experience at least. (2) The requirement for complete translation will hold good only if the redesigned terms have in some sense received a determinate meaning. This, too, must be identified as a crucial problem in Whitehead's metaphysical language, since the validity of his metaphysical language hinges upon the manner in which categorial meanings are deduced. Whitehead's categories are derived by assembling the meanings embedded in a word language, which is most often, and deliberately, a poetic language. It is obvious, therefore, that the subsequent derivations will involve meanings which have not been made explicit and which, for the most part, come trailing clouds of glory.

Whitehead's redesigned terminology, in the sense that it is part of an "ideal" language must, therefore, be assessed in the light of questions such as the following: (1) Can every mode of human experience be univocally described in the language? (2) Can any question be asked about the discriminated object-domain and an answer be expressed in the language? (3) Are

³ Ibid., p. 16.

⁴ *P. R.*, p. 4.

there any undecidable statements resulting from an application of the language? In other words, Whitehead's metaphysical language would qualify as an "ideal" one if the following conditions were present: (a) All modes of human experience can be expressed in the language. (b) The form of the expressive statement is either a protocol statement or derived from one through reduction sentences. (c) A criterion of adequacy is indicated in terms of a formal syntax. It is, as we have said, precisely with respect to the formal marks of adequacy that Whitehead's language may be seriously challenged.

If it is assumed that a language in some sense mirrors the nature of "what there is," then the syntax of that language must also in some way reflect the same structure, for it is within the framework of the syntactical rules concerning the definitions and reduction sentences that we come face to face with the problem of deciding on what sort of words and sentences we require in order to express the object-domain. Whitehead has designated the nature of the object-domain with which he is concerned in metaphysics, but there is a singular absence of any syntactical structure. This means that in Whitehead's rather casual inductive search for new categories the selected terms are either going to be introduced without a complete analysis as to whether they are fitted to say anything about the nature of "what there is" or they must themselves bear the onus for their adequacy.

If there is a reason for redesigning a language, and if this language is not restricted by the formalities of syntax, then perhaps Whitehead envisaged some unique role for the language of metaphysics to play. If metaphysical language is not to be identical with a scientific language in structure and intent, then is there a peculiar differentia for a metaphysical language? The question remains: What, for Whitehead, is the mark of a genuine language of philosophy?

II

The Derivation of Categories. Whitehead's familiar definition of the task of speculative philosophy as the "endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be inter-

puted"⁵ contains three fundamental requirements relative to the problem of the construction of a metaphysical language. They are: (1) the statement of a schematic structure, or system, (2) the derivation of general ideas, and (3) the determination of the degree of extension for the application of the categories. For Whitehead, the "voyage towards the larger generalities" is made with knowledge of the following problems: (a) that any system "will remain only an approximation of general truth"; (b) there are no axiomatic certainties which we may consider as a legitimate starting point; and (c) that the "language of literature breaks down" when confronted with the problem of expressing the generalities. Nevertheless, Whitehead did proceed with the philosophic endeavor and, therefore, it may be assumed that he regarded the task as possible and worth while.

What is the manner in which Whitehead's categories are derived? Let us turn to the chapter on "Philosophic Method" in *Adventures of Ideas* for a "later" and consequently (according to some interpretations) a comprehensive statement of Whitehead's position.⁶ We are informed that "speculative philosophy embodies the method of the 'working hypothesis,'" and that the purpose of this method "is to co-ordinate the current expressions of human experience, in common speech, in social institutions, in actions, in the principles of the various special sciences."⁷ A derivative problem presents itself at this point. The question is this: Since the working hypothesis is in some sense a sort of theory and as the theory is intended as a tool to "direct" and "decide" with respect

⁵ *P. R.*, p. 4.

⁶ It may be questioned whether the interpretation of Whitehead's philosophy is aided by the theory that his thought is marked by "early," "middle," and "late" periods. See, for a statement of this point of view, Nathaniel Lawrence's *Whitehead's Philosophical Development*, Berkeley, 1956. I shall assume that there is as much evidence to support a theory of organic development as there is to support a linear one and that comparisons of excerpts from the "earlier" as well as the "later" works will show that the subject-matter and the method are identical. This is not to say, however, that his "later" insights do not show a richer content of meaning. To say this would be to deny the principle of growth in Whitehead's dialectic.

⁷ Whitehead, Alfred North. *Adventures of Ideas* (hereafter *A. I.*). Mentor Book, p. 223.

to the "mutual relevance of various types of evidence," does this mean that there is an extralinguistic encounter with the object-domain, the result of which permits us to assess whether the linguistic structure is adequate for the purpose of "mirroring" the nature of "what there is"? Or is the nature of "what there is" determined by the constitutive function of the symbolic structure? If it is the latter, then on what grounds is there a requirement for a redesigned language? When Whitehead adds, however, that "method is a way of dealing with data, with evidence," it is obvious that he is referring to the case in which the theory is regarded as in some sense constitutive. Perhaps, then, the problem of a redesigned language is related to extensiveness of the evidence which, for Whitehead, is the wisdom of going beyond the narrow range of sense experience. Hence, in order to derive "some of the major categories under which we can classify the infinitely various components of experience, we must appeal to evidence relating to every variety of occasion."⁸ Where must we turn to find the reservoir of the infinite varieties of human experience? The answer is given that the "storehouse" of human experience which philosophy is to use as the "basis of its discussion" resides in (1) language, (2) social institutions, and (3) action.⁹

It is language regarded as a source of evidence which is our concern here. Whitehead suggests that language presents its evidence in three ways: (a) the meanings of words, (b) meanings as they are "enshrined in grammatical forms," and (c) the meanings that are evoked "beyond the individual words and beyond grammatical forms." The latter meanings are those revealed by "flashes of insight" and are found in the language of literature, the symbolism for science, and the systems of philosophy. In other words, "civilized language provides a whole group of words, each embodying the general idea under its own specialization."¹⁰

Let us now speak of a "civilized language" as a natural language such as English or French. We distinguish within the natural language what may be termed sub-languages. These are

⁸ *A. I.*, p. 227.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

the special linguistic structures of science, religion, literature, art, and philosophy. If we assume that there is no problem of translation for inter-disciplinary needs, although this is unlikely, then we may suggest, in the terms of Whitehead, that the "flashes of insight beyond the meanings" represent the manner in which the various disciplines deal with the "infinite varieties of human experience." The problem of translation is indicated, but this, too, takes the form of an insight rather than any specialized syntactical structure of transformation rules. In other words, the insights in synthesis represent what may now be called a master metaphor of some sort. I suggest that this is precisely the way in which Whitehead derives his basic categories.

Let us consider Whitehead's own illustration. He takes as a working hypothesis the view that "the ultimate realities are the events in their process of origination."¹¹ Upon analysis it is revealed that this implies "two ideal termini," from which we educe the notion of "process," "creator," "creativity," and then "novelty." Is there a single category which will convey the meaning of creativity that we have educed? Whitehead suggests the word "concrecence" which we must now regard as one of the redesigned words of his metaphysical language. But the mere postulation of a word is insufficient. How, in fact, is the word derived as to its content? The answer is, of course, that Whitehead appeals to the insights of "civilized language." For example, he considers the word "concrecence" as derived from the Latin verb for "growing together." But does this convey for Whitehead the full meaning he is seeking? In the case of this particular category, "concrecence" fails to carry the meaning of creativity. In instances of this sort, when the meaning is not deep enough, the inductive search for other "insights" continues until a rich metaphor is established.

For the most part the inductive search for meaning is carried out within the language of literature. Whitehead is deeply impressed by poetic insights,¹² especially those of the romantic

¹¹ A. I., p. 237.

¹² For a valuable study, see Mary A. Wyman, "Whitehead's Philosophy of Science in the Light of Wordsworth's Poetry," *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4, October, 1956.

writers. A few excerpts reveal the extent of Whitehead's appeal to literary visions which complete the abstractions of philosophy. In *Science and the Modern World*, in the chapter entitled "The Romantic Reaction," we find the following statements of faith: "Wordsworth opposes to the scientific abstractions his full concrete experience." And again; "Furthermore Shelley is entirely at one with Wordsworth as to the interfusing of the Presence in nature." In continuing to speak of Shelley, Whitehead writes: ". . . he is here an emphatic witness to the prehensive unification as constituting the very being of nature." What Whitehead finds in the evidence of the poets is that "they express deep intuitions of mankind penetrating into what is universal in concrete fact."

A summary of Whitehead's method of deriving the categories would suggest these steps: (1) a working hypothesis of the form, "ultimate realities are the events in their process of origination"; (2) an analysis of what is entailed in the concept; (3) the appeal to "civilized language," especially the language of literature for words which convey aspects of meaning relevant to the basic concept; (4) the inductive principle which is followed so carefully that even negative instances are included. As a result of this method, Whitehead's metaphysical language is enriched by the introduction of a "master metaphor."¹³ A master metaphor such

¹³ A reading of the chapter, "The Romantic Reaction," reveals that Whitehead already is using his redesigned language. In speaking of the significant witness of romantic language as a storehouse of the intuitions which will be incorporated, he quotes a few lines from *The Prelude* in which typical phrases such as "impressed upon all form . . ." were probably used to derive categories like "prehension." But in the sentence immediately preceding the quotation from Wordsworth, Whitehead writes: "But it would hardly be possible to express more clearly a feeling for nature, as exhibiting entwined prehensive unities . . ." Does this represent an anomaly of literary style, or is Whitehead looking in Wordsworth for confirmation of a concept whose meaning is already established? This question may also be raised, when in the same chapter, Whitehead writes: "The eternal objects are also there for him, 'The light that never was, on sea or land.'" Was the category of eternal object derived from the storehouse of poetic insights or merely confirmed in this literature?

There are relatively few instances in which Whitehead goes to science, that subclass of civilized language, for an insight. When he does, there are immediate questions to be asked regarding his use of scientific terms. For example, in *Process and Reality*, we find the sentence, "Feelings are

as "concrecence" is therefore a general idea obtained from the intuited meanings of terms like "together," "creativity," "feeling," "becoming," "process," and "subjective form." Whether the metaphor is a single term standing for a complex meaning of inclusion or whether each term bears the full connotation for each other term through a sort of cross reference is not clear.

In whatever manner the metaphor be conceived, once it is formulated, its application must be given the widest extension. "When a general idea has been obtained, it should not be arbitrarily limited to the topic of its origination."¹⁴ This view raises questions regarding the validity of inter-disciplinary translations in the absence of specific rules. But it is Whitehead's position that only in terms of the widest extension "can the true adjustment of ideas be explored."¹⁵

It seems to me that the categories thus educed do not constitute the ground of a precise language for the following reasons: (1) the informal dialectic of sampling provides merely an arbitrary selection of meanings; (2) the languages of philosophy and literature as subclasses of our "civilized language" make no pretensions to exactness. Only scientific terms approximate the ideal of exactness by means of definitions and the rules for their use; (3) any linguistic term "breaks down" when stretched to the larger generalities or when applied to the actual datum of inquiry.

Finally, the most difficult problem related to an ideal, meta-

vectors." (p. 133). This is a typical example of the ease with which Whitehead combines terms in a way that would shock a logical positivist. There is no evidence that Whitehead suggests rules for formations or transformations. I realize that Whitehead is protected from this charge by his own theory of propositions.

¹⁴ A. I., p. 238.

¹⁵ For an interesting parallel, see Kenneth Burke, *The Philosophy of Literary Form*. Vintage Book, 1957, p. 127 ff. Burke suggests that "a metaphor's validity is of a much more arduous sort, requiring nothing less than the *filling-out by concrete body, of the characterizations which one would test.*" What Whitehead refers to as the "storehouse" of meaning that is found in the insights beyond the stabilized meanings of individual words and syntax Burke describes as a "filling-out" of the concrete concept. For Burke, "the poetic ideal" envisions a vocabulary that *goes through* drama. Whitehead sees the drama principle in the natural evolution of meanings in "civilized languages." In both cases categories are secured which exhibit the "*maximum profusion of weightings.*"

physical language is that a precise language is dependent upon a complete metaphysical scheme. "Such meanings are incapable of accurate apprehension apart from a correspondingly accurate apprehension of the metaphysical background which the universe provides for them."¹⁶ The apparent logical circularity of this problem is resolved by Whitehead in a manner similar to that used by Descartes in which initial doubts are later regarded as hyperbolic once they are underwritten by the certain knowledge of God. For Whitehead, as it was for Descartes, the method is a dialectical progression from a "working hypothesis," which originates inquiry, to the elucidation of categories which are constitutive of a universe within which the language is grounded.

Whitehead's metaphysical language appears, therefore, to have the dual character of being descriptive and normative, although, it must be added, the constitutive character is informal and dialectical rather than syntactically precise. This raises serious doubts regarding Whitehead's motives for a redesigned language and implies that the inventor has specific knowledge of the object-domain to be signified by the new language. But if the language is at the same time both descriptive and constitutive, then what the real is like is in a sense determined by the language while the form of the language is determined by the nature of "what there is." Whatever the structure of such a language may be, we must question its adequacy as a philosophical language until this problem has been resolved.

III

Appearance and Reality. Whitehead's commitment to the example and results of poetic perception is illustrated by the distinction which he makes between Appearance and Reality. It must be recalled that Whitehead's metaphysical position dictates that a comprehensive understanding of actuality "requires a reference to ideality." "The truth that some proposition respecting an actual occasion is untrue may express the vital truth as to the aesthetic achievement."¹⁷ Whereas this dictum may be regarded

¹⁶ *P. R.*, pp. 19-20.

¹⁷ *Science and the Modern World*, (hereafter *S. M. W.*) Mentor Book, p. 159.

as a reiteration of the philosophic wisdom that determinateness involves negation, there is at the same time an implied peril if it is taken to read that untrue propositions which, when considered as "alternative suggestions" and thus ostensibly predicated, are to find no root in reality. If there is no requirement of a footing in reality in the sense of being an expression of "what there is," then although the aesthetic conditions are satisfied, is it equally possible to say that the intelligibility requirements have been satisfied?

The assumption that the so-called "untrue propositions" may be predicated with significance as an essential characteristic of actuality while not possessing a footing in reality *per se* entails that such a liberation from signifying "what there is," which is the function of language which we have postulated as traditional and meaningful, is equivalent to saying that propositions created by a universe of discourse peculiar to poetic or artistic divination are intelligible to the creators alone. The dangers I have visualized are the dangers of obscurity and unintelligibility that one encounters when there is a denial of the conceptual, logical universe of discourse which provides rules for the confirmation of meaning. Otherwise, in what sense are untrue propositions to be considered as significantly predicated if the sole requirement is the criterion of aesthetic satisfaction?

We recognize that, for Whitehead, finite entities are meaningless unless there is an identification of the mode of relations that lie beyond the entity. Whitehead has stated this doctrine as the manner in which "fact is confronted with alternatives." He writes: "This graded envisagement is how the actual includes what (in one sense) is not-being as a positive factor in its own achievement."¹⁸

There are at least two ways of interpreting Whitehead's category of "graded envisagement." The first would imply that there is no perspective from which the totality of being is fully comprehensible. In other words, any actual occasion is confronted with an infinity of possibilities for actualization to the extent that the objective content of the world is received or rejected by the entity. Since each actual entity is responsible for the reception

¹⁸ S. M. W., p. 177.

or rejection of objective data, the abrupt realization represents the recognition or simply the enumeration by an entity of the possibilities that are identifiable. This amounts to an addition or subtraction of infinite alternatives and does not constitute a *genuine infinity*. Whitehead's view of Appearance and Reality leads one to question whether this is what he had in mind. An endless concern for a mere plurality results in mental fatigue; for the conditions of reason limits must be set. The philosophical question becomes: What is to be done once a limit has been indicated? For one thing, it must be added that the finite and the infinite mutually develop each other. With the limit established, transcendence becomes a question for reason. Being or the modes of being are no longer of primary importance. What reason is concerned with now is the representation of a true infinity wherein an entity (individual) confronting transcendence compares the being which is properly his with those aspects of being which could not in the nature of things be his at all. It is this second interpretation which becomes meaningful in the light of Whitehead's distinction of Appearance and Reality.

The philosophical principle which is involved here is similar to Kant's "regulative ideas" which are *immanent* and hence necessary and proper to the constitutive phase of understanding. It is likewise evoked by Jaspers' statement that "the rational is not thinkable without its other, the non-rational, and it never appears in reality without it."¹⁹ The basic concept that emerges as an authentic principle of metaphysics is that *the other, the transcendence, the appearance* stand over against the *fact* and requires that reason make no move to synthesize the fact and its transcendence. Appearance and Reality are not, therefore, contradictory concepts but represent the philosophical truth that the reality of an actual occasion demands the contemplation of possibilities that are *outside of it*; appearance affirms the *non-being* of actuality as a metaphysical requirement of *being*.

The distinction of Appearance and Reality is, for Whitehead, grounded upon the self-formation of each actual occasion. The

¹⁹ Jaspers, K., *Reason and Existenz*. New York: The Noonday Press, 1957, p. 19.

initial phase of self-realization is the reception by the actual entity of an objective-content which, for that entity, constitutes its basic reality at that moment. The intermediate stage is reached when there emerges a "ferment of qualitative valuation"²⁰ relative to the objective content which is still present in the entity and felt as vague and massive despite the overlay of conceptual feelings. The final stage in the self-realization of the individual is achieved when "the content of the objective universe has passed from the function of a basis for a new individuality to that of an instrument for purposes."²¹ At this point the entity becomes aware of its own completion. Hence, appearance "lives in our consciousness as the world presented to us for our enjoyment and our purposes."²² The self-realization of the individual is achieved when it has "gathered the creativity of the Universe into its own completeness."²³

What is the nature of this creativity? Whatever it means, for Whitehead, in the final analysis he has been specific in his statement that the initial objective-content is "overlaid and intermixed with" the product of a conceptual ferment. It seems, therefore, that the creative subject stands confronted with an objective world and the results of the creative act are envisaged as in some sense entering into and being integrated with that objective domain. Creativity is not merely a regrouping or distribution of the elements of the objective world; this has taken place in the initial phase of self-realization. Nor is it merely a constitutive shaping of the material world in the sense of imposing ideal forms upon it. This later view is especially rejected in the light of Whitehead's commitment to the position of "provisional realism" and his careful exposition of the reasons for distrusting a subjectivist basis in philosophy. "My point is, that in our sense-experience we know away from and beyond our personality; whereas the subjectivist holds that in such experience we merely know about our own personality."²⁴

²⁰ *A. I.*, p. 211.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 213.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

²⁴ *S. M. W.*, p. 90.

But naive realism contains within its orientation the seeds of a subjectivism in spite of the best intentions of the philosopher. The object confronts the subject with a gross brutality and in the struggle for liberation from the compulsiveness of the object the subject tends to distort the claims of the phenomenal world to be reality. Nor is the constant threat of subjectivism removed by Whitehead's appeal to the evidence of poetic intuition, for this indicates the direction of his philosophical orientation. Poetic representation of human concrete experience is in terms of value and the affirmation of value is not necessarily the same as the affirmation of being. There is, therefore, good reason to suggest that, for Whitehead, the creative act is essentially an uplifting experience for the self in which there is transcendence, not into the object, but into a spiritual ascent which becomes a movement of the spirit towards truth.

But truth is the "conformation of Appearance to Reality." Of the two "conspicuous examples of the truth-relation in human experience" we have now only to speak of propositions. The truth-relation of sense-experience we have referred to above. For Whitehead, a proposition represents "a suggestion, a theory, a supposition about things."²⁵ And since a proposition should be interesting rather than true, the question as to whether actual entities are merely "conceived in the guise of illustrating the predicate" bears directly upon the possibility of the "conformal correspondence" between Appearance and Reality. The fact remains that for Whitehead's doctrine there is no principle of causal efficacy relating Appearance to Reality. Statements about Appearance have no metaphysical footing in reality except under the "conditions of normality" and these may be seen to be tenuous in the extreme. If philosophical propositions are not intended to be assertions contributed for objective use, that is, in some sense to mirror "what there is," then philosophical knowledge is personal and philosophy is indeed akin to poetry as Whitehead claims.²⁶

²⁵ *A. I.*, p. 243.

²⁶ Whitehead, Alfred North, *Modes of Thought*. New York: Macmillan, 1957, p. 237.

IV

Confirmability Principles. Let us consider in what sense Whitehead's categories are effective as modes of explanation. He has affirmed that a philosophical scheme "should be coherent, logical, and, in respect to its interpretation, applicable and adequate."²⁷ If we take as our point of departure that "metaphysics is nothing but the description of the generalities which apply to all the details of practice," then whether Whitehead's metaphysical sentences represent root metaphors or analogies, they do, as descriptions, presuppose a theoretical content and are therefore comparable to scientific sentences. But here the comparison ends, for there is no similarity to scientific views of confirmability or verifiability evident in Whitehead's categories of explanation.

Take, for example, the metaphysical sentence: "Every actual entity is in its nature essentially social."²⁸ It has the form of any legitimate sentence of the behavioral sciences. It remains, however, an instance of dialectical illusion unless it is shown to satisfy the requirements of confirmability. Confirmability, according to the model of physical theory, would demand that the steps to cognitive meaning must include at least the following conditions: (1) Observable and realizable predicates as found in sentences of the forms which read, "at point x there is the property p ." This sentence implies that there is a class of atomic sentences or terms to which there are definite meanings assigned. (2) The meanings of other terms and sentences are assured through the derivative steps which are either (a) definitions or (b) reductive sentences. Granted that these conditions are the minimum requirement for purposes of confirmability, we see that Whitehead's terms do not satisfy these conditions. He has resorted to, and depended upon, for the most part, poetic insights or at least the insights of "civilized language"; and there have been no special precautions indicated for the specification of linguistic restrictions which are so essential for the establishment of definitive content to concepts.

According to Whitehead, a metaphysical proposition is mar-

²⁷ *P. R.*, p. 5.

²⁸ *P. R.*, p. 309.

ked by the following conditions: (1) there is a meaning for the proposition relative to the subject entertaining it; (2) the proposition is general; and (3) the proposition "has a 'uniform' truth-value, in the sense that, by reason of its form and scope, its truth value is identical with the truth-value of each of the singular propositions" which are secured through restriction of their application.²⁰ In other words, metaphysical statements are empirical propositions of a high degree of generality. For that reason the principles of confirmability would apply to them in the same sense that these principles apply to authentic statements of science. But there is an air about Whitehead's writing which forces one to hesitate to speak of his metaphysical statements as substitute statements for any science. For example, the sentence we have taken to be typical, "every actual entity is in its nature essentially social," might be taken to be a proposition from sociology or psychology and would, therefore, be verified in the same way as are statements from these sciences. But this does not seem to be his intent. Nor are these statements, nor the basic categories which are contained in them, to be taken as directives or constitutive concepts. Whitehead's method of derivation precludes the presupposition that his propositions are synthetic *a priori* in nature. At first glance, an examination of Whitehead's *Categories of Explanation* reveals that they do not have the form of traditional postulates which usually read, "given $x \dots$ to the effect that. . . ." Whitehead's categories of explanation have the form, "that x is . . . and that y is. . . ." This form of expression holds for all but five of the twenty-seven categories of explanation. The content of each explanatory statement sounds more like any synthetic proposition than a postulate or directive. His categories of explanation have, it seems, incorporated the insights which were the source of their derivation.

A metaphysical sentence of the form, "Actual entities are social," is meaningful if, and only if, it can be shown to be a declarative sentence the terms of which satisfy a criterion of verification for a language which purports to talk about the structure of "what there is." Whitehead's metaphysical language

²⁰ *P. R.*, p. 300.

contains no such criterion of verifiability and any so-called "proof" must be communicated indirectly through the intellectual process which is dialectical and asymptotic. This is demonstrated by the view that "the unity of treatment is to be looked for in the gradual development of the scheme, in meaning and in relevance," so that "at the end . . . there should be no problem . . . left over for discussion."³⁰

The principle of confirmation finds its locus in the unique function of the symbols taken either individually or collectively (the total system). The function of the symbol is to say all that it can say; and when it has ceased to speak, *i.e.*, ceased to be an image for continued inquiry, it perishes in the same manner that any actual entity perishes when its unity is lost. Confirmation is secured by an attitude, a mood, a moral orientation; these are nourished by "that ultimate good sense which we term civilization."

V

Conclusion. Let us affirm Whitehead's insight that a system of philosophy is never refuted; it is merely abandoned when its "charm is dissipated." No small measure of the charm of Whitehead's categorial scheme lies in its blend of factual, systematic, rationally-conceived claims to validity with an indirect appeal to metaphor; its inchoate mixture of poetry and reason, its rejection of the Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary, and the demand for a reconstructed terminology. But there should be no question of either refuting it or abandoning it, for the value of Whitehead's scheme rests not with its charm, which is considerable, but upon the fact that it constitutes a "matrix from which true propositions can be derived." I use this phrase only in the sense that Whitehead's attitude towards language provides us with one of the most constructive "test cases" in contemporary thought against which to assess the cluster of new questions related to language and metaphysics. Nor is the value of Whitehead's system lessened by the evidence that it seems to stand at variance with contemporary rationalistic trends in linguistic reform.

³⁰ *P. R.*, p. vii.

It should be noted that (1) Whitehead's linguistic reform is not dominated by a concern for an "ideal" language. While he suggests that "the verbal expressions . . . must be trimmed and dressed," the final arbiter is "that ultimate good sense" which resides in "civilized intercommunication." (2) Whitehead's categories themselves possess a unique function which is separated from any principle of conformity. The categories "evoke a feeling," establish a mood; they are diffused and notional. (3) Although philosophy is said to ally itself to "mathematical pattern," the syntactical means of assuring this role is singularly absent. "Learned precision" is demanded, but the call is not answered.

The extent, therefore, of the divergence from other recent attempts at logico-semantic reform is evident in the priority which Whitehead assigns to Eros over Logos. A necessary demarcation between these two basic forms of human knowledge is not easily detected in Whitehead's metaphysical language. To leave creativity enthroned and irresponsible is a derilection of philosophical analysis.

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CRITICAL STUDIES

EDWARDS RE-EXAMINED

CLYDE A. HOLBROOK

PRESIDENT EZRA STILES of Yale College commented in his diary entry for August 7, 1789, that in the future only "rare characters" and "singular and whimsical eccentrics" would be interested in the "futile speculations" of Jonathan Edwards. Stiles's prophecy, at least for the present generation, has proved to be singularly inaccurate. The projected publication of all of Edwards' works, now well under way by the joint efforts of a distinguished Editorial Committee, headed by Perry Miller of Harvard, the Yale University Press, the Bollingen Foundation, and a group of Edwards scholars, is sufficient evidence that Jonathan Edwards does not appeal solely to "whimsical eccentrics," but still commands the respectful attention of scholars of high competence.

The formidable task of republishing Edwards' works is made the more significant by the planned inclusion of the manuscript material hitherto little known except to a limited number of research scholars. The job of deciphering and organizing these writings, to say nothing of providing a meaningful context for understanding their merits, is one of the first magnitude. Each of the volumes will be put into the hands of a competent scholar for the editing of the text and the writing of an interpretive introduction. No attempt is being made to secure a unanimous interpretation of Edwards, and there is no possibility of fastening his many-sided genius to the partisan interests of any theological or philosophical group. What should emerge from the finished project is the first complete edition of the known writings of Edwards, plus a series of interpretive essays, each of which will be in itself a major contribution to the understanding of Edwards and to the broader field of humanistic studies.

Two volumes in the series have been brought out by the Yale University Press. The first, contains "A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of . . . Freedom of Will." The

second, gives us "A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections." Each of the volumes includes correspondence relevant to the main work contained in it.¹

The "Freedom of Will" is an impressive evidence of Edwards' intellectual and theological capacities. Perry Miller has called it the "cornerstone of Edwards' fame," although he also admits that it is the least valuable of Edwards' works for American literature.² Certainly it lacks the rhetorical power and aesthetic value of "The Nature of True Virtue" and the "Dissertation Concerning the End for which God Created the World." Yet by sheer intensity of argumentation it stands foremost among the polemical writings of Edwards. After several interruptions in his first laying out of the "Enquiry," Edwards wrote it in a relatively brief span of time. Although it received its final form amidst the practical problems and annoyances of mission life at Stockbridge, nothing of the daily turmoil, pettiness, or frontier dangers breaks through the steady pace of the work itself. Its precise and crushingly severe argument moves on its ponderous way to the triumphant annihilation of Edwards' foes, the "Arminians."³ Their views reduced repeatedly to absurdity and self-contradiction, Edwards is left to march to the vindication of his major contentions: that there is moral necessity in God's world, that man's liberty to do what he in fact chooses is all the liberty one can reasonably ask for, that man stands blameworthy and responsible precisely because his acts of volition stand in necessary connection with each other—which is to say, that one's whole character is subject to moral judgment.

Ramsey's introduction to the "Enquiry" is a thorough, at times involved, but exceedingly perceptive piece of craftsmanship. He sets the "Enquiry" in its historical context both by indicating

¹ *The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Volume I. Freedom of the Will.* Edited by Paul Ramsey. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, pp. xii, 494. *Volume II. Religious Affections.* Edited by John E. Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959, pp. 526.

² Perry Miller. *Jonathan Edwards.* New York: William Sloane Associates, 1949, p. 251.

³ Edwards admits that the term "Arminian" is not an entirely accurate description of his opponents. Cf. pp. 131-2. Vol. I, Yale Edition. All references in this article are to the Yale Edition, unless otherwise stated. Page references for both volumes under review will be given in the text.

how it came to be written and by describing fairly and fully those against whom it was written. The course of the argument and its implications are given critical exposition and interpretation. The letters appended to the "Enquiry" add immeasurably to the understanding of the work itself, indicating as they do the directions in which the later discussions moved.

According to Ramsey, there are two major lines along which the arguments of the "Enquiry" move. There is the theological issue, which comes down flatly to Edwards' conviction that "either contingency and the liberty of self-determination must be run out of this world, or God will be shut out" (p. 9). The other line of argumentation which more clearly stands to the forefront of the "Enquiry" is the philosophical or metaphysical. It relies heavily upon Lockean ideas on power and the will, and develops from the postulate that every effect must logically have a cause.

In understanding this work, it is difficult to overestimate the role played by Edwards' conviction of the sovereignty of God. It provides the *raison d'être* for Edwards' entering into the debate with the Arminians.⁴ Edwards is attacking what he regards as specious doctrines of the "freedom of the will" and defending his own views because unless this is done, the majesty of God will be repudiated. He makes clear in Part 2, section 3, that all things that begin to be "must have some foundation of their existence without themselves" (pp. 180-185). If this notion of cause be surrendered, if events, including acts of volition, come into being without cause or sufficient reason, then the world is a jumble of unintelligibility. No way is left by which to know God and his attributes. Indeed, there is no possibility for understanding how events connect with each other within the world itself. If human wills erupt spontaneously into decisions, divine foreknowledge is impugned, Biblical prophecies are left hanging, and the divine purposes may be frustrated. If this is God's world—and of that

⁴ William S. Morris criticizes Ramsey for suggesting that the theological issue is one of freedom versus divine sovereignty. Yet curiously enough Morris concludes by a virtual admission that this is the case. "God's moral government and providential care over the world must be established by the abolition of such notions" (i.e. "false notions of morality and freedom"). "The Reappraisal of Edwards" in *The New England Quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 4, 1957, p. 520.

Edwards was convinced beyond all shadow of doubt—then it is an intelligible world in which events hang together in causal or necessary connections. It is a world in which there are no “loose ends” which, if left to themselves, would unravel the whole system. God is no celestial mender of the fabric of being, which careless, free humans assume they can disrupt at will. He is not standing by helplessly while men go through the illusory motions of controlling their wills by their reasons, which they call making up their minds.⁵ He is the gracious, sovereign deity to which the whole of creation attests. “It properly belongs to the supreme and absolute Governor of the universe, to order all important events within his dominion, by his wisdom . . . Is it not better, that the good and evil which happens in God’s world, should be ordered . . . by the good pleasure of an infinitely wise Being . . . than to leave these things to fall out by chance, and to be determined by those causes which have no understanding or aim?” (pp. 404-5). So Edwards comes home to his principal conviction of divine sovereignty near the end of the “Enquiry,” nor has it been far removed from any point in the discussion. The Enquiry is not a debater’s or metaphysician’s game; it is Edwards’ way of staking out one portion of his claim for God’s complete and glorious sovereignty by showing men that they are not exceptions to the divine will.⁶

Although this theme of divine sovereignty provides the basic motif of the work, it cannot be denied that the more obvious, and certainly explicitly controversial aspects of it lie in the philosophical arguments. To even begin to deal with these arguments of Edwards (or with Ramsey’s interpretations of Edwards) is to run the danger of being swept into the vortex of a dialectician’s battle which would carry this review far beyond its proper limits. Problems of definitions and consistent use thereof are strewn throughout the “Enquiry” and in lifting any one issue into prominence, the writer soon finds he has lifted an interlocking group of problems, each of which calls for immediate and sharp resolution. Clearly, the arguments concerning the “Enquiry,” which

⁵ Cf. P. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

⁶ Cf. C. A. Holbrook. “The Ethics of Jonathan Edwards” (Unpublished dissertation, Yale University Library), pp. 182-3.

started with its first publication, have not reached an end some two hundred years later. The questions of how we read Edwards, what we regard as incidental and what germane to its principal argument, what his terms signify, and the evaluation of his proffered proofs, are issues upon which diversity of opinion remains.

We can at best only indicate a few of the areas in which interpretations have proved difficult. We may begin by showing the course of interpretation of Edwards' idea of liberty. In Part I, section 5, he wrote, "Let the person come by his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom" (p. 164). Again, in the letter entitled "Remarks on the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion," Edwards, in referring to his "Enquiry," stated, "Nothing that I maintain, supposes that men are at all hindered by any fatal necessity, from doing and even willing and choosing as they please, with full freedom; Yes, with the highest degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or that ever could possibly enter into the heart of any man to conceive" (p. 457).

In the light of such passages as these, Ramsey argues that Edwards "bracketed" the whole question of what precedes an act of willing, and centered his attention primarily, though not exclusively, on the actual experience of freedom, thus entering upon a kind of phenomenological analysis of the will or agent in action. Edwards' "definition of liberty and his account of voluntary action have the clarity and force of phenomenological analysis. This analysis may be consistent with various metaphysical views, such as determinism or indeterminism, which were bracketed" (pp. 11 and 16). The upshot of Ramsey's understanding of Edwards on freedom is that "In any case there is nothing in Edwards' account of an act of free, responsible volition which precludes it from being independent and self-moved" (p. 25). This is far from being a conventional conclusion, yet it is thoroughly understandable, both on the basis of what Edwards himself stated and the analysis which Ramsey offers.

However, this is not an acceptable construction of Edwards'

words for A. E. Murphy. He thinks that the first passage quoted above from Part I, Section 5 has been misread by Ramsey. The freedom referred to is not "a freedom of *acts of volition* at all, but of action consequent upon such acts of volition, a freedom not in choosing (and willing is choosing) but in acting as one wills or chooses . . . The question of the causation of voluntary actions is never for a moment 'bracketed' . . . What is provisionally 'bracketed' is the question of the determination of the acts of volition that cause such actions." ⁷ Thus when Ramsey allows that Edwards left the way open for a free, self-moved act of volition, Murphy replies that there is "no account of any act of free, responsible volition at all," and insists that so to construe Edwards makes absurd his whole position.

The line Ramsey has taken is one which interprets Edwards as holding to a freedom which can be demonstrated by a thorough analysis of "an act of volition." But in doing so "questions about what goes before an act of willing should not be raised" . . . then, "we can be sure of sticking close to the actual experience of freedom . . ." (p. 11). What seems significant to Ramsey are comments by Edwards such as these: "Let a man come by his volition or choice how he will," or "If a man does something voluntarily, . . . then in the most proper sense . . . he is said to act: but whether that choice or volition be self-determined, or no, whether it be connected with foregoing habitual bias, whether it be the certain effect of the strongest motive, or some extrinsic cause, never comes into consideration in the meaning of the word" (p. 347). Murphy's criticism of Ramsey follows the familiar line of Edwardean interpretation that acts of volition are "determined," all exhibiting the causal nexus, whereas actions following from these acts may be free, if nothing extrinsic to the agent interferes. But acts of will are not voluntary acts.

I think it likely that Ramsey has gone beyond the main thrust of Edwards' argument. Certainly the interpretation he offers is not one which Edwards himself stressed or often brought to the foreground. Yet there is enough material, both in the body of

⁷ A. E. Murphy, "Jonathan Edwards on Free Will and Moral Agency" in *The Philosophical Review*, April 1959, pp. 189-90. Italics in text. Cf. also W. S. Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 523.

the "Enquiry" and the appended letters, to give color to Ramsey's view. Ramsey himself must be credited with warning his reader that Edwards does not entirely set aside or completely bracket belief in divine determination or universal causality (p. 16). Murphy's views represent a conventional treatment of Edwards, and there is much in the explicit statements of the "Enquiry" to support him. However, when he claims that acts of will are not voluntary acts, or that there is no account of any free, responsible volition in Edwards' work, it seems that the only answer is to read Edwards again, and first of all to get his terminology straight, especially as to what he means by "necessity." Woodbridge's perceptive words on this issue bear repetition: "The causes of volition, whatever they may be, do not affect its voluntary aspect or destroy the function of the will, any more than the causes of life destroy the functions of life."⁸

Yet it is small wonder that interpreters fall out among themselves, since Edwards himself often leaves open the way for it by inconsistent usage of some key terms. An illustration of this is found in the use made of "cause" and "necessity." Ramsey makes clear that causation is to be understood not as efficient causation, but as a fixed connection or correlation as between an antecedent and a consequent. "Free acts are uncompelled acts, not uncaused or undetermined acts" (p. 37). Edwards himself has apparently clearly laid the ground for this distinction by saying, of "philosophical necessity," "When the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms the existence of anything, either substance, quality, act or circumstance have a full and certain connection, then the existence or being of that thing is said to be necessary in a metaphysical sense. And in this sense I use the word 'necessity,' . . . when I endeavor to prove that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty" (p. 152). At another point he speaks of cause as "any antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition which affirms that event, is true; whether it has any positive influence, or not" (p. 181).

⁸ F. J. E. Woodbridge, "The Philosophy of Edwards" in *Edwards Bicentenary*, p. 55.

However, we may ask, does Edwards, once having established the distinction between cause in the sense of logical connection and cause as an efficacious operation in being, maintain consistently the distinction? To speak of the fixed connection of terms in a proposition is to speak on one level of discourse without any necessary reference to being. But does Edwards not also want to argue, as he in fact does, that nothing happens in this world without "cause" in the sense of efficient causality, i.e. at the level of being? What else are we to make of his statement that all things that are not self-existent "must have some foundation of their existence without themselves" (p. 181).⁹ Here Edwards is not dealing with possible being, that which is rationally implied in the notion of a First Cause, but with that effective factor which brings into actual existence all we are and find in our world. God is not only an intelligible ground of being; He is the active agent in creation.

When Edwards talks of "certain connections between motives and volitions" and then lapses, as Ramsey puts it, into the use of the idea of "determination," it is not surprising that Murphy finds genuine contradictions in Edwards. When Edwards says, "the will always is as the greatest apparent good," is he not contradicting his other claim that the will is determined by the strongest motive (pp. 144, 148)? Both expressions are used by Edwards, but which best represents Edwards' views of "cause" and "necessity"? Murphy concludes that all talk about motives causing acts of volition leads not only to a disappearance of the freedom of the moral agent, but of the will itself.¹⁰ Interestingly enough, Edwards had insisted from the outset that there was no faculty labeled the "will," and had stressed, although not consistently, the unitary character of the moral agent. Murphy seems to have arrived at the very viewpoint for which Edwards had been heading all the time. Yet on his way Edwards has slipped back and forth between necessity as a characteristic of logical predication and as an efficient agent. Ramsey recognizes the issue, but seems to let Edwards off too lightly in his mention of it (p. 37 and p. 46).

⁹ Cf. W. S. Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 524.

¹⁰ A. E. Murphy, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-5, 201. Cf. also Joseph Haroutunian, "Piety Versus Moralism." New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1932, pp. 221-22

There are many other problems both in Edwards' and in Ramsey's interpretations. Was Edwards confusing the language of mental causation with that of moral approval and justification? Did he, and can Ramsey, make out his case for "necessity" as consistent with the use of "inducements" and the passing of moral judgments? And since every metaphysical theory ought to be able to show how it may be held consistently with what it has in substance maintained, we may ask whether Edwards' theory about the "will" is consistent with the possibility of passing judgment on its truth or falsity. Can questions of validity, in any form, including evaluation of his theory, properly arise on Edwards' showing?

Dr. Johnson assured Boswell that "all theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience for it." But Edwards did not see the problem in any such simple light. He had set out to show that experience as well as theory was against "freedom" and for "moral necessity." Much of the "Enquiry" develops in this empirical vein. For example, in a revealing footnote, he claimed that he had no experience of his will's determining itself or behaving in a "contingent" manner (pp. 425-6). All he could find—and he reasoned that others would find the same—was that he could do as he willed and that "what I will, I will." However, his honesty and empiricism drove him to make an almost fatal admission, namely, that he did not experience the "effectual cause" of his volitions. The rationalist in him at this point came to the rescue of the empiricist by fending off those who attempted to argue from this lack of experience to the notion of self-caused volition. He tartly remarked, "I have no more reason from hence to determine any such thing [i.e. that volitions cause themselves], than I have to determine that I gave myself my own being, or that I come into being accidentally without a cause, because I first found myself possessed of being, before I had knowledge of a cause of my being" (p. 426). Only up to a certain point would Edwards count himself a disciple of Locke!

It is difficult to speak too highly of Ramsey's skill in laying out the crucial lines of this enormously taxing work. He has handled exposition and interpretation without pedantry, yet with competence and thoroughness. He has given breadth to the

"Enquiry" not only by showing its function in Edwards' thought and the theological situation of his day, but also by correlating its insights with issues not yet resolved in our own time. Edwards' opponents are given their just due, and Ramsey does not flinch from showing where Edwards failed to meet them on their own grounds. His extensive discussions of Chubb, Whitby, and Watts succeed in being both highly informative and intrinsically interesting. Of course, opinions will differ on Ramsey's treatment of certain crucial issues, only a few of which have been mentioned in this essay, and perhaps he has exhibited a tendency to read Edwards as a more consistent and impregnable thinker than he was in fact. The total effect, however, is one of scholarly proficiency at a high level.

"A Treatise concerning Religious Affections" appeared in 1746, nine years before the "Enquiry." Building on his previous works, especially "The Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God" (1741), Edwards set out to make clear that true religion lay very much in raised affections, properly understood—this in answer to Charles Chauncy and the "rationalists"—and that true piety was not to be confused with the crass and ridiculous emotionalism set off by the antics of Davenport and other "enthusiasts." It was this last named group which had prompted Stiles to write off the Great Awakening as a time when "Multitudes were seriously, soberly, and solemnly, out of their wits." Thus, Edwards assumed the double-edged task of defending "true piety" against both its detractors and those groups who were "solemnly out of their wits." With the possible exception of his essay on "Qualifications on Communion," the "Treatise" was perhaps the most discouraging and thankless job Edwards ever undertook. It did nothing to convince Chauncy, who, as Miller points out, went to his death without answering it, convinced that Edwards was "a visionary enthusiast, and not to be minded in anything he says."¹¹ The enthusiasts went their merry way quite unaware or heedless of Edwards' fine distinctions between true and false affections. In the meantime, the "Treatise"

¹¹ P. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

was set aside, so far as any practical effect upon the immediate situation was concerned.

The remarkable fact remains, however, that as time passed, the "Religious Affections" proved to be one of Edwards' most durable works. The number of editions and printings through which it has passed in this country and abroad indicates its popularity. Smith calls it "Edwards' most widely read book" (Vol. II, p. 78). Its treatment of vital, "experimental" religion proved to be something of a classic, and may be regarded as a forerunner of James' "Varieties of Religious Experience."

Smith's introduction sets the "Treatise" in its historical context, describes Edwards' argument for affections as a major part of religion, carefully takes the reader through an analysis of the "signs," and shows how Edwards' insights may bear upon contemporary religious concerns. The editor also offers helpful identification of the authors upon whom Edwards drew for support, and concludes with the customary notes on the editing of the text itself.

Smith obviously disagrees with Sereno Dwight's estimate of Edwards' style in the "Treatise." Dwight called it "the most incorrect of all his works, published by himself."¹² Rather, Smith extols Edwards' manner of writing and thinking. He insists that Edwards "was in tight control of his ideas," that he wrote with a "meticulous form of expression" and a "precision in language." "The most striking features of the Affections," the editor maintains, "are the exactitude and vividness of the language. Edwards always sought the right word, the one which exactly expressed his intended meaning" (p. 8).

There is much truth along with a measure of exaggeration in these remarks, as the following observations may show.

After reference to Edwards' attempt to distinguish sharply between the understanding, affections, and will, Smith tells us "we must not overlook the extent to which these critical distinctions are overridden in the course of the argument" (p. 11).

¹² "Works of President Edwards," Vol. I, p. 602 (Converse Edition, New York, 1829). Cf. also C. H. Faust and T. H. Johnson, "Jonathan Edwards: Representative Selections," p. cxiv (New York: American Book Company, 1935).

In the footnote on page 14, Smith admits that Edwards is not clear on the subject of the difference between will and affections and their mutual connections. "Perhaps," he writes, "the attempt to be too meticulous here will only lead to confusion." Again, in the footnote on page 17, Smith admits that Edwards falls into "minor inconsistency" in describing sin and hardness of heart as an "unaffected heart" rather than as a heart affected negatively, i.e., as hatred, aversion or rejection. At another juncture, the editor writes: "His argument at this point is apt to be confusing because he speaks of both the *nature* of the states in the soul and their *order*" (p. 19). Most obviously, Smith finds this thesis of Edwards' "meticulous form of expression" and "precision in language" in difficult straits when he admits that Edwards does not use the term "sign" in a consistently clear manner, and that he fails to clarify the relation among the "signs." He rescues Edwards by saying "Confusion can be avoided if we bear in mind that some signs point to affections themselves, others to their ground, and still others to what issues from them or to their consequence" (pp. 23-4).

The substance of the "Treatise" lies in the signs by which Edwards hoped to unravel the strands of spurious and valid religious experience. He prefaces the catalogue of signs with a defense of the proposition that "True religion, in great part, consists in holy affections," and a description of the nature of these "affections." Smith's analysis of the nature of the affections is an extremely able one. It makes crystal clear that Edwards refused to be herded into the category of those who defend emotion or the "heart" at the expense of the reason of the "head." The affections are not simply some entity or faculty possessed by the soul; they represent the central orientation or bent of the total self, inclusive of the mind. "The point almost invariably missed," writes Smith, "is that in Edwards' view the *inclination* involves both the will and the mind." The affections are "expressions of inclination *through the mind*" (p. 13). (*Italics in text.*) They are not to be regarded as blind passions or seizures of the higher faculties by some inchoate subterranean force within the self.

Armed with this conception of the affections, Edwards was ready to argue another essential point. Although affections are

not blind, they are not, on the other hand, capable of being used as signs. They must themselves be put to the tests which Edwards establishes. Here a major problem arises which Edwards never completely clarified. In fact, it was one which in one form or another affected his elaborate system of "tests." When Edwards spoke of gracious affections, he often identified them with the activity of the Holy Spirit, yet among the tests or signs of these same affections stands first his dictum that only those affections which arise from "spiritual, supernatural and divine influence are genuine" (pp. 17 and 24). We must ask in what sense this sign is a test of gracious affections, when already by definition, gracious affections are conceived as identical with divine and supernatural influences. We would seem to be faced with circular reasoning.

Having raised the issue in this form, we may raise other closely connected questions. For whom are these signs intended? Who is to apply them to the affections? Are they tests by which to judge the validity of others' religious experiences, or are they, as Smith suggests, in accordance with Edwards' main line of thought, only to be employed by each individual for himself? Clearly the first alternative is repugnant to Edwards, and Smith on his behalf comments that the judgment of one man on another's spiritual estate is "not only unreliable but ultimately impossible" (p. 21). However, if we turn to the second alternative for Edwards' true purpose, a problem remains. If an individual attempts, with Edwards' assistance, to judge his own condition, does he not run the risk of undoing the work of the Holy Spirit, if he has been truly "wrought upon"? Unless one doubts, why test oneself? And if one tests, is he not doubting? It is basic to Edwards' position, developed in his description of the affections, that the self operates as a unit, not in some piecemeal, faculty-by-faculty fashion. Why then this anxious scanning of one's interior landscape? Indeed, if a person is a unitary being, how is it possible for him to hold a segment of his experience at arm's length while he estimates its value? In fact, Edwards' fifth sign, that of the spiritual conviction "of the reality and certainty of divine things" would appear to make impossible and unnecessary any attempt to judge among affections. As Smith says, "A man sees that it is really so" (pp. 33-4, 291 ff.). If one sees most

certainly that he has "gracious affections," why go further? The task is already done!

Questions concerning the application of Edwards' elaborate apparatus of signs, and how and when they are employed, lead to another important issue. On what grounds can the signs or tests themselves be validated? Presumably the signs themselves, however they vary in content and method of application, are true signs. That is, they are to be judged as to their validity in the public domain, although their application may be private. Some of Edwards' signs undoubtedly can be adjudged in the public domain, such as that of "good works." However, several of them, and some of his most important ones, do not appear to be capable of passing the bars of candid empirical inspection, disinterested rational consistency, or practical results. They are norms or signs which could be recognized as germane to the task of testing the affections only by one either already convinced of Edwards' position, or wrought upon by the Holy Spirit. Their status as criteria, independent of the specific content of which presumably they are to be tests, proves to be verbal or merely apparent. Or to return to our first formulation: if true affections are themselves the divine operation, if a new, supernatural sense must accompany them, if certainty about divine things is an ingredient in them, why and how should they be properly tested?

The editor recognizes some of the problems briefly alluded to above, and he strives to pull Edwards out of the difficulties I have suggested. Smith, not Edwards, clarifies the two basic senses in which the term "sign" is used. "It is best to suppose," he writes, "that the sign 'points to' the activity of the Spirit, especially when we consider the matter from the side of our human process of knowing. Taken apart from its evidential force, however, a sign must be understood as the very presence of the Spirit . . ." (p. 23). But to go farther, the term "sign" sometimes refers to the affections themselves, sometimes to the ground of the affections, and sometimes to the consequences of the affections. Certainly, Smith is to be credited with showing us what some of the issues are, but neither he nor Edwards reaches the problem of the validation of the norms. To describe a "sign," to show its nature and jurisdiction, is one thing; to show why it should be employed as a norm

is quite another. In spite of the most diligent efforts of the editor, I am afraid that Edwards has left the whole question of the status of signs in such an anomalous condition that he cannot be completely extricated from it.

One of the "signs" to which Smith and Edwards pay much attention is the twelfth or last one. Stated briefly, true religion or "gracious affections" result in practice directed by Christian rules, as a persistent and thorough engagement of one's life. Smith sees this sign as the most important of the group, as Edwards gave more space to it than to the others, and he himself called it "The chief of all the signs of grace, both as an evidence of the sincerity of professors unto others and also to their own consciences" (p. 406).

Several troublesome matters arise in connection with Smith's interpretation of this sign. First, the amount of space given its treatment is not dictated solely by its importance as the "chief sign." A major portion of this section is taken up with a recapitulation of previous signs, showing how they reach fruition in this sign. Second, another segment of the section provides Edwards with the opportunity of answering objections and possible misunderstandings about this sign. Finally, as the twelfth sign is the last, Edwards employs this section for a climatic conclusion to the work. Thus the space allotted to this sign need not be considered as due solely to the intrinsic merit of the sign itself.

This is not to say that Smith has overestimated the importance of Edwards' treatment of this sign. Clearly Edwards considered the fruits of the affection a crucial manifestation of genuine piety. More than this, Edwards had on his hands the task of showing Chauncy and his followers that affections did not end in narcissistic enjoyment but led out into the domain of publicly observable actions. By the same token, the frenetic supporters of revivalism were emphatically reminded that raised affections without concrete reforms of behavior were no true indication of the divine operation. Edwards, at the same time he embraces "good works" as a manifestation of gracious affections, must not allow himself to be trapped into a doctrine of justification by works, a view completely alien to his evangelical posture and antagonistic to his views on the manner in which true affections

function and are grounded in God. Therefore, he had to walk a narrow line; works are the chief sign or test of one's own and another's faith, yet we cannot glory in them or hope to be justified by them. So sensitive was he to the possibilities of misunderstanding of this delicately poised position that he repeatedly refined his original statement of the sign until he whittled away much of what must have been to his opponents the unmistakable meaning of the sign as first stated. At last he states his position in a manner which suggests that even this chief sign has very definite limitations, the implications of which affect many of the other signs: "No external manifestations and outward appearances whatsoever, that are visible to the world, are infallible evidences of grace. These manifestations," he continued, "are the best that mankind can have" (p. 420). As a safeguard against men's attempts to judge finally of the sound condition of others, Edwards is on strong ground. However, if practice is the chief sign, and this sign turns out not to be a sure and true sign of grace, but only "the best men can have," a large margin is left, even when all the signs are put together, wherein genuine error about one's spiritual condition is possible. That amount by which one fails of complete certainty is enough to give an earnest seeker many a sleepless night!

Dr. Smith rather incautiously claims that Edwards was "most careful not to say that other men should use the sign and judge their neighbors; he confines himself instead to saying that practice is the best evidence of a man's godliness in the eyes of others" (p. 40). This is the main drift of Edwards' interpretation of this final sign. However, it is not accurate to credit Edwards with denying something he did explicitly state several times. What Edwards wrote was "Christian practice is the *principal sign* by which Christians are to judge both of their own and others' sincerity of godliness" (pp. 406-7. *Italics in text.* Also, pp. 411, 436, 438, 441). Smith is correct in assuming that Edwards never intended to provide by this sign, or any other, an infallible norm by which people could go about judging others. There had been too much "censoriousness" attendant upon the Great Awakening, and it had ended in ill will and factionalism. Yet, as we have noted, Edwards does refer to this sign as a means of judging

others. Smith's distinction between a "sign by which to judge" and "the best evidence to oneself and others" is so fine a line of distinction that it becomes almost imperceptible in Edwards' handling of it. When good works are interpreted as the necessary function of gracious affections, and the term "sign" is looked at in that light, we have the most valid interpretation of Edwards' position. But when good works are employed as signs by which to judge oneself and others, the term "sign" refers to a practical norm and not simply to a spontaneous manifestation of the Spirit. In this sense the way is left open to just that kind of pragmatic self-justification which Edwards most wanted to avoid. He was not successful in closing off this avenue because of his ambiguous use of the term "sign."

I am inclined to think that the profoundest signs Edwards offered, though probably the least likely to persuade others, are those which test the affections by the nature of the objects upon which they fasten. In dealing with the second, third, and eleventh signs, Smith brings out clearly the theological objectivism which undergirded the "Treatise," as it did the "Enquiry." The affections are themselves signs of something more ultimate, namely God and the Spirit (p. 39). Or to allow Edwards to speak his own piece: "A holy love has a holy object; the holiness of love consists especially in this that it is the love of that which is holy, as holy, as for its holiness" (p. 260). Even while developing his treatment of the last sign, Edwards does not retire from this objectivistic position when he writes, "Whenever a person finds within him, an heart to treat God as God, at the time that he has the trial, and finds his disposition effectual in the experiment, that is the most proper, and most distinguishing experience" (pp. 452-3). What at last distinguishes true affections from spurious ones is that they are brought into play by the divine, and they find their proper satisfaction in the glorious nature of God for His own sake.

A particularly significant aspect of Professor Smith's introduction is his observation that the "Treatise" has made three contributions relevant to contemporary religious trends. He sees Edwards as having recovered the distinctively religious dimension of life; as having shown that the understanding, broadly conceived, could and should be retained in close affiliation with

the individual's most intimate religious experiences, and as having demonstrated that piety could be subjected to rational scrutiny in the forms of tests (p. 44). Smith has made his case for the first two of these observations, but perhaps he has given undue credit to Edwards for having carried through the third. Edwards' criteria in too many cases are assumed to be valid and relevant prior to any demonstration of that validity and relevance. If, as the editor says, "The criteria are provided by the New Testament picture of the Christian life, as interpreted in a rational way," it may be urged that the "New Testament picture" is itself assumed to be valid prior to any consideration of its validity. Of course, there is a stopping place in getting at the validity of norms, and for the Christian the New Testament in some measure is such a stopping point. For Edwards, who is dealing in the last analysis not with religion as such, but with distinctions among various forms of Christian religion, the halting point may properly be the New Testament. However, the question of whether criteria drawn from Christian sources are adequate to the problem of distinguishing among various forms of religions in today's world, is not a question to which Edwards convincingly speaks. Nor in fact, need we expect him to have done so within the set limits of the "Treatise." Whether criteria extrapolated from the "Treatise" will serve this purpose for the contemporary scene, is another question.

Among the many attractive features of Smith's introduction are the accounts given of the large number of authors from whom Edwards quotes. Smith has checked Edwards' citations of them and given ample credit to each in proportion to his ascertainable influence upon Edwards. One minor caveat might be entered in respect to John Owen, who is labeled, according to Smith's reading of Owen's contemporaries, as one of the "over-orthodox doctors" and less flexible Calvinists. However, others have referred to him as "a man of strong Puritan sympathies, but of a very tolerant temper." It has been suggested that Locke's attachment to religious toleration owes something to Owen, who was Dean of Christ Church and Vice-Chancellor during Locke's time at

Oxford.¹³ It was he who drew up a scheme for religious toleration during Cromwell's Protectorate.¹⁴

The inclusion of the letters which passed between Thomas Gillespie of Scotland and Edwards is a welcome addition to the volume, showing as they do how Edwards went on to clarify issues in the "Treatise" for his friends overseas. The last letter ends with a pathetic postscript in which Edwards refers to his dismissal from the Northampton church. He expresses the fervent hope that "God would open a door for my future usefulness and provide for me and my numerous family . . . being cast on the wide world" (p. 513).

Both Ramsey and Smith have gone far to fulfill Edwards' hope of "future usefulness." By their judicious editing and insightful and provocative interpretations, they have helped us to see Edwards for what he was—a person whose prodigious intellectual force and profound religious sensitivity lift him into the front rank of theologians and philosophers of all time.

The Yale Press and Bollingen Foundation, as well as the general editorial committee, are to be congratulated on the undertaking of this significant project in the interests of American literature, theology, and philosophy. The attractive form as well as the weighty substance of these volumes should lure increasing numbers of scholars and laymen to understand and enjoy one of the world's greatest minds.

Two minor flaws in spelling or typography should be mentioned. In the first volume the quotation from Faust and Johnson on page one has been carried over with a misspelling of "catechize." In the second volume, page thirty-one is marred by the misspelling of "understanding."

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¹³ S. P. Lamprecht, ed. *Locke Selections* (Modern Students' Library) p. viii. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928.

¹⁴ Maurice Ashley, *Oliver Cromwell and the Puritan Revolution*, p. 143. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1958.

THE THEORETICAL AND THE PRACTICAL

E. M. ADAMS

IN THIS STUDY, I shall discuss some recent attempts to illuminate the practical dimension of experience¹ and some tendencies to assimilate the theoretical to the practical.²

Perhaps the central categories of the practical area are 'intention' and 'intentional action.' As Hampshire says, "The notion of the will, of action, the relation of thought and action, the relation of a person's mind and body, the difference between observing a convention or rule and merely having a habit—all these problems find their meeting place in the notion of intention" (p. 96). Certainly if 'intention' and 'intentional action' are clarified the whole practical field will be illuminated. Miss Anscombe thinks that 'intention' itself can best be got at by concentrating on 'intentional action.'

One might think that the difference between what is said about an action when it is described as intentional and what is said when it is spoken of as unintentional would indicate the intentional aspect of the event. This would suggest that intentional actions are identifiable by the presence of certain characteristics and that they thus form a natural class. Miss Anscombe argues against such a position. Intentional actions, according to her, have nothing extra or internal about them that unintentional ones do not have. She defines 'intentional action' in terms of language—in terms of a form of description; namely, the form of description of an event to which 'in order to' or 'because' (in one sense) may be attached—the form that renders the question 'why?' (in a certain sense) applicable or appropriate. 'Why?' in the requisite sense,

¹ G. E. M. Anscombe. *Intention*. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957; and Stuart Hampshire, *Thought and Action*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1959.

² John Hartland-Swann. *An Analysis of Knowing*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958; Roderick M. Chisholm, *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study*. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957; and Michael Polanyi. *Personal Knowledge*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958.

does not ask for a causal explanation; nor for evidence; but for a reason. But the question has application, according to Miss Anscombe, even if it is answered 'no particular reason' or 'I don't know why.' The question is not applicable, she contends, if the agent is not aware of what he is doing, if he knows about the action only through observation, or if there is no mental cause—that is, if the agent does not have non-observational knowledge of the cause of his behavior, but has to speculate about it.

I would be inclined to say that the sense of 'why?' in question is that which asks for a *practical* reason—one that could appear as a premise in a practical argument. Much of what Miss Anscombe says seems to support this view. "Aristotle's 'practical reasoning' or my order of questions 'Why?'" she says, "can be looked at as a device which reveals the order that there is [when actions are done with intentions]" (p. 80). In one place she says "if you ask 'Why did you kill him?' the answer 'He killed my father' is surely a reason" (p. 10), and it is clear that 'why?' is used here in the sense in which she wishes to define 'intentional action'; but later she says the example, 'He killed my father, so I shall kill him,' is not only not a practical argument, but "is not even a form of reasoning at all," for there is no calculation involved (p. 64).

This apparent confusion can be cleared up, I think, by giving attention to what she says positively about the kinds of answer the question 'Why?' in the requisite sense, may elicit. "The answer may (a) simply mention past history [like 'He killed my father' as an answer to 'Why did you kill him?'], (b) give an interpretation of the action [like 'Resting' as an answer to 'Why are you lying on the bed?'], or (c) mention something future (like 'I am flying to New York this morning on the 8:00 plane' as an answer to 'Why are you up so early?'" (p. 24). In regard to (a), she says, the mention of a past event is an answer to the question 'Why?' in the sense in question "if the ideas of good or harm are involved in its meaning as an answer; or again if further inquiry elicits that it is connected with 'interpretative' motive, or intention *with which*" (pp. 24-25). The problem is to determine when the past event is given as a reason as distinct from a cause, whether mental or not. But the statement of the past event can not function as a premise in practical reasoning even if it does constitute an

answer to 'why?' in the appropriate sense, for to her there would be no calculating involved. "The mark of practical reasoning," she says, is that the thing wanted is *at a distance* [either as a wider description like 'resting' in relation to 'lying on the bed,' or remote in time] from the immediate action, and the immediate action is calculated as the way of getting or doing or securing the thing wanted" (p. 78). In other words, practical reasoning, as she uses the term, does not include reasoning that terminates in a want or desire, but only reasoning about what to do to obtain what is wanted. She says: "If, thinking 'if I do this, this will happen,' he decides to do it and so determines 'this' as the result he wants, which before was undetermined, and if 'this' is not wanted with a view to any further end, he is not 'reasoning with a view to an end' at all" (p. 80); and in the same paragraph she says this is not a case of practical reasoning. Practical reasoning, she contends, always begins with something wanted (p. 63) and its absolute beginning point is something wanted for its own sake; something falling under a desirability characterization that "gives a final answer to the series of 'what for?' questions that arise about an action" (p. 71).

The situation, then, may be summarized this way. Practical reasoning leads from something wanted to something to be done to obtain or to secure it. While the question 'Why?' asked of an action may elicit the structure of such reasoning, it has a wider application. To ask 'Why did you kill him?' (when the answer is 'Because he killed my father') is not to ask 'What was wanted that killing him was calculated to obtain?'; nor is it to ask 'How was killing him calculated to obtain what was wanted?' It attempts to elicit why the person *wanted* to kill him when killing him was not a calculated way of obtaining something else that was wanted. One might say that it is practical reasoning after all; for the person wanted revenge for his father's death and killing his murderer was calculated as the means of obtaining it. But to say 'I shall kill him in order to revenge my father's death' is simply another way of saying 'He killed my father; so I shall kill him.' Revenge is simply doing injury to a person because of some injury he has done to you.

Miss Anscombe denies that there is reasoning involved appar-

ently because she assumes that one cannot come to want something through a reasoning process except in cases where wanting is extended from, let us say, *a* to *b* by reasoning about the connections between *a* and *b*. This turns upon the nature of wanting. Miss Anscombe says "there are two features present in wanting; movement toward a thing and knowledge (or at least opinion) that the thing is there" (p. 64); "but where the thing wanted is not even supposed to exist, as when it is a future state of affairs, we have to speak of an idea, rather than of knowledge or opinion" (p. 69). This leaves the movement toward the thing entirely unexplained. I suppose it is thought of as a natural occurrence causally produced in some way. But I would like to suggest, without arguing for it here,³ that wanting something, in the sense Miss Anscombe has in mind ("The wanting that interests us . . . is neither wishing nor hoping nor the feeling of desire, and cannot be said to exist in a man who does nothing towards getting what he wants" (p. 67), is similar to believing "something" in that it is the acceptance of what we may call an imperative, the acceptance of something as something to be, to be had, or to be done; just as believing something is the acceptance of a statement or proposition, the acceptance of something (some fact) as something that is the case. Furthermore, the imperative may be accepted because of certain facts which one acknowledges to be supporting reasons for the imperative in question. The "movement toward" or inclination to act of which Miss Anscombe speaks is, I suggest, an essential part of what it is to accept an imperative of the kind involved in wanting. If there is any truth in this account, one can come to want something through a reasoning process in a more direct way than Miss Anscombe would allow. 'He killed my father; so I shall kill him' might be a case in point. Perhaps reasoning that terminates in wanting something may be unlike reasoning that leads to a belief in this respect: a belief can be reached by reasoning only if there are premises that are believed; but perhaps a want can be reached by reasoning in some cases not from something *wanted* but from purely factual beliefs. If so, the basis of the connection between

³ This suggestion is developed in my forthcoming book, *Ethical Naturalism and the Modern World-View*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, summer, 1960. Chs. V, VI.

the factual premises and the imperative conclusion would be mostly interesting and perhaps philosophical significant.

But the only point I am concerned to make here is that if we should think of practical reasoning in the manner I have suggested, then we could clarify the particular sense of 'Why?' that Miss Anscombe has in mind in terms of the concept of a practical argument; we could say that 'why?' in the requisite sense, asks for a reason that might appear as a premise in a practical argument, a reason that would validate or support an imperative.

If these suggestions are acceptable, we may say that Miss Anscombe's position is that an intentional action is one to which the practical 'why?' is applicable. But one might still want to know what there is about an event or action by virtue of which the question is applicable. This, however, is not a meaningful question, according to Miss Anscombe. "The description of what we are interested in," she says, is a type of description that would not exist if our question 'why?' did not. It is not that certain things, namely the movements of humans, are for some undiscovered reason subject to the question 'Why?' So too," she continues, "it is not just that certain appearances of chalk on blackboard are subject to the question 'What does it say?' It is of a word or sentence that we ask 'What does it say?'; and the description of something as a word or a sentence at all could not occur prior to the fact that words or sentences have meaning [prior to the fact that 'What does it say?' is applicable to it]. So the description of something as a human action could not occur prior to the existence of the question 'why?' simply as a kind of utterance by which we were *then* obscurely prompted to address the question" (p. 82).

But what does this establish other than that we cannot describe an occurrence as a human action without having the question 'why?'; that the description 'human action' and 'why?' are interdependent linguistic devices? Maybe we cannot define one independently of the other, but must not the whole linguistic complex that embraces both of them have a ground that can be illuminated in some way? She herself has said many insightful things about when the question 'why?' is applicable and when it is not—such things as it is applicable only when the person acting has non-

observational knowledge of what he is doing and when there is room for non-observational knowledge of the cause of the act. Rankin has suggested⁴ that we can define an intentional action as one in which the non-observational knowledge of it is its mental cause (the cause of which the agent has non-observational and non-speculative knowledge). Even though one might want to quarrel with this particular proposal, I do not see how it can be ruled out *a priori* in the manner Miss Anscombe would.

Contrary to Miss Anscombe, I suggest that it would be more fruitful to concentrate on 'intention' than 'intentional action.' She says "if we consider just the verbal expression of intention, we arrive only at its being a—queer—species of prediction; and if we try to look for what it is an expression of, we are likely to find ourselves in one or other of several dead ends, e.g.: psychological jargon about 'drives' and 'sets'; reduction of intention to a species of desire, i.e. a kind of emotion; or irreducible intuition of the meaning of 'I intend'" (pp. 5-6). But at one of these "dead ends" we might find illumination. And, too, perhaps there is an alternative to psychological jargon about drives and sets in trying to locate what the linguistic expression of an intention is an expression of.

Both Anscombe and Hampshire recognize that intentions, like beliefs, may be given linguistic expression (Anscombe, p. 5; Hampshire, pp. 97, 145). Hampshire points up other similarities with beliefs: "an intention is not a momentary occurrence . . . to express an intention, or to impute an intention to do something to someone else, is in many ways like expressing or imputing a belief. I may have formed the intention or belief at a particular moment. Thereafter it can truly be said of me at anytime that I believe so-and-so, or intend so-and-so, until I change my mind, even if I never give the matter another thought" (pp. 100-101); "when asked what I am going to do on a certain occasion in the future, I may find myself giving a definite answer without the least hesitation and without ever having reviewed the question before; this, I now recognize, had all along been my intention, just as I have all

⁴ K. W. Rankin, review of *Intention in Mind*, Vol. LXVIII, N. S. No. 270 (April, 1959) pp. 262-263.

along believed without question that a certain statement is true" (p. 101); "Intentions [like beliefs] may in themselves be specific or vague, apart from the statement of them, which in its turn may be more or less specific in relation to the intention stated" (p. 123); "An intention [like a belief] . . . is possible only in a being who is capable of at least the rudiments of conceptual thought" (p. 99); "Intentions [like beliefs] are something that may be concealed and disguised; but they can be concealed and disguised, only because they naturally express themselves immediately in words or in actions" (p. 99).

These parallels suggest that we think of intentions as significantly analogous to beliefs. We cannot understand or clarify what a mental state of believing is without reference to *what is believed*. This is because believing is a propositional attitude. It is a state with a semantic dimension that lends itself to being articulated or expressed linguistically. I suggest that a mental state of intention also has a semantic dimension; but instead of being expressible in declarative sentences as in the case of a belief, it is expressible in imperative sentences. This may seem misleading because we use imperative sentences primarily in giving instructions or in telling others what to do. But if we approach the matter with the question 'What is it one accepts when one forms an intention?' (parallel with the question 'What is it one accepts when one forms a belief?'), it will be clear, I think, that what one accepts or subscribes to in an imperative, (just as what one accepts in forming a belief is a proposition). Hampshire suggests this when he says "Every convention or rule that I accept is an intention that I declare" (p. 99).

Perhaps it was the intentionality (in the semantic sense) of the mental state of intention that led Miss Anscombe to insist upon a linguistic rather than a psychological account. But the purely linguistic account that she gives does not recognize the semantic character of the mental state *per se*. If this had been entertained as a possibility, she would not have given up the search for what the linguistic expression of an intention is the expression of for fear that it would terminate in psychological jargon about "sets" and "drives." Both the psychological and the purely linguistic talk fail to do justice to the mental state of intention. The former ignores

the semantic dimension involved; the latter attributes it only to language in the conventional sense. The truth seems to be that mental states are themselves semantic in character and language (in the ordinary sense) only derivatively so by virtue of being their instrument. But complex mental states are not possible without certain linguistic devices. Perhaps an intention (and thus intentional action) is not possible without 'why?' (in the appropriate sense), but this does not seem to get to the heart of the matter. It would seem that an intention is not possible without the imperative linguistic form (at least in some rudimentary sense) and that 'why?' as a form of question goes with the imperative form. So the applicability of the question 'why?' to an action simply indicates that the action was done in carrying out an accepted imperative to do the thing in question. We might say, along the line of Rankin's suggestion, that the acceptance of the imperative to do X is the mental cause of one's doing X when the doing of X is an intentional action.

As I suggested earlier, the acceptance of an imperative to do something may be the result of a reasoning process; and, too, one may be led to give up an imperative by being reasoned with. Such reasoning is practical. It consists of citing facts that are acknowledged to support or to invalidate the imperative (plan or policy) in question. Herein lies man's basic freedom—his capacity to accept or to reject propositions and imperatives on the basis of evidence and reasons rather than being causally determined (in a naturalistic way) in belief and intention by antecedent conditions.

A full exploration of the realm of the practical would involve delving into the nature of practical reasoning, how or in what sense a fact can lend support to or invalidate an imperative, the nature and role in all of this of pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, feelings, attitudes, and the like—in other words, a complete epistemology and ontology of practical (or value) language. This I must forego. The best I can do is to make a brief summary suggestion. It seems that we do reason from factual beliefs to imperative conclusions. Often there are obvious or suppressed imperative premises involved in the form of desires or inclinations. In such cases, the reasoning may be purely logical—the conclusion may be

only a tautological consequence of the premises. But is this always the case? Either we go back to imperatives that we are simply committed to or operate under by virtue of what we are, by virtue of causal conditions, or by virtue of purely arbitrary commitment; or we grant that some imperatives "follow from" factual beliefs alone by virtue of the facts concerned normatively demanding or prescriptively requiring that enjoined in the imperative conclusion. The former position is thoroughly naturalistic. The latter involves an ontology of value-requiredness as a feature of the world discerned in value-experience and thought pertaining to it. For reasons I cannot go into here, I am inclined toward the latter view. If I am correct, the whole practical dimension of experience and thought is epistemic in character (in its own peculiar way) and is grounded in and reflects a unique, value-structure of reality. If this is so, the "theoretical" and the "practical" may not be as radically different as some have thought and the terms employed to mark the distinction may not be fully appropriate. But there are differences, it seems, that must be acknowledged. My only point is that there are significant similarities that should not be ignored. Perhaps such terms as 'cognitive,' 'epistemic,' 'knowledge,' 'theoretical' and the like should be sufficiently broadened to embrace both areas.

So far my line of discussion has tended to blur the radical character and the sharpness of the distinction between the "practical" and the "theoretical" by pointing out ways in which the "practical" resembles the "theoretical." Now let us look in the other direction. To what extent can we conceive the "theoretical" in terms of "practical" categories?

Hartland-Swann gives two analyses of 'knowing that'—one in terms of 'knowing how' and the other in terms of 'decision,' but they are not independent. (1) He maintains "that all cases of knowing *that* can ultimately be reduced to cases of knowing *how*" (p. 60), for "when I use the expression 'I know that,' I am merely saying emphatically 'I am able to state correctly that,' where 'correctly' implies . . . 'in accordance with some decision, personal or dominant'" (p. 61). (2) He also says "When you say you know that S is, was or will be P, you are in effect announcing that you have made or accepted some decision" (p. 19).

The precise difference between 'I have decided that this man is ill' and 'I know that this man is ill,' he contends, is that "the former simply and explicitly expresses a decision which I would admit to be open to revision, whereas the latter implicitly expresses a decision which I personally do not regard as open to revision" (p. 26). Apparently, according to him, one may be in a "knowing-that" state of mind so that his statement 'I know that . . . ' is true without one's being justified in being in that state of mind, for he says "you can justifiably say 'I know' if the decision on which this assertion is based was well grounded" (p. 43) and nowhere does he say that 'I know that . . . ' expresses only a well-grounded decision. To say that your decision is well-grounded, he says, is to say, "that, on technical matters, you have decided in accordance with the dominant decision of those generally regarded as experts, and that on non-technical matters, you have decided in accordance with what is, or would be, the dominant decision of people regarded as normal and intelligent" (p. 43). "Where you have decided contrary to a dominant decision," according to him, "your decision is well grounded if you can show that it would become a dominant decision if there were general access to the evidence which, for the moment, you alone possess" (p. 43). In other words, one knows that P if and only if one has decided that P and one *considers* the decision not to be subject to revision; and one is justified in knowing that P provided that one's decision actually is not likely to be revised.

These two analyses are not taken to be alternatives but supplementary to each other. The first is considered to be the dispositional counterpart of the second (see pp. 47, 61). I suppose the point is that one is not able to state correctly that S is P unless one has decided that S is P and considers the decision not to be subject to revision; and that if one has decided that S is P and considers the decision to be final one is able to state correctly that S is P. This makes sense only if one accepts his view that for me to say 'I am able to state correctly that S is P' means I am able to state in accordance with a decision that I consider not to be subject to revision that S is P. Fundamental to his position is the view "that we have no way of 'getting at' the facts except by

deciding that they are so and so on the basis of certain evidence" (p. 22).

I shall not attempt an extended criticism of this position. My only concern is the way in which it considers 'knowing that' to be a practical concept. His first analysis does this quite explicitly, for 'knowing how' is a central practical category. But is "knowing that" a matter of "knowing how"? Of course most of the time if a person knows that S is P, he is able to state correctly that S is P. However, a paralyzed person might know it without being able to *state* it at all in any usual sense of the term. Perhaps we could substitute 'think' for 'state.' But does 'to know that S is P' mean the same as 'to be able to think correctly that S is P'? Certainly I do not know that S is P unless I do think that S is P when I give attention to the matter and I am correct in thinking so. This might be taken to mean that I do not know that S is P unless I am able to think that S is P when the occasion arises to describe S and this is a correct description. Even if this is a necessary condition for me to know that S is P, it is not a sufficient condition. I have to have grounds or evidence for thinking that S is P and the grounds or evidence have to justify my thinking that S is P or render my thinking that S is P a responsible thought rather than a wild guess. In other words, to know that S is P is to be able to think responsibly and correctly that S is P when the occasion arises to describe S.

I should point out that I would not analyze 'correctly' in the way in which Hartland-Swann does. While we check the correctness of our thoughts against what others think and what we ourselves think at other times, in saying that a thought is correct we say that what it claims to be the case is the case.

But does 'to be able to think responsibly and correctly that S is P' mean the same as 'to know *how* to think responsibly and correctly that S is P'? In a sense, perhaps so. Certainly a skill is involved in thinking that anything is the case on the basis of grounds or evidence. Some people are more skillful than others in this respect. Certainly a Sherlock Holmes is more skillful in thinking responsibly and correctly what is the case than a Dr. Watson. Those with greater skill in this regard need less in

the way of grounds and evidence for responsible thought than the less skillful.

This brings us to the question of the role of decision in knowing. Apparently for Hartland-Swann, to decide that *S* is *P* is simply a matter of making up one's mind that *S* is *P* or committing oneself to the proposition that *S* is *P*. This is close to what I meant by 'to think that *S* is *P*' except for the fact that I used it more in an episodic sense. Having one's mind made up or being committed to a proposition, although its origin may be dated, is a continuing state or disposition of mind.

However, to speak of decision in connection with knowing suggests a value-aspect that is not as obviously indicated by its cognate terms. Of course the primary use of 'decision' is to indicate the acceptance of an imperative, the acceptance of something as something to do. We decide to do things. We also decide what ought to be done and which is the better or best. But it seems odd to say 'I have decided that I am forty years old.' It suggests that I am choosing what age to be. It seems that it would not be an appropriate thing to say unless there had been considerable doubt about my age and there was conflicting evidence and I had in a sense chosen age forty as the *best* hypothesis.

From Hartland-Swann's analysis, then, we find the suggestion that "knowing that" involves skill or know-how and value-considerations. Chisholm explicitly embraces and develops the latter suggestion and Polanyi emphasizes both.

It is not at all unfair to say that Chisholm attempts to understand basic epistemic or "theoretical" categories by assimilating them to the manner of analysis and characterization that are appropriate for value- or "practical" concepts. Indeed he reduces them to value-categories; or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that, according to his analysis, the basic epistemic categories involve a primitive value-component. For example, he defines 'perceives' and 'knows' as follows:

'There is something that *S* perceives to be *f*' means: there is an *X* which is *f* and which appears in some way to *S*; *S* takes *X* to be *f*; and *S* has adequate evidence for the proposition that *X* is *f* (p. 3. Last italics added).

'*S* knows that *h* is true' means: (i) *S* accepts *h*; (ii) *S* has adequate evidence for *h*; and (iii) *h* is true (p. 16. The italics of (ii) added).

The locution 'S has adequate evidence for *h*' (or its equivalent), which is involved in both definitions, means, he says, "it would be unreasonable for S to accept non-*h*" (p. 5), or "*h* is more worthy of S's belief than non-*h*" (p. 5). Here we are up against a value-concept, and the categories of which it is an essential component must be plotted in the value-area of our language-map. "Many of the characteristics which philosophers and others have thought peculiar to ethical statements," Chisholm says, "also hold of epistemic statements. And when we consider the application of 'evident' and our other epistemic terms, we meet with problems very much like those traditionally associated with 'right,' 'good,' and 'duty'" (p. 4).

After the manner of the moral philosopher who looks for right-making and good-making characteristics rather than the nature of rightness and goodness, Chisholm looks for evidence-making characteristics, or criteria for applying the term 'adequate evidence.' This is not simply a parallel between the two. It must be remembered that 'S has adequate evidence for *h*' is a value-sentence according to his analysis. It is not that what is evident is (in the predicative sense) worthy of being believed or ought to be believed. '*h* is evident for S' means *h* is worthy of being believed by S, or S ought to believe *h*. So what is being sought is right-to-believe-making or worthy-of-being-believed-making characteristics. As is the case with all value-making characteristics, one cannot discover evidence-making characteristics, according to Chisholm, without first knowing what propositions one has adequate evidence for. He specifies three conditions that a characteristic must meet in order to be a mark for any subject S that he had adequate evidence for a given hypothesis *h*: (1) it must be "some state or condition of S which could be described without using 'know,' or 'perceive,' or 'evident,' or any other epistemic term"; (2) it must be "a state such that S could not be said to make any mistake at any time about his *being* in that state at that time"; and (3) it must be "a state or condition such that, whenever S is in that condition, S then has adequate evidence for *h*" (p. 67).

Chisholm interprets classical empiricism as maintaining that the sole evidence-making characteristics are certain ways of appear-

ing, just as hedonism or utilitarianism insists that the only right-making characteristics are experiences of pleasure (p. 69). He agrees that appearing (in what he calls the non-comparative sense of the word—what is expressed in C. I. Lewis' expressive use of appear-words) is an evidence-making characteristic, but that it alone is not adequate to make any perceptual claim evident or worthy of acceptance. He finds another mark of evidence in *taking* (in the sense in which the term is used in his definition of 'perceives.' It is related to perceiving, he says, in the way in which accepting or believing is to knowing. He defines it this way:

'S takes something X to be f' means: S believes (i) that X's being f is a causal condition of the way he is being appeared to and (ii) that there are possible ways of varying X which would cause concomitant variations in the way he is appeared to (p. 77).

It should be noted that he says that for S to take X to be f is a mark of evidence only when f is a sensible characteristic or relation. *Thinking* that one remembers is also taken to be a mark of evidence, where 'remembers' is an epistemic term and thus one could not be said to remember what is not true.

A crucial question for this account is the status of the commitment to a characteristic as right-making, good-making, or evidence-making. I am not speaking of the philosopher's claim that a given feature is a right-making or evidence-making mark. He allegedly discovers that people do in ordinary life count the characteristics in question as right-making or evidence-making. That is why, as Chisholm says, the philosopher has to know at the beginning of his inquiry what acts are right and what propositions are evident. My question concerns our commitment as non-philosophers to certain characteristics as right-making and to others as evidence-making. Is such a commitment grounded in a *recognition* that a given property is a right-making or evidence-making one? Is it an *acknowledgment* that is subject to being appraised as *correct* or *incorrect*? Is the proposition that f is an evidence-making characteristic, when taken as involved in the commonsense commitment, subject to being appraised as *true* or *false*? And do we at least sometimes know that such a proposition is true? Chisholm thinks that such knowledge would have to be

a priori synthetic. And so "to avoid the doctrine of the synthetic *a priori*," he says, "we may classify moral and epistemic convictions with such states as that of *being amused* and say that they are *neither* true nor false. The view that such convictions and the statements expressing them are neither true nor false is simpler and more economical than its contradictory and leads to fewer puzzling questions" (p. 110).

It seems to me that to ground all knowledge in such a *de facto* commitment of the human mind to count certain characteristics as evidence-making leads to quite a few puzzles of its own. For one thing, it seems to deprive 'evidence-making' of its meaning. What can it mean to say '*f* is an evidence-making characteristic,' in the sense in which it expresses the commonsense commitment, if the sentence is neither verifiable nor in any sense true or false? To say that this kind of sentence does not have a truth-value or is not in any sense correct or incorrect is to say that it does not make any significant claim. And if it does not make any significant claim, neither does the sentence 'Proposition P is evident because of *f*.' In ethics the theory of right-making characteristics was formulated to avoid a naturalistic definition of 'right' in terms of those characteristics. Those who hold that sentences like 'A is *f*; therefore A is right' make significant claims and may be known to be true, admit that '*f* is a right-making characteristic' also makes a significant claim that may be known to be true. Those who deny the latter and also refuse to define 'right' in terms of '*f*' have to reject the former also. It seems to me that Chisholm's thesis would force us to reject the possibility of any proposition's being evident in any significant sense and therefore the very possibility of knowledge itself.

Let me try to make Chisholm's position a little clearer. The ethicist who defines moral concepts in terms of subjective states or conditions of people is a phenomenalist in value-theory just as the one who defines physical-object concepts in terms of sense-impressions is a phenomenalist in theory of perception. The one who refuses to define value-concepts in this manner but takes the subjective states in question as right-making marks has one foot in the subjectivist's camp and the other in the objectivist's. He is in the same position as the Cartesian who can "know" only sub-

jective mental states but can make significant claims about external physical objects. Only *a priori* synthetic knowledge can render these claims knowable. But it is not clear how even this could solve the problem of what the sentences that express the alleged claims mean. Chisholm, taking a clue from the ethicist, attempts to escape a pure phenomenalist theory of perception by trying to put one foot in the objectivist's camp by treating phenomenalist states as evidence-making characteristics for physical-object statements. But when he comes to the crucial question of *a priori* synthetic knowledge, he slams shut on his own foot the only door into the external world open to him. However, he does not seem to notice that he did not get his foot outside at all. The only consistent position for him seems to be a pure phenomenism. But he would be unhappy with that and justifiably so.

I am not sure that the possibility of *a priori* synthetic knowledge should be dismissed in quite the *a priori* manner in which Chisholm does. But I would like to suggest a possible way of avoiding both pure phenomenism and the *a priori* synthetic that seems to me more promising than Chisholm's position.

In the case of perception, the difficulty, as I see it, lies in the way in which he conceives "being appeared to" and "taking." He considers being appeared to as a psychological state that is causally produced by an external object. And for someone to take something X to have a certain sensible quality *f* is for him to believe "that X's being *f* is a causal condition of the way he is being appeared to and that there are possible ways of varying X which would cause concomitant variations in the way he is appeared to." This I think must be wrong. According to suggestions made in the first part of this paper (and argued for more fully in *Ethical Naturalism and the Modern World-View*), subjective states or experiences such as pleasure, felt satisfaction, desire, etc. are "value-making" characteristics precisely because they are the modes of experience by which we cognize values. In a somewhat similar vein, although I cannot develop it here, I would like to suggest that "being appeared to" is not simply a "psychological" state or occurrence that is causally produced by an external condition. It is rather a matter of an external object's *appearing to have a certain property* or, to put it the other way around, it is a matter

of one's seeming to see such and such a kind of object. In other words, the subjective state or experience embodies a tentative cognitive claim about something. The "taking" Chisholm speaks of is not a belief about external causal conditions of the subjective occurrence but a matter of commitment to the semantic claim inherent in the experience. In fact I am not sure that we should analyze perceiving into something expressible in appearing or seeming language and something else called 'taking.' It is more likely that there is a sensory experience involving a semantic claim that may be entertained in either of two ways, namely, tentatively pending further confirmation or simply as what is the case. If the former, we express it in seeming or appearing language; if the latter, in terms of epistemic perceptual terms. Perhaps we are led to think that seeming or appearing is involved in perceiving because if we come to doubt what we perceive to be the case we retreat to the language of seeming or appearing. And it is only natural to think that seeming or appearing was involved all the time. But perhaps the doubt gave rise to a shift in the way in which the semantic claim was entertained rather than a retreat to something more basically involved in the experience. If this is so, "being appeared to" and "taking" are not two components in perceiving, but two alternative ways of entertaining a cognitive claim based on sensory grounds.

Chisholm's position leaves what is meant by objective statements (including the external causal conditions believed, according to him, in the "taking" involved in perception) and what it is for the subjective states of "being appeared to" and "taking" to be evidence-making for objective statements and how and why they do it, something of a mystery to say the least. According to my suggestion, what is meant by the objective statement involved in a perception is located in what is meant by, or the semantic content of the subjective state or experience itself. And, too, if the experience is or may be epistemic, it becomes intelligible why the having of the experience may be counted as a mark or criterion that the proposition that expresses the semantic claim of the experience is evident or worthy of belief. But it is only a secondary mark. It amounts to no more than saying that the proposition is evident because it has been found to be evident or, to put it in the

best possible light, that the proposition is evident to reflective thought because it has been found to be evident in perception.

What I am suggesting is that the mind is active in perception as well as in reflective thought; even that it is active in seeming to see or being appeared to. In perception, a cognitive claim is definitely made; in seeming to see or being appeared to a claim is only tentatively made or entertained as a possibility. In reflective thought, a claim may be either made firmly or entertained tentatively (as a possibility).

This brings us to the question of the value-component in Chisholm's analysis of epistemic concepts. According to him, for a person to have adequate evidence for a proposition is the same as for it to be worthy of his belief. If we ask what it is for the proposition to be worthy of his belief, we are told that it is for him to be in or to have certain psychological states that are worthy-of-being-believed-making characteristics for the proposition in question. If we push further for clarification of the elusive concept, the answer given is that the term 'worthy of belief' simply indicates or shows (if it does not say it) that the proposition is of the kind that is accepted by the human mind just as some moral philosophers maintain that 'right' simply indicates or shows that that to which it applies is the kind of act which the human mind approves.

I should like to suggest that the *acceptance* of a proposition (or the making of a semantic claim) in reflective thought or *taking* something to have a certain property in perception involves *experiencing* it as worthy of acceptance. And if I am correct in suggesting that value-experiences are cognitive and may be epistemic, being worthy of acceptance is independent of being accepted. How else could the value-experience be veridical or erroneous?

For a proposition to be worthy of my acceptance in either reflective thought or perception is for it to be a proposition that I ought to accept. If we ask 'Why ought I to accept it?', the answer can only be in terms of grounds or evidence available to me. (I speak of "grounds or evidence" in order to avoid a possible error. An objective fact or truth may be evidence for another. But certain sensory clues too primitive to be reported may be grounds for taking something to be such and such in perception.) In other words,

a proposition is worthy of my acceptance because I have or am aware of grounds or evidence for it. What it is for a fact or state of affairs to be a ground or evidence for something is to be analyzed, I suggest, in terms of semantic and logical concepts. But we must not confuse having grounds or evidence for a proposition with the proposition's being *evident*, as Chisholm apparently does, for the latter means that the one to whom it is evident has sufficient grounds or evidence for it to be worthy of his acceptance.

In perception Chisholm considers certain experiences to be evident-making characteristics (he speaks of "evidence-making" marks, but apparently he does so because of the confusion mentioned above). As I have already indicated, I think this is a mistake. However, since there does not seem to be any room for anything like the lucky guess or the unfounded true belief in perception, we may be justified in saying that if a perception embodies a correct cognitive claim, then the proposition that constitutes its content was worthy of the person's acceptance because of sensory grounds too primitive to be articulated.

Although I have quarreled with some of the details of Chisholm's analysis, what I am suggesting still leaves a value-component involved in epistemic concepts. Any proposition that is accepted or taken to be the case in knowing or perceiving must be worthy of being accepted, or else the mental state or act concerned is not one of knowing or perceiving.

Knowing that and perceiving, we have concluded, involve the exercise of skills in correctly and responsibly making claims about what is the case on the basis of grounds and evidence. Thus epistemology cannot afford to ignore value-theory, for the position one takes concerning value-language defines the options open to one in epistemology. As Polanyi says, "Science can then no longer hope to survive on an island of positive facts, around which the rest of man's intellectual heritage sinks to the status of subjective emotionalism. It must claim that certain emotions are right; and if it can make good such a claim, it will not only save itself but sustain by its example the whole system of cultural life of which it forms a part" (p. 134).

Polanyi goes much further than either Hartland-Swann or Chisholm in emphasizing the practical nature of the theoretical.

He represents knowing at all levels, including perception, as an art that makes use of tools, skills, connoisseurship, and the like in personal acts of achievement and failure that involve commitments, decisions, intellectual passions, satisfactions and frustrations. The intellectual tools, skills, commitments, interests, passions, etc. are so much a part of oneself that one is seldom if ever aware of them. So it is easy to ignore that they play a big role in shaping and determining what one counts as knowledge. When this happens, which is the rule, one counts one's knowledge as objective, as determined solely by a transparent observation of the facts as they are in themselves. When one becomes aware of the role these "personal" factors play in knowledge, one is likely to become a subjectivist and discredit all knowledge claims. Polanyi proposes what he considers to be a third alternative, namely, *personal knowledge*. He thinks that we "can arrive at a responsible judgment with universal intent" in spite of the fact that "making sense of experience is a skillful act which impresses the personal participation of the scientist on the resultant knowledge," because, he says, the accidents of personal existence are "concrete opportunities for exercising our personal responsibilities" and our deliberate intellectual commitments may be justified.

If affective-volitional experience is itself cognitive, as is suggested earlier in this paper, the role of decision, commitment, passion, skill, etc. in theoretical knowledge need not in any way compromise its objectivity, for these modes of experience may obtain objectivity for themselves. However, we cannot escape the fact that a person always obtains objectivity from within a conceptual framework that admits of alternatives. But this fact makes for neither subjectivity nor the personalization of knowledge. It avoids subjectivity because reality is grasped through the framework; it avoids personalization because the conceptual framework is genuinely interpersonal and may be shared by anyone and usually is shared by many. Instead of rendering knowledge either subjective or personal, it merely makes it perspectival. Its claims are always from the perspective of a given conceptual framework, but this fact is embodied in what is claimed. The only objectivity denied is a perspectival-less variety, which, when we become clear about it, is seen to be an impossibility.

Perspectival objectivity can be maintained only on the basis of a semantic theory of meaning and truth. If these were reduced to purely pragmatic or practical concepts, then no genuine objectivity of any kind could be claimed.

We have found the sharp distinctions between the theoretical and the practical to be blurred by finding the practical to have a cognitive dimension and the theoretical, especially, the epistemic, to have a practical dimension. It might be said that the two are not so radically different because both involve a somewhat common semantic dimension by virtue of which objective truth and knowledge are possible.

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NATURALISM AND SUBJECTIVISM*

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IN HIS *Foundations of Phenomenology* (1943) Professor Farber gave an extended exposition of the *Logische Untersuchungen* and of other of Husserl's earlier works in their relation to scientific and philosophical movements of the time. He expressed high admiration for the *Untersuchungen*, but at the end of the book deplored the transcendental subjectivism which had appeared in Husserl's later writings. It was understood that Farber would write a second book which would deal critically with Husserl's later works, such as *Ideen, Formale und Transcendentale Logik, Méditations Cartésiennes*, etc., but the present volume goes beyond all expectations in the vigor and sweep of its polemic, which seems to leave even the value of the *Untersuchungen* in doubt.

In opposition to phenomenology and other currents of recent philosophy, Farber holds that the progress of science and the accumulation of human experience furnish a foundation on which philosophy can safely build, and which it is a waste of time to question. Among the basic truths are:

1. "Philosophy should never be detached from its social-historical context, in terms of which its significance is to be sought" (p. 7).
2. Because of the role of social-historical factors and the continuing progress of science, finality in the analysis of experience cannot be achieved (*Ibid.*).
3. "Experience is in nature, and not nature in experience . . . The independence of the world, with respect to the knower, is a brute fact which no philosophical arguments can alter" (p. 9).
4. What is thought to be "given" at any time depends, not only on the relatively constant physical framework and on scientific advance, but on the social order (p. 10).

* Marvin Farber, *Naturalism and Subjectivism*, American Lecture Series, Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1959, pp. xvi + 389.

5. "Naturalistic" truth is the "basic fact" for all philosophizing (p. 382).

6. A philosopher is concerned with the understanding of ideals, but there is nothing unphilosophical in his also taking an active part in realizing them.

7. Ideals, values are to be understood only in terms of human needs, desires, and their fulfillment.

The author is not concerned in this book to define his own position precisely, but rather to state a broad platform in opposition to phenomenological and existentialist doctrines; the broader the platform, the broader his case against them. At the same time he does not deny the legitimacy of the phenomenological method when restricted to its proper sphere of *description of experience*. "If pursued descriptively, such inquiry may help to provide an additional dimension of clarification to the naturalistic treatment of value and fact" (p. 159), and does not at all commit us to Husserl's constitutive idealism. This is an important instance of what Farber calls his "methodological pluralism," i.e., the principle that no one philosophical method should be regarded as exclusively valid, that widely diverse methods can make their limited contribution in the long run of intellectual history. Not all of them can, however, for existentialism is not conceded to have contributed anything. Along with methodological pluralism goes "logical pluralism," which apparently means that just as in the social sciences, for example, various complementary systems of knowledge are recognized, so in philosophy a "collective totality" of contrasting systems should be seen as a valid aim. Farber does not develop this interesting idea, nor does he satisfy our curiosity about his striking principle of "ontological monism," according to which there is "in the last analysis" only one kind of "being," physical events. But how can the phenomenological method have any place at all if only physical events exist? The author answers this question with tantalizing brevity: "This view leaves out nothing that can be descriptively established. Even the most abstract activities of the 'pure' reflective (or 'transcendental-subjectivistic') investigator may be fully allowed for on this monistic basis" (p. 385). No doubt Farber will tell us what he

means by this in some future volume. Right now it would seem that all the phenomenologist could be talking about are certain of his own neurophysiological patterns, the last thing we should expect him to know anything about. But perhaps we miss the irony. What is meant may be that the phenomenologist, especially in his transcendental and Jehovah phase, is not talking about anything at all, but simply *behaving* as the result of fantastically elaborate social conditioning.

The great merit of Farber's book is the exposition and thorough-going criticism of Husserl's philosophy it offers. His exposition, though very expert and fair-minded, is also terse and unsparing. Since he has no sympathy at all with Husserl's driving purpose of overcoming naturalism by way of a transcendental constitutive idealism, he does not make any of the usual allowances for the difficulty of the task, and relentlessly exposes the word-magic and pompous frauds into which the master's high earnestness often leads him. Phenomenology is charged with inconsistency with the conclusions or implications of science, such as the priority of matter and the dependence of thought on brain events, with the outlook of naturalism and a scientifically oriented common sense and, finally, with its own descriptive method.

The extent to which Husserl's constitutive idealism was a betrayal of his own descriptive method is shown by many examples. A purely descriptive procedure could not yield a transcendental ego which constitutes the world, nor the absurdity of any world not so constituted, for the origin of the world is a causal question not to be resolved by essential insights. Husserl first recommended a systematic suspension of our natural positing of existence as a means of reaching essential laws and relations and of extruding prejudices, the understanding being that this procedure would justify itself methodologically. But it is not long before we learn that this methodological device yields a whole new region of being, the sphere of transcendental subjectivity. The outcome of the universal *epoché* is not the discovery of essential laws and relations, for very few materialized which were both novel and unquestionable, but rather the escape from the *naïveté* of existence in the natural world to the higher transcendental life, in which the natural world is seen as constituted by the ego, and one's own body

as only a subjective appearance. As Farber says, we have here and elsewhere a complete reversal of the cautious method of description.

The term "constitute" has its ambiguities, and Farber suggests that "reconstruct" would be a better word for it. The world is already *constructed* in ordinary experience, but the phenomenologist, suspending all assumptions and going back to the indubitable elements of experience, is able to *reconstruct* the world by carefully intuited steps, thus validating what had before been accepted "naively." If this is what Husserl meant and had continued to mean, Farber and other naturalists could have far less to object to, but unfortunately he was intent to overcome naturalism and to put idealism on its feet again, and "constitute" thus acquired the unmistakable sense of *creation*. This could be rendered plausible only by a special interpretation of the "meaning-conferring" act. Professor Farber would no doubt agree that the talk of "meaning-conferring" acts involves an equivocation. It is true that no such acts could be carried out in the absence of human beings, and that no terms of discourse could have any meaning, including such terms as "extension," "mass," "cause," "object," and "physical event." But it is a long jump to the conclusion that the physical world is constituted in such acts and would not exist without them. It is necessary of course to distinguish between the origin of language and the question when and how far it answers to the facts. But as the author says, all the old arguments for idealism show up again in Husserl, often in a more refined form, but no new ones.

The vulnerability of Husserl's later philosophy is revealed at numerous points: There are the perplexities or contradictions involved in transcendence and immanence, the problem of how the transcendental ego can be known without becoming an object—a transcendent—the shallow refutation of naturalism rendered possible by a crude interpretation of it, the identification of empiricism with skepticism, the failure of the *a priori* sciences Husserl had established to materialize, the will o' the wisp quest for *absolute* certainty which is doomed in advance by the question "How could you ever be certain you have it?", the hollow claim of phenomenology to be a guide to the sciences, and so on. So many-

sided indeed is this attack on phenomenology that one may well ask whether anything can be salvaged. Farber answers that "one cannot deny the beneficial effect of an attempt to carry through a "radical" suspension of beliefs. It may be an indispensable stage in all sound philosophical procedure . . ." (p. 278). One can agree that a continual willingness to test one's beliefs is a good thing, but not that a radical suspension of belief in existence in general is advisable. Suspension of belief would seem to be serviceable only in particular cases where there is a specific reason to doubt or a lack of evidence. Programmatic abstention does not seem to have yielded any results which could not have been reached without it, and it has led inquiry into problems which will never be problems except for a few philosophers. In another respect also the present reviewer's criticism may go farther than Farber's. Farber objects to the phenomenological doctrine of intentionality when it is assimilated to the transcendental constitution, but not when it is understood in the sense of phenomenological description. It would seem more consistent with Farber's naturalistic position, however, to say that whether given experiences or certain classes of experience are intentional is an empirical question, to be resolved by differential methods aided by experimental and clinical findings, rather than settled out of hand, for mental experiences in general, by a blanket intuition.

Although Farber's criticism will be hard to discount, most students of phenomenology will sympathize with his conviction that one can learn a great deal from Husserl, even from his mistakes. Philosophers associated with or influenced by Husserl, such as Scheler, Sartre, Heidegger, and Jaspers, are rightly put on a lower plane of accomplishment, and the brief but trenchant criticism accorded to them, while it does not do justice to all their gleams and insights, cuts deep from a naturalistic viewpoint into their pretention to escape with clear conscience and logic. Farber's book, in short, is a serious, uncompromising review and stock-taking of a group of important philosophers whom he has studied and considered and reconsidered for many years, and it furnishes an unusual intellectual experience which should not be missed.

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DIALECTIC, LAW, AND CIVILIZATION

WILLIAM A. BANNER

I

ONE IS AWARE TODAY of an increasing number of books which are appearing on public life and moral obligation. This is doubtless a consequence of the serious problems of law and order, both domestic and international, which have been encountered in recent years. The areas of unrest in the social and political relations of men have increased as the forces of population, economic need, nascent nationalism, and cultural conflict have brought new pressures upon old forms of order. This general practical situation has given rise to theoretical issues which have commanded more and more the attention of those concerned with moral and social philosophy. These issues bear upon the basic questions of the foundation of right in society and state and the structure of just social and world order. These questions are taken up in the recent book by Paul Weiss, *Our Public Life*, based on the Mahlon Powell Lectures for 1958.¹

II

Mr. Weiss proposes to make the public life of man (in society, state, culture, and civilization) the object of a systematic speculative inquiry, without the hindrance of traditional method and theory in law and politics. This approach is supported through what is termed "the method of dialectical construction," which is contrasted with four other methods—the genetic, the empirical, the analytic, and the paradigmatic (pp. 17-26). The dialectical method, as distinct from the other methods in their historic intent, combines features of these methods in such a way as to avoid historic inadequacies. Like the paradigmatic method in social and political theory, the dialectical method provides a *model* for the

¹ Paul Weiss, *Our Public Life* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1959) pp. 256.

more important larger groups—society, state, culture, and civilization. But this model, it is urged, is not nonpolitical or prepolitical, as in the theories of Plato, Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Marx. Rather, one begins with what is "observed or known to be true" about social existence, with actual "socially habituated ways of acting," from which it is shown what ought to obtain in order to fulfill the aims represented in existing patterns of social order. Dialectic thus seeks to provide knowledge of the essence of basic groupings (p. 20) and to offer "a technique for anticipating and punctuating the outcome of man's persistent drive to achieve a satisfying and enriching public existence" (pp. 21-22).

While he rejects the paradigmatic method in its historic intent, Mr. Weiss has a good deal to say about "nonassociated man" as a model for the understanding of human association and its aims. It seems fair to say that it is really this paradigmatic element which enables Mr. Weiss to support comments on the inadequacies of the analytic and empirical procedures. If the process of analysis itself gives no clue to the elements to be discovered in analysis (without presupposing the very results which are obtained, pp. 19-20), and if the empirical investigation of social life does not provide any key to the distinction between the essential and the irrelevant (without presupposing this distinction, p. 19), then the clue or key must lie in some concept of man. For clearly the "socially habituated ways of acting" from which this dialectical procedure sets out do not themselves provide any infallible guide to what is essential and what is irrelevant, to what is beneficial and what is inimical, in human existence. To know what society, state, culture, and civilization are in essence is to have more than a knowledge of existing social forms themselves. The features of prevailing social patterns cannot alone suggest what is normative or ideal, unless ultimately *what is* is to be taken for *what ought to be*.

Mr. Weiss represents man as a creature of distinct needs, which are related to objects which threaten pain and promise satisfaction (pp. 22-26). Man is also a social creature. At least for his own sake, to overcome the limitations of solitary effort, the individual comes to act with others in the social group and to accept in time the instrumentalities of political society. State, culture, and civilization are successively advancements over simple

society. They are "more inclusive, stable, richer ways" for the realization of perfection in human life (p. 29).

Mr. Weiss's discussion of what is normative in man's life in society moves between a consideration of the actual character of society and its structure of classes, on the one hand, and the recognition and defense of the "native rights" of the individual, which are never adequately expressed and satisfied in his society, on the other hand. This movement is the source of some ambiguity in Mr. Weiss's treatment of normative social existence, an ambiguity which is not entirely resolved in the compass of the book.

For Mr. Weiss, the actual character of a society is determined by the temper or spirit of the society as a whole (which is expressed formally in the positive law) and the temper of the various subdivisions or classes. The norms which the various subdivisions or classes offer and accept in their mutual relationships become, when accepted by the society at large, the "social law" of that society (p. 44). This *living law* is an unwritten law which is distinct from the decisions of judges. Social law reflects in a society the actual attitudes and practices, which are not wholly determinate and which are not ever capable of complete codification (pp. 44-45).

It is the need for the explicit ordering of social relations through positive law, together with the problem of the function and limits of positive law, which brings Mr. Weiss to the consideration of the question of rights. In an extended discussion of rights and the nature of their alienation, it is argued that there are *essential demands* (native rights) which are morally anterior to the prevailing attitudes and practices of a society and which are not to be confused with nor reduced to rights which may be bestowed in society.

That there are native rights, it is maintained, follows from the knowledge of the essential features of human nature ("the indestructible, indispensable features of man") and from the knowledge of the needs of body, mind, will, and emotion (pp. 67-72). In Mr. Weiss's words, "a right is a justified claim, depending for its existence on the nature and powers of men" (p. 53). The native rights of man are distinguished accordingly as the right to the use

of one's body, the right to truth, the right of the will to insist on itself, and the right of the emotions to express a personality (p. 93). These rights are distinguished as constituents of a general, unspecific, unalienable ² right to be a man (p. 67) ³.

In expanding the unalienable right to be a man to embrace "the unalienable single right to benefit from social existence" (p. 92), Mr. Weiss distinguishes further the *public rights* to movement, health, and security; to education, speech, and inquiry; to pledge oneself; to property, and worship; and to be a distinctive self-determining person (p. 93). These public rights are the native rights of the individual as publicly supported and matched by the claims of others. It is the recognition of rights in public life which, for Mr. Weiss, supports "a humanly sensitive politics."

The defense of the individual's native rights brings Mr. Weiss, after a discussion of the law of the state and sovereignty, to the consideration of natural law. Mr. Weiss is not concerned with historic conceptions of natural law, other than to give a brief statement of the "common core" of the many different formulations of natural law ideas.

No matter what the theories advanced to account for its origin, to justify, or to ground it, Natural Law seems always to have been acknowledged to be a norm which is (a) pertinent to men living in a space-time world, and (b) pertinent to every society and state. On all sides, Natural Law is affirmed to be at once natural in its being (though not necessarily in origin), and socio-political in its application (though not necessarily acknowledged). (P. 143.)

From this general statement, Mr. Weiss proceeds to present and defend his own position.

Mr. Weiss observes that "to be just, a state should act as a

² For Mr. Weiss, the native rights of the individual are absolutely *unalienable* but subject to limitation (and therefore *alienatable*) to a degree necessary for the affirmation of all rights.

³ Mr. Weiss presents a three-fold list of rights, taken from many sources, as representative of the diversity of opinion among writers. Rights are here classified into *rights to* (which point toward man's inward nature), *rights from* (as the individual's claims against intrusion and injury by others), and *rights of* (as features of the individual as a private and public being) (pp. 63-64).

sovereign in the light of the dictates of Natural Law" (p. 140). As men are beings with rights, their submission to the sovereignty of the state (as expressed in the authority of positive law) is always open to review or change. This review or change is in terms of the goals which are indicated by their native rights and in terms of instrumental norms governing means to accepted goals. "The common goal of men in a given society or state" (of men with "a common past, a common experience, and a common society") is the common good, in which men are perfected together. This good, as the good of all together, prescribes that all men receive their due in harmony, that they "be dealt with justly" (p. 155). The common good as a goal is possible because men, for all of their individuality (as "inwardly unique, irreducible, unduplicatable individuals") are comparable beings.

The common good which *ought to be* indicates what is required, what *ought to be done*, for its realization. What is so indicated is an instrumental norm, a *Natural Law* (as a second-order evaluation,⁴ a second-order relation); through it individuals are able to assess and order the relations that "connect men with an accepted end." A Natural Law is a law of nature which is made *preferential* (normative) by the common good.

For Mr. Weiss, a law of nature, which may have reference to animate and rational as well as to inanimate beings, is an order or sequence in nature. To connect experience in definite predictable ways is to recognize laws of nature, and to be subject to such laws is to be law-abiding (pp. 150-154). Mr. Weiss rejects the extreme of modern nominalism, in declaring that it is not necessary to suppose "that laws of nature are nothing but summaries of inductive generalizations, high correlations, and statistics, spiced with some semantics" (147).

Laws of nature "are ingredient in and sustained by real things" (p. 149). They are "a logico-mathematically infected time, a

⁴ Mr. Weiss's point is that second-order evaluations do not merely articulate or endorse first-order evaluations, namely desires and approvals (p. 144). "Men, more or less explicitly, . . . acknowledge a norm which enables them to evaluate first-order relations connecting what is present with what is future. That norm is a standard of excellence for the choice of means." (p. 146).

time germane to the things that now exist as well as to what they can become" (p. 149). Because things have common natures, they form real classes and are law-abiding (p. 152). Men have common natures and they aim at a common end. In society, men form real classes; their common natures and ends are "connected by the rational, predictive frame of law" (p. 152). Such a frame of law is a *law of nature* through which men move from the past into the future in law-abiding ways (p. 151). Natural Law, as "an objectively binding intelligible link" with the common good, is thus wholly *in* the natural order; it is uncontrived, public and impersonal (nonvolitional) (pp. 157-158). It is a pattern of action *in nature* through which good in a society is realizable. It is not imposed upon nature and yet it is *prescriptive* for social action. Natural Law prescribes the best possible way "to bring about a social justice" within "the scope of nature's law."

A Natural Law is applicable to the situation of a particular society or state, and changes with social conditions. Natural Law, as compared with the ethical in itself, is less absolute, less universal and less comprehensive (p. 159). Natural Law thus reflects what is relative and contingent in social existence, although less so than social and positive law.⁵ This suggests a difficulty concerning the moral superiority of Mr. Weiss's notion of Natural Law over merely social and positive law. One is aware that Mr. Weiss indicates that the common good, while realizable in and for men in a given society, transcends a society as an ideal which *ought to be*, whether realized or not (pp. 141, 155). He speaks also of Natural Law as that which enables one to evaluate all social and political practice (p. 167) and as that norm to which every society and state ought to conform, "to a degree greater than they now do" (p. 142).⁶ It is not clear, however, as to what this conformity involves.

⁵ Cf., p. 159: "But the content of Natural Law must . . . change, since it relates men in different situations to a common end, requiring now one law of nature and then another to be in operation."

⁶ Cf., p. 184: "Natural Law states the desirable relation which should hold between social and political men as they now are and the social good they seek to attain."

In discussing, for example, the current struggle between the United States Supreme Court and "the Southern community," it is stated that as both sides (the Southern way of life and the demands of the legal order) attend to the demands of Natural Law, they will become "correlative enterprizes for producing and preserving a socially sensitive state" (p. 182). It is not clear as to what way the Southern way of life (or, indeed, the Northern way of life) is made compatible with the pursuit of the common good and with the demands of Natural Law as an instrumental norm.⁷ If what is meant by Mr. Weiss is that in yielding to the demands of Natural Law the Southern way of life will become transformed into a contingent pattern of socialization through which the native rights of *all* Southerners will be allowed freedom of exercise, then the difficulty is removed. If this is not what is meant, then Mr. Weiss's concept of Natural Law, in its compatibility with existing social law, would appear to be a vague and impoverished notion as compared with certain historic formulations.

To some extent, the difficulty which has been indicated is set aside by the distinction which is made by Mr. Weiss between *Natural Law* (which is applicable to a particular society or state) and the *law of civilization* (which is constituted of "principles which are pertinent to all men, regardless of what state or society they may be in" (p. 186)).⁸ The law of civilization, as a law of nature, is the instrumental norm that is elicited by the *common human good*, which is the end of all men (pp. 183-184). The common human good and the law of civilization represent that part of the absolute Good (in which ethics is grounded) which perfects man in his public life. The common human good is the public peace and prosperity of mankind as a public whole (p. 190). This complete human good, which embraces in its compass the pursuit of the arts and sciences, is civilization.

Mr. Weiss holds that the wise judge may go counter to social and positive law in recognizing the overriding right of the law of

⁷ Cf., p. 182: "The Southern way of life and the legal order should both modify their claims not in terms of or because of any pressure exerted by the other, but because each can be seen to have value from the very same objective position from which the other can be seen to have value."

⁸ Cf., pp. 166, 181, 183, 185, 225.

civilization (p. 166). The law of civilization thus becomes interpreted by the wise judge in the form of a relevant natural law, germane to his own society. It is perhaps here that one finds the rapport between Mr. Weiss's theory of Natural Law and older natural law formulations. In some historic statements, natural law embraces *universal invariant principles* which are made applicable to different social and political situations through a *variable content*.⁹ In Mr. Weiss's theory, it is the law of civilization which is the norm constituted of universal principles while Natural Law is the norm which embraces rules for the realization of public good in a given society. It is the content of the law of civilization which alone "offers an adequate measure of the degree of public satisfaction which is to be accorded to all men's essential parts and their rights" (p. 184). And it is only in the concept of this law (which "transcends and measures social, positive, and Natural Law, and the societies and states to which these are germane.") that Mr. Weiss reaches a level of order which is clearly superior morally to that of social and positive law and which matches the affirmation of natural right in certain historic statements of natural law ideas.¹⁰

It is important to insist, in this connection, that what Mr. Weiss calls the *law of civilization*, as the universal principles applicable to all men, is *ipso facto* the Natural Law of every society and state, whatever particular prescription is also germane to a given society and state.¹¹ There is so much attention given in this book to the character of social existence and of Natural Law as variable, that the universality of social principles and the possible uniformity of order among societies and states through the recognition and acceptance of one law of public life are not adequately treated. Indeed, the possibility that civilization may be realized through acting "inside our own societies,

⁹ Cf., Francisco Suarez, *De legibus ac deo legislatore*, Bk. II, Ch. XII, 9; Bk. II Ch. XIX, 9.

¹⁰ It would seem that it is the *law of civilization* (and its relevance to every social situation) which is entailed in Mr. Weiss's defense of native rights and not *Natural Law* as it is characterized by him.

¹¹ Cf., p. 185: "The only hope that we now have for adjudicating social practice and legal demands lies in our ability to provide force neutral to both society and state to back the demands of Natural Law."

states, and cultures" is rejected as supposing "that the various cultures necessarily fit one with the other" (p. 240). It is of course true that the fitting of cultures one with the other is merely *possible*, in terms of the love of the common human good which binds all men in a common purpose. But it is also true that it is just such a community of purpose, however vaguely sensed, which is involved in all communication between peoples and in all comparison of cultures.¹²

To belong to a particular culture or "unit civilization" is not necessarily to be oblivious to the common good of all men, whatever the apparent restriction of the horizon of a local cultural mythos and ideology.¹³ The diversity of culture does not preclude community of purpose among peoples. The creation of a single world-state, which Mr. Weiss strongly endorses and toward which the United Nations represents for him the greatest advance in history, is not really an alternative to the realization of civilization through a harmony of purpose and order among peoples. A world-state, with power to compel men to cooperate in the promotion of civilization,¹⁴ is an instrumentality which itself presupposes such uniformity of commitment among men as is represented, for example, in the United Nations *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.

III

Mr. Weiss says in the Preface to *Our Public Life* that the book offers, with respect to his other recent work *Modes of Being* (1958), a supplementary study of the actualization of the Ideal in "a publicly significant life." In the course of the argument of *Our Public Life*, much is said about actual social structures, their aims and norms, on the one hand, and about the aims and norms which transcend the immediate social intent of these actual structures, on the other hand. The latter aims and norms, as indicated in the native rights of men, are within and beyond the scope of particular social existence. The Ideal itself, the common good of

¹² Cf., pp. 222-225.

¹³ Cf., pp. 187-191.

¹⁴ Cf., pp. 238-242.

all men, stands in contrast to the common social good at which "a limited number of men in a society" inescapably aim because of the conditioning of that society (p. 154, footnote). It is the emphasis on local conditioning in the recognition and acceptance of social aims and norms which raises doubts in the mind of the reader concerning the relevance of the Ideal to the actual public life of man.

No matter is more important today than what is represented in questions of law and order, relating to the whole realm of public life. Any critical comment on Mr. Weiss's book must be offered with appreciation of the force and significance of his whole argument. Without ignoring the importance of other sections of this book, one is especially impressed by what is said about civilization and its law, as an order of life and justice "which transcends local conditioning." "To be a man," Mr. Weiss reminds us, "is to belong to a single public domain of mankind."

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DISCUSSIONS

SUBSTANCE, SUBSTRATUM, AND PERSONAL IDENTITY

JOHN KING-FARLOW

N. L. WILSON'S DEFENSE of 'Substances without Substrata'¹ deserves to be hailed as a showpiece for idiomatic metaphysics. Certain tools of analysis which many thought would serve to eliminate traditional disputes become, in Wilson's hands, the instruments for reviving such questions in a more exciting and sometimes more lucid form. Of course he is not alone in doing this. Yet, to me at least, 'Substances without Substrata' bespeaks richer sympathies with historical metaphysics and offers a much hardier link with the past than works like Quine's 'On What There Is' and Prior's 'Time and Modality.'

My real intention, however, is not to praise Wilson but to harry him. His argument seeks to give us substances, concrete individuals, without the prop of a Lockean substrate and without the Humean stigma of reducibility to bundles of properties.² Wilson explicitly aims at doing justice in his doctrine to our rather hazy ordinary beliefs about individuals. He writes: "Goodman's language is remote from our ordinary ways of looking at the world and our ordinary ways of speaking about it. At the risk of being subsequently hoist with my own petard I should be inclined to suggest that these ordinary ways should be treated with respect and, if possible, vindicated. At any rate we may quite properly be suspicious of gratuitous and unnecessary departures from our common sense views."³ Here Wilson stands in the tradition of Aristotle's attempt to resolve puzzles (*dialuein aporias*) about common sense concepts and so to forestall the motivation for a revisionary metaphysics like Plato's. And much more blatantly than does the *De Anima* account of souls as simply the forms of organisms, Wilson's treatment of substances succeeds in distorting important differences in our ways of thought about personal

¹ *Review of Metaphysics*. XII, 4. (June 1959); 521-539.

² *Ibid.*, p. 522.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 537.

identity and about non-personal identity. Without ignoring the fact that non-personal individuals themselves form a heterogeneous class from an identifier's point of view, I do suggest that certain identification puzzles about people and near-people tend to diverge sharply from those about things and near-things. Anthony Flew has brought out several quite peculiar difficulties concerning 'same person' in a paper on 'Locke and Personal Identity'.⁴ For instance, the problem of finding criteria for personal identity, as Flew commends Locke for showing, is quite crucial to questions about the concepts of fair reward and punishment and about the notion of 'survival.' Recall the obvious: it is people and near-people that we worry about both as having the (logical) possibility of a *reincarnation* or *hereafter*—be it theological, theosophical or parapsychological—and as being the (logically) proper recipients of praise and blame. Insofar as we worry about dogs, ships and ideals in these respects they are treated as what I call 'near-people.' Insofar as people do not invite such queries they are 'near-things.' Locke's probe into the logical grammar of personal identity points to common sense intuitions about individuals which Wilson here and elsewhere has contrived to slur over. Of course such apparent intuitions may lead to error or even nonsense, but let us for the moment cleave to Wilson's intention of vindicating them.

Certain of our ways of thought about people as people seem to be violated in inter-related ways by Leibniz, Locke, and Wilson. Leibniz, in his *Discourse on Metaphysics*, Chapter 34, insists on the importance of memory for *personal* identity and immortality as opposed to the eternity enjoyed by all substances. Hence a person would have no reason to desire to become the King of China on condition of forgetting his own past. I, on the contrary, feel that, if I were a wretch like Prometheus, I would have every reason to believe that I would benefit by such a change on such a condition. It seems to me that Leibniz needs memory for *personal* survival because contrary to much of our usual thinking he considers all true substances eternal and because his concept of 'perception' tends to assimilate all substances to near-people. (The Abderite view of atoms as *the* eternal substances is a legitimate

⁴ A. G. N. Flew, 'Locke and Personal Identity,' *Philosophy*, 1951.

but non-intuitive metaphysic; one, moreover, that tends to assimilate persons to near-things.)

Locke likewise considers memory, unity of consciousness, crucial to personal identity. At Enquiry II.27 he wisely distinguishes the problem of 'same person' from that of 'same man,' yet at a crucial passage in Section 7 he in effect confounds the two. He argues that the identity of soul-substrate cannot be the criterion of personal identity because "if the identity of soul alone makes the same man and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be possible that those men living in different ages and of different tempers may have been the same man; which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the word 'man.'" Here it seems natural to reply to Locke that it would not be the same man but it would be the same person. Nor is Locke right to argue that the justice of eschatological retributive punishment against *persons* turns on their having memory of wrong done and not on mere identity of soul substrate. Granted the questionable premise that anyone should be punished simply for wrong done and not as a deterrent or a purgative toward moral health, even so memory in the culprit of wrong done does not seem to be a necessary factor for exacting true justice from him as a person. Should a war criminal not be punished for all his atrocities simply because he cannot remember them all? It surely suffices for exacting justice from a person that he be a rational being capable of understanding why he is being punished, no matter whether or not he remembers the misdeeds. (Flew points to the long history of other difficulties raised against the supposition that memory is either a necessary or a sufficient condition of personal identity.)

Leibniz and Locke fail to show that personal identity cannot rest on a substratum and so does Wilson. He writes: "What would the world be like if Julius Caesar had all the properties of Mark Anthony and Mark Anthony had all the properties of Julius Caesar?" I am assuming that the properties of being called 'Julius Caesar' and of being called 'Mark Anthony' are included among the properties in question. Clearly the world would look exactly the same under our supposition. Our view of history would in

no way have to be altered."⁴ He concludes from this later: "At least we are not describing a different possibility. Hence the doctrine of metaphysical substratum does not make sense."⁵ Here Wilson begs the important questions against the Platonism which I am hopefully assuming is more congruent than his Hegelianism with more ordinary folk's intuitions. If something not too unlike Plato's "Myth of Er" in *Republic*, Book X were true then two disembodied souls outside history might be assumed after visiting the waters of Lethe to lose memory of previous lives and to drop all previous historical traits. Thus from a This Wordly view each would simply have the identifying properties of being this piece of spiritual substratum now to be annexed to a body rather than that piece and of having once been annexed to these historical figures rather than those. Or better still, assume that they have never been connected with a body or with history. Now make three alternative extra-historical assumptions; (a) the souls which drew the lots of being Caesar and Anthony are annexed to the wrong historical bodies by the overworked authorities and, since all is fated, proceed to play out their predestined roles; (b) they are deliberately annexed to the wrong ones by mischievous subordinates and the authorities feel called on to rectify this in the midst of the historical drama when it comes to their attention; (c) they are annexed to the right ones.

Our (a), (b), and (c) would not, I agree with Wilson, alter our view of history or fail to be pragmatically equivalent. (Take a suitably crude view of history and the pragmatic.) But they would not merely be non-L-equivalent in Carnapian semantics; they also represent quite different metaphysical possibilities, though our history books would not reflect them. If such myths and such differences are intelligible, then Wilson's account of proper names as variables with suppressed quantifiers and associated with certain historical predicates can only handle at best a

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 522.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 526. A substratist more ardent than myself might retort to Wilson that 'all properties' would have to range over the property of having Caesar's or Anthony's substratum—hence the example would not prove what Wilson expects but would turn out to be nonsensical, from the substratist's view of proper names, or to beg the question that there is no such property.

sadly truncated portion of the totality of what might be. Similar charges could be levelled at one of his earlier papers where transmigration hypotheses are avowedly barred by axiomatic obstacles.⁷ Like Wilson I do not believe in the Myth of Er or theosophy. But I do urge that the apparent intelligibility⁸ of such beliefs and the elusiveness of criteria for personal identity other than that of substratum point to a counter-intuitive streak in Wilson's doctrines.

Whether we are to call a car, once christened 'John Jones,' whose parts have been completely replaced over the years, *the same thing* or not is a question we may well shrug off as a matter of pragmatics (and possibly of law). But whether John Jones, a completely mutilated amnesia victim, is the same person or not does not strike me merely as a matter differing in degree from the *thing* question. We readily say that in a sense he is not the same jolly person who went off to the war—yet we would, I hope, be distinctly unhappy about shrugging him off either as 'numerically the same' or as 'in effect, someone else' on pragmatic grounds. A deeper puzzle about a 'something, I know not what' remains, a puzzle which many people, unlike Locke, would not think remained in the case of things. Of course it might not remain because we had dismissed the mutilated, insane John Jones as a near-thing. Or it might remain in the case of the car because we took its proper name rather too seriously and treated it as a near-person. This 'something, I know not what' puzzle rightly makes itself felt in baffling notions like 'soul' and 'inner self.' Ryle and Flew hasten to abuse such talk as involving Ghosts in the Machine and here they seem much less hard on Cartesians than on ordinary men. A good start has been made, towards helping ordinary men fight back, by J. R. Lucas in his recent essay "The Soul."⁹ The

⁷ 'Space, Time and Individuals,' *Journal of Philosophy*, 1955.

⁸ Of course Wilson could argue that they are not intelligible, but then his argument should be openly directed against common sense and ordinary ways of thought and his complaint against Goodman would fail. For vindications of the intelligibility and *point* of non-verifiable propositions in metaphysics and theology see I. M. Crombie's contributions to "Faith and Logic" (Ed. B. Mitchell) and "New Essays in Philosophical Theology" (Ed. A. Flew).

⁹ See "Faith and Logic" (Ed. B. Mitchell), pp. 132-48.

I-Thou-It phenomenology of Buber and Marcel also succeeds, though in a fashion more mystical than philosophical, in doing a great deal more justice than do Wilson and Ryle to a great deal of ordinary beliefs about individuals.

It may indeed be said that my Platonism is no fairer to ordinary language than Wilson's Hegelianism. Nor do I conceive that likeness unto ordinary language proveth a metaphysical thesis. I do hold that Wilson's treatment of substances inclines, for all his lipservice to common sense, to assimilate persons to things. This weakens his account of identity and especially his explanation of the role of proper names. But it is as a rival metaphysician, not just as an expounder of ordinary language, that I wish to see him hoist with his own petard.

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IDENTIFIABLE INDIVIDUALS

A. N. PRIOR

I WANT TO EXAMINE some of the things that Professor N. L. Wilson says about the identity of individuals in his paper on "Substances without Substrata";¹ and then I want to raise a few further problems of my own.

We can best begin from Wilson's "simple little puzzle" about Caesar and Antony: "What would the world be like if Julius Caesar had all the properties of Mark Antony and Mark Antony had all the properties of Julius Caesar?"² Wilson's own approach to an answer is indirect—he begins by telling us not what such a world would *be* like but what it would *look* like. "Clearly the world would look exactly the same under our supposition." But this assumes that the question "What would such a world look like?" is a proper one; which it surely is not. For his answer to it is meaningless until he specifies *to whom* this supposed world would look as he says it would. It *would* look exactly the same to him or to me; but would it have looked the same to Caesar or to Antony? In fact Julius Caesar had the experiences of being called "Julius Caesar," being murdered on the Ides of March, and so on, and these are very different experiences from being called "Mark Antony," dallying on the Nile with Cleopatra, and so on; so I don't see how this alternative course of events could possibly have looked the same to Julius Caesar; or—using a similar line of argument—to Mark Antony. So I cannot agree that, as Wilson goes on to say, "our attempt to describe a distinct possible world has produced just the same old world all over again."³ I am not, indeed, convinced that even a world which looked to *everyone* just as the actual one does would necessarily *be* the same world (since no one sees everything); but even putting this doubt aside, since the world mentioned *wouldn't* look to everyone as the actual

¹ *Review of Metaphysics*, XII. 4 (June 1959), 521-539.

² *Ibid.*, p. 522.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 523.

world does, it wouldn't be the same even by Wilson's own standards (unless, indeed, he is a solipsist, and equates how the world is with how it looks to *him*).

Wilson then goes on⁴ to consider a peculiarly perverse person who maintains that what has just been supposed is in fact the case, i.e., who seriously contends that in fact it *was* Antony, not Caesar, who was murdered on the Ides of March, etc., and Caesar, not Antony, who dallied on the Nile with Cleopatra. With regard to such a person, Wilson says that "it would seem at least plausible to suppose" that he "is really not guilty of historical error, but is using the words 'Caesar' and 'Antony' with significations we attach to 'Antony' and 'Caesar' respectively."⁵ I don't disagree with Wilson at this point, except that he seems to me not half emphatic enough. I would say that what he suggests is even more than "plausible," and that there is nothing else we *can* suppose such a man to be doing unless it be flatly contradicting himself. For Wilson explicitly includes being called "Julius Caesar" and "Mark Antony" respectively among the properties which are supposed to be interchanged;⁶ and while he doesn't say so, we can fairly assume that when he says "called 'Julius Caesar'" he means "called 'Julius Caesar' by most people," and similarly with being called "Mark Antony." But it is impossible consistently to maintain that the man whom most of us call not "Caesar" but "Antony" is the man who really had the experience (among other experiences) of being called by most of us not "Antony" but "Caesar." It really is absurd to say, "It isn't the person we all call 'Julius Caesar' that we all call 'Julius Caesar,' but it is rather the different person whom we don't call 'Julius Caesar' but 'Mark Antony' whom we call 'Julius Caesar.'" So certainly the most charitable thing to think of a man who says or implies this is that he is using names in an idiosyncratic way.

But why is this ridiculous person brought into Wilson's story at all? Apparently the argument is that because such a man must at best be supposed to be using language in an odd and private way, and at worst contradicting himself, this is all that we can

⁴ Pp. 524-5.

⁵ P. 526.

⁶ P. 522.

suppose about a man (myself, for example) who says that Caesar *could* have been named "Antony," and Antony "Caesar," and each had the other's properties. This sounds deplorably like the following argument which was discussed (and trounced) by William of Ockham: "I am going to sit down tomorrow, so God, whose thoughts are always true, thinks that I am going to; but I could have been not going to, so God could have been wrong."⁷ The obvious answer is that if I had not been going to sit down, God would not have thought I was going to. And analogously, if Caesar had been called not "Caesar" but "Antony," then "Antony" and not "Caesar" is what we would have called him, so that we would *not* under those circumstances have described the situation by saying (in the manner of Wilson's eccentric gentleman) "The person we call 'Antony' is not really Antony but Caesar." Nevertheless the person we would in the imagined circumstances be calling "Antony" would be the person whom in the actual circumstances we call "Caesar," and in the actual circumstances the correct and only way to describe the imagined circumstance is as "one in which it is not Antony but Caesar who is called 'Antony.'"

I have, nevertheless, my own qualms about this supposed exchange. In the first place, there is quite certainly at least one property of Antony's which it makes no sense to suppose Caesar exchanging with the corresponding property of his own, namely the property of *being Antony*. For if we do attempt to include this property among those exchanged, and so suppose that all of Antony's antics and experiences characterise someone who *is Antony*, and similarly all of Caesar's characterise someone who *is Caesar*, this is indeed to suppose things to be exactly as they are.

Properties which *entail* being Caesar or being Antony, as the case may be, are also obviously to be exempted from the exchange if it is to be an exchange at all. For example, Antony had the complex property of "dallying with Cleopatra, and not dallying with Cleopatra without being Antony"; clearly no one but Antony can be consistently supposed to have this property, though some-

⁷ William of Ockham, *Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de Praescientia Dei et de Futuris Contingentibus*, ed. P. Boehner (Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1945), pp. 19 ff.

one else can easily be supposed to have the simpler property of dallying with Cleopatra. But this is a comparatively trivial extension of my last point; I have more vexing worries.

As Wilson himself suggests, one way in which his question may be put is by asking whether there is a "possible world," distinct from the actual one, in which Caesar has all of Antony's properties (with, of course, the exceptions just mentioned) and Antony all of Caesar's. It is clear that any such possible world must *contain* both Antony and Caesar, that is to say the actual Antony and Caesar; and it is here that our new troubles begin. When we talk about "possible worlds" we frequently do so as if each such world were a complete and separate idea in the mind of God (or some such place); and when thinking of them in this way I find it difficult to believe that *any* merely possible world can contain individuals identifiable as our Julius Caesar and our Mark Antony. My objection here is not at all the Leibnizian one that Caesar is or is defined by the sum of his properties, so that any individual with different properties (including relational properties; and so any individual set in a different world) could not have been Caesar. On the contrary, I am away over on the other side of this fence; and it is just because Caesar *isn't* a property or collection of properties, that it is impossible as it were to detach his identity from the *Caesar that is* and attach it to a merely imaginary person in a merely imaginary world.

The feeling to which I have just given voice may be in some way misguided; but it is worth giving way to it sufficiently to let it drive us into considering a somewhat different way of talking about possible worlds, namely thus: We might say that a possible world is (1) one of the alternative possible future outcomes of the present actual state of affairs; or by a natural extension (2) anything that *was* a possible world in the preceding sense, i.e., an outcome of some *past* state of affairs which *was* possible at the time, though it may by now have been excluded by what has actually taken place instead. Or finally, (3) we may use the phrase for anything that constitutes a "possible world" in sense (1) or (2), together with its past, so that a possible world in this last sense is a *total course of events* which either is now possible or was possible once. And perhaps the more abstractly "possible" worlds

considered in the last paragraph may be comprehended in the present sort, inasmuch as, for any abstractly possible world *W*, if you wipe out *enough* of the actual past you will presumably reach a state of affairs of which *W* would have been a possible outcome. This would seem to be so, at all events, if going back far enough takes you to the creative *fiat* of God.

However it may be with this last speculation, "possible worlds" in our second sense undoubtedly include some in which the actual Julius Caesar figures; namely, at the very least, all those which constitute alternative possible continuations of his actual life-story. And there is a possible world in which Julius Caesar is called "Antony," i.e., Julius Caesar could have been called "Antony"; since possible sequels to parts of his life include, e.g., adoption by Antony's family. But of course this is only a very minor tinkering with the actual, and remains so even if we go on to suppose a different upbringing to have made rather a different man of him. Can we not go further and suppose Caesar to have had the whole of Antony's life, including being born to Antony's parents?

It is always a useful exercise (and one insufficiently practiced by philosophers), when told that something was possible, i.e., could have happened, to ask "When was it possible?" "When could it have happened?" So if Caesar could have had different parents, when could he have had them? *After* his birth, indeed after his conception—indeed, *at or after* his conception—it was clearly *too late* for him to have had different parents. But why not before? Do not the possible worlds in which Caesar figures include alternative sequels to what happened before he existed, in which we have him *entering* the stage at a different point? My difficulty here is that *before* Caesar existed (whether we suppose his conception or some other event to constitute the start of his existence) there would seem to have been no individual identifiable as Caesar, i.e., the Caesar we are now discussing, who could have been the subject of this possibility.

But this line of argument, it may be objected, proves too much. For if, before Caesar existed, there was no individual identifiable as Caesar to be the subject of the possibility of being born to *Mark Antony's* actual parents, neither was there an indi-

vidual identifiable as Caesar to be the subject of the possibility of being born to *Julius Caesar's* actual parents. So there cannot have been at that time any such possibility as that of Caesar's being born to these parents. Yet in due course this non-possible thing actually happened!

Let's repeat this paradox, so that it is quite clear what is being said. Julius Caesar, i.e., a certain now-identifiable individual, did at a certain time begin to exist. But before that time, the possible outcomes of what was going on did not include the starting-to-exist of *this* individual. However, they did include the possibility that there should be *an* individual born to these parents, who would be called "Caesar," would be murdered on the Ides of March, and so on; and this possibility was in fact realised when Caesar was born and underwent all these things.

Is this really so outrageous and unparalleled? Some of the Schoolmen made a puzzle of the sentence *Equus tibi promittitur*.⁸ There are two ways in which I may promise you a horse: I may promise you a particular horse, or I may just "promise you a horse" without undertaking to let you have any horse in particular. In the former case, there is a horse-that-I-have-promised-you, but in the latter case there is none, though any horse whatever that I make over to you will constitute a fulfillment of my promise. I may even say as I hand it over, "Here is the horse I promised you," but it is my handing it over in fulfillment of my promise that makes it that—it wasn't that when I promised (I could not truly say of this or any horse, "This *was* the horse I promised you"); nor would it make sense for you to raise a doubt on the point and ask, "But is *this* the horse you promised me?—are you sure it's *this* one?" With the other sort of promise, this question would of course be entirely in order. And what I want to say now is that the possibility that *an* individual should begin to exist and do and undergo such-and-such things, is like a promise of the second kind. Any individual's starting to exist and doing and undergoing the things in question will constitute a realization of this possi-

⁸ See, e.g., W. Burleigh, *De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior*, ed. P. Boehner (Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1955), pp. 13 (*Dubium* 2), 14, 15.

bility; yet one cannot say of any individual that what was possible was that *he* should begin to exist and do and undergo these things; there just cannot be a possibility of that sort (which would correspond to a promise of the *first* kind) except with respect to what already exists (and so no possibility, of this sort, of existence itself).

Put it this way: Suppose there is some person living before the existence of Caesar or Antony who prophesies that there will begin to be a person who will be called "Caesar," who will be murdered, etc., and another person who will be called "Antony," who will dally with Cleopatra, etc. And then suppose this prophet to say, "No, I'm not sure now that it *will* be like that—perhaps it is the *second* of the people I mentioned who will be called 'Caesar' and will be murdered, etc., and the first who will be born later and be called 'Antony', etc." This, it seems to me, really would be a spurious switch; and after Caesar and Antony had actually come into being and acted and suffered as prophesied, it would be quite senseless to ask "Are these, I wonder, really the two people he meant?" and if possible more senseless still to ask, "Is it—if either of them—our man's first prophecy, or his suggested alternative, that has now come to pass?" "The (merely) possible," as Peirce said, "is necessarily general," and "it is only actuality, the force of existence, which bursts the fluidity of the general and produces a discrete unit."⁹

Wilson, one feels at first, has read into our present condition, in which it really does mean something different to say that Caesar did and suffered this and that and to say that Antony did, the indeterminacy on this point which obtained before Caesar and Antony existed, when we could speak and think only of suppositious individuals. But one's second thought is that maybe Wilson is not all that far out, since in order fully to imagine an interchange of Antony's and Caesar's properties we must as it were pass through this Limbo in which their identities are lost, and then we can never regain them. Or, to drop the metaphor: In filling in the details of this supposed exchange, we must look back to the time

⁹ C. S. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 4.172. Cf. my *Time and Modality*, p. 114.

before either Caesar or Antony existed, and as alternative futures to *this* time the two histories mentioned by Wilson really are indistinguishable.

But could not even God Himself have launched Julius Caesar into being, or arranged his coming into being, at a different time and under different circumstances? I doubt it; and I am not the first to have doubted it either. Thomas Aquinas doubted it; and though I have read what he has to say on this subject again and again, I am still not sure what his final opinion really amounts to. The relevant passages are in his *Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei*, Q. 3, *De Creatione*, Articles 1 to 3. The immediate subject here is the creation of the world out of nothing, but much that is said bears equally upon the bringing into being of any individual subject that was not there before. Like any good writer on this topic, Thomas insists that when we speak of *creatio ex nihilo*, we don't mean that "nothing" was some sort of *material*, no doubt very tenuous, out of which the world was made. That the word was made out of nothing just means that it *wasn't made out of anything*; and indeed in this sense God was "made out of nothing" too—there was nothing *He* was made out of, because He wasn't made at all. But, as Thomas nicely puts it, this manner of speaking is not usual, and the world was made out of nothing in the narrower sense of being indeed made, but not made out of anything.¹⁰ But what was it of which it was possible, before it was made, that it should be made? Nothing, Aquinas says—it was possible that there should be a world, and God had the power to make a world, but there was nothing that had the power of being made.¹¹ But if creation was a gift of existence, he imagines an objector asking, *to what* was existence given? If to nothing, then nothing was created. If to something, then it must have had its own existence before the existence was given.¹² To this Aquinas answers that in creation "God at the same time gives being and provides that which receives being";¹³ an answer which I do not fully understand, but it is at least clear that Aquinas has *not* said,

¹⁰ Art. 1, ad obj. 7.

¹¹ Art. 1, ad obj. 2.

¹² Art. 1, obj. 17.

¹³ Ad obj. 17.

and has very deliberately not said, that the world somehow existed before it did exist in order to receive (and before that be capable of) existence.

"Is Creation a Change?" he asks next,¹⁴ and answers that although the unreflective may regard it as the most radical change conceivable, it is not properly speaking a change at all. For in what is properly called change, one and the same subject must first have this or that true of it, and then not ("one same thing must be otherwise than it was before")—for example, if at one time X is Z, and at another time Y is not Z, there need be no change here ("two contraries if referred to different subjects can exist simultaneously"). But we do not have any one subject X first being Z and then not, or first not being Z and then being Z, when X begins to be; for before it was, there was just no X. But is not this itself a change in the wider sense in which there is change if at one time P and not Q is true, at another time Q and not P? Thomas answers that there can be nothing like this with the creation of the world, since before the world there was no time. My own answer would be that "Once X was not, and now it is" cannot mean "Once X's non-being was the case and now its being is," but can only mean "It is *not* the case that X *was*, but it *is* the case that X *is*," and this does not express a change but two contrasting present facts (note the tense of the two main verbs).¹⁵

In Article 3 Thomas goes further and says that being created is not properly speaking a *passion* in a thing, i.e., something that it has done to it, and insists that not only must a finite being *be created* in order to *be*, but any being must *be* in order to *be created*. ("This relation"—i.e., being created—"is an accident, and considered in its being, is subsequent to the thing created"¹⁶). So on Thomas's view, whatever else is obscure, it seems clear that there can be no question, even for God, of grabbing hold of *Caesar* and bringing him from nothingness to being at some arbitrary time. Expressions like "launching" *Caesar* into being, and *Caesar* "entering" upon the stage of existence, would certainly have been

¹⁴ Art. 2.

¹⁵ Cf. my *Time and Modality*, pp. 34-5.

¹⁶ Art. 3, ad obj. 3.

recognized by Thomas as the metaphors they are, and as misleading metaphors to the extent that their literal performance would involve Caesar's existing-before-he-existed. And this seems very close indeed to the admission that it is only once he exists that Caesar is an identifiable individual, and that God did not and could not "create Caesar" in any sense in which, He having said "Let there be a man, with properties X to Z," and there then starting to be a man with those properties, one could intelligibly ask "But was *this* the man you wanted?" or intelligibly say "This—this and no other—*was* the man God intended."

To stop at this point, however, even with this remarkable theological reinforcement, would be to forget where we began. Let us leave both God and Caesar out of it for a moment; could not *I* have been born when and where Mark Antony was and had all his properties and experiences? As each of us puts this question to himself, it will seem clear that the thing is at least logically possible, i.e., not a self-contradictory supposition, and discernibly different from the actual state of affairs. We have already, in fact, in Section I, imagined Caesar putting this question to himself and having to give this answer. We may reflect also that if the theories of pre-existence and transmigration had been true, Caesar *would* have existed before his conception and so could have waited and been born to Mark Antony's parents at Mark Antony's time, and Mark Antony, also pre-existing, could have been born a little earlier to the people who in fact had Julius Caesar as their child; and we do not *know* that doctrines of pre-existence and transmigration are *not* true. Even if most of us regard it as so unlikely that belief in it is not a "live option," it seems at least logically possible that it should be true.

I have no wish to maintain that we cannot be mistaken as to what is logically possible. On the contrary, to fall into error on this subject is extremely easy. For example, the following imagined sequence of events is one which most people will be inclined to regard as logically possible: A certain Mr. X has a very low opinion of the intelligence of a colleague, Mr. Y, and the two of them are walking down a corridor and eventually separate into adjacent rooms; Mr. Y, as he thinks, into Room 7, and Mr. X, as he thinks, into Room 8. It is towards 6 o'clock and Mr. X

reflects for a while, as he often does, on the incurable stupidity of Mr. Y, and at precisely 6 o'clock the thought occurs to him that whatever is being thought at 6 o'clock that night in Room 7 is false. That is all that he thinks at that time, and there is no one else in the room with him. But unfortunately, owing to some inadvertence, it is he himself who has gone into Room 7, and Mr. Y is in fact in Room 6. Most readers who have followed me so far will, I think, have found this chain of events a possible one, however curious. Yet it is easy to demonstrate that what I have described is incompatible with the most elementary logical laws. For what Mr. X takes to be the case must either be the case or not be the case. And it cannot be the case, for if it were, i.e., if it were the case that nothing thought at 6 in Room 7 is the case, then it would not be the case, since it is itself thought at 6 in Room 7. And since it thus cannot be the case that nothing thought at 6 in Room 7 is the case, then the fact must be that *something* thought at 6 in Room 7 is the case. But this true thought in Room 7 cannot be the one we know about, since that, as we have just seen, is false. So there must be some other thought than this one occurring at 6 in Room 7; but our hypothesis was that it was the only one. Our hypothesis as a whole, therefore, is implicitly self-contradictory, exactly as the hypothesis that there is a barber who shaves all those people and only those people who do not shave themselves is implicitly self-contradictory. Yet I must confess that I still feel, and I suspect that this is true of other people, also, that there could be a Mr. X and Mr. Y behaving internally and externally exactly as I have said; so great is the force of certain "logical illusions."¹⁷

I doubt, however, whether it is necessary to bring in the hypothesis of "logical illusion" to explain the apparent logical possibility of an exchange of properties between Antony and Caesar, or even between Antony and me. What is necessary is to distinguish logical possibility from the sort of possibility that we have been considering hitherto, and to get their relation straight. The distinction we want is made, for example, by the 15th century

¹⁷ Cf. my 'Epimenides the Cretan,' *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, Vol. XXIII, No. 3 (September 1958), pp. 261-6.

scholastic philosopher Ferdinand of Cordova,¹⁸ when describing a certain argument for the "necessity" of correctly predicted future events. What is in question, he says, is not that "logical necessity" which arises from a certain relation between a proposition's terms, but rather that "truth which can no longer be prevented" which Aristotle was thought (by the propounders of the argument) to have required for a proposition to be counted "already true." If this distinction be kept clearly in view, it will be profitable to look again at the other horn of my dilemma about the *time* at which it was possible for Caesar to have had other parents. Once he was already born, I suggested, it was too late for him to have any chance of having had other parents. The "necessity" here hinted at is of Ferdinand of Cordova's second sort; but the proposition that *this* person (the one we know as "Julius Caesar") should have had those other persons (the ones who were in fact the parents of Mark Antony) as his parents, is certainly "possible" in the sense of containing no internal inconsistency, and moreover is different in sense from the proposition that *that* person (the one we know as "Mark Antony") had those persons as his parents.

In making this distinction, it is tempting to say that logical necessity and possibility are independent of the passage of time; and that about this sort of possibility the question "*When* was it possible?" need not and in fact cannot sensibly be asked. This, however, seems to be an over-simplification. For there can be no truths, not even logical truths, that are distinguishably "about" Caesar and Antony until there are such persons to be the subjects of these truths. Hence, while the passage of time may eliminate "possibilities" in the sense of alternative outcomes of actual states of affairs, and cause that to be no longer alterable which once might have been otherwise, with "logical" possibilities the opposite change occurs. For as new distinguishable individuals come into being, there is a multiplication of the number of different subjects to which our predications can be consistently attached, and so a multiplication of distinguishable logical possibilities. What was once just a possibility that "someone" should have such-and-such a history, and "someone else" should have such-and-such another

¹⁸ In L. Baudry's, *La Querelle des Futurs Contingents* (J. Vrin, Paris, 1950), p. 139.

history, can now be replaced by the distinct possibilities that X should have had the first history and Y the second, and that Y should have had the first and X the second. We must also accept the slightly odd result that it is logically possible that Julius Caesar *should have been* the son of Mark Antony's parents, even though before he existed it was not logically or in any other way possible that he should *come to have* those people, or any other people, as his parents. One must, in other words, take very seriously the present tense of the main verb in "It is logically possible that Julius Caesar should have, etc.", just as one must take it very seriously (*viz.*, on creation and change) in "It is not the case that Julius Caesar existed in 200 B.C."

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PROBLEMS AND PERPLEXITIES

THIS SECTION, devoted to the examination of challenging questions, was inaugurated in the March, 1960 issue. Continuing the policy begun there, \$25. prizes are offered—

7. For the best listing of the differences between Aristotle's logic and Aristotelian logic. Or, alternatively, for the best account showing that the differences are non-existent or minor.

8. For the best statement of the use of the term "proof" in G. E. Moore's supposed proof of the external world, or for the best re-statement of the supposed proof.

9. For the best statement showing that the ontological argument does or does not use "existence" as a predicate.

10. For the best account showing that Aristotle did or did not write dialogues.

11. For the best account of what Hegel thought (or should have thought) the next stage of history, after his own, would be like.

12. J. J. Scaliger said that all wars originate in bad grammar. Can this be justified according to the tenets of linguistic analysis?

Papers should not be more than 1000 words long, and should be in the hands of the editor of this *Review* no later than August 15th, 1961. Submitted manuscripts will either be published in the *Review* or returned to the authors.

Readers are invited to submit questions. Ten dollars will be paid for each question that is used.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS *

JOYCE E. MITCHELL AND STAFF

BECK, L. W. *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. xvi, 308 pp. \$6.00—This book, besides meeting a definite need in the field of Kantian ethical studies, is excellent. Professor Beck treats the *Practical Reason* as an exemplification of a general Kantian method applied to problems organic to the Kantian system as a whole. His interpretation of the 'Transcendental deduction' of the Principle of Pure Practical Reason is particularly brilliant; the Principle is shown to be established in precisely the form required for a complete resolution of the third antinomy of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the procedure has the further warrant of showing the validity of the "deduction" of chapter III of the "Grundlegung." — J. B.

BECKER, O. *Größe und Grenze der mathematischen Denkweise*. Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Albers, 1959. 174 pp. 12.80 DM—Becker gives a brief survey of the philosophically relevant aspects to be found in the history of mathematics, starting with the Pythagorean conception of numbers and its fate at the hands of Plato and Aristotle. He considers the development of the exact sciences based on mathematics, paying particular attention to the problems in pure mathematics. In the final chapter the limitations of mathematical reasoning are examined. Nothing new is presented, but then that is not its purpose. The survey presupposes no special competence in either mathematics or logic. — L. S. F.

BERGMANN, G. *Meaning and Existence*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960. xi, 274 pp. \$1.75 paper; \$6.50 cloth—A collection of recent essays published previously in various journals. The collection forms a continuous discussion of closely related problems. The conclusion of the first and key essay is that "the content of every awareness is propositional." This thesis is expanded and defended in subsequent essays by comparisons with some doctrines of other philosophers. Fresh in style, careful and original in thought. — D. D. O.

* Books received will be acknowledged in this section by a brief résumé, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgment does not preclude more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. The Summaries and Comments will be written by the Managing Editor and her staff of assistants, with the occasional help of others. Reports have been contributed to this issue by Alan R. Anderson and Alfred Lessing.

BICKEL, L. *The Unity of Body and Mind*. Ed. and trans. by W. Bernard. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 167 pp. \$3.75—Drawing upon the insights of Spinoza and Constantin Brunner, Bickel develops a theory of the identity of mind and body. Difficult to understand. — F. E. B.

CULLMANN, O. *A Message to Catholics and Protestants*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1959. 57 pp. \$1.50—Cullman, a distinguished Swiss Protestant theologian, presents a practical proposal for realizing Christian solidarity. He concedes, first, that opposing views on the concept of the Church make actual church unity humanly impossible for contemporary Protestants and Catholics. He proposes that a collection be taken up among Protestant churches for the Catholic poor and among Catholic churches for the Protestant poor. An adaptation of Paul's suggestion, this "exchange" offering would, he hopes, foster an atmosphere in which theological debate could flourish. — D. D. O.

DUFRENNE, M. *La Notion d'"A Priori"*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959. 292 pp. N. F. 9,60—The problem the author sets himself in this historico-critical study of the post-Kantian development of the *a priori* is: Can one understand the nature of the *a priori* as part of the explanation of knowledge, without assigning it exclusively to the subject and without radically identifying the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*? Dufrenne thinks this can be done by retaining a dualism of subject and object. Well-written and scholarly. An index would have been helpful. — D. D. O.

ELIADE, M. *The Myth of the Eternal Return*. Trans. by W. Trask. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954. 195 pp. \$2.75—In this essay on the archaic conception of historical being, Eliade has marshalled a wealth of archaeological and anthropological material. Eliade considers not only the more sophisticated versions of eternal return in great years and in cosmic cycles, but also its foundation in the annual cultic rites designed to overcome time. He catches the flavor of archaic ontology very nicely—the ontology which found its philosophical expression in Plato. — L. S. F.

ELIADE, M. *Yoga, Immortality and Freedom*. Trans. by W. Trask. Bollingen Series LVI. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. xxii, 529. \$6.00—A lucid account of Yoga. The interest of the author is descriptive; little attempt is made to present the reader with a ready evaluation. Yet Eliade has succeeded in conveying a feeling for the many dimensions of the phenomenon and for its significance. Perhaps, after having finished the book, the reader may still not know how to assess Yoga, but the foundations have been laid from which one may fruitfully go on to further investigations. The appended bibliography is helpful. — K. H.

- FEIBLEMAN, J. K. *Religious Platonism; The Influence of Religion on Plato and the Influence of Plato on Religion*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960. 236 pp. \$4.50—Feibleman finds two diverse strands in Plato's philosophy: an idealism centered upon the Forms denying full ontological status to the realm of becoming, and a moderate realism granting actuality equal reality with Forms. For each strand Plato developed a conception of religion: a supernatural one derived from Orphism, and a naturalistic religion revering the traditional Olympian deities. Unfortunately, Feibleman's method of mere confrontation of conflicting statements in Plato detracts from his persuasiveness. — L. S. F.
- FINK, E. *Alles und Nichts, Ein Umweg zur Philosophie*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. viii, 249 pp. Gld. 15.75—This is the third volume in a series of university lectures at Freiburg published by the author, a long-time assistant and interpreter of Husserl. The lectures are a sustained effort to rethink, amend, and develop themes first discussed by Husserl and Heidegger. In this volume Fink offers a new interpretation of the problems of nothingness and the totality of being. He seeks to avoid the tendency to reify the notion of totality; such reification the author argues (with Heidegger) is the besetting sin of previous philosophies of being. — D. D. O.
- FREUND, H. *The Balanced Life*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 186 pp. \$4.50—This introductory essay sketches the problem of the good life by a brief description of moral experience and discusses some major alternative answers. Freund suggests that the good life has as its final value "the unity of communion, fellowship, and creativeness" and concludes with a plea for a re-examination of our educational procedures. — F. E. B.
- FUJISAWA, C. *Zen and Shinto, The Story of Japanese Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 92 pp. \$2.75—Fujisawa in his plea for Shinto cosmic vitalism may indeed be right in thinking that Japanese thought has much to contribute to Western philosophy. But this has to be supported by a far more searching and self-critical study than the author has provided. — K. H.
- GILSON, E. *Elements of Christian Philosophy*. New York: Doubleday, 1960. 358 pp. \$5.50—The first in a new series of Catholic textbooks, this offers a masterly presentation of the essentials of Thomistic metaphysics. The book is written with Gilson's characteristic clarity and style and may probably be regarded as a definitive statement of his two familiar theses about Thomism: the centrality of the act of existence, and the necessity of following the structure of the *Summa Theologica* in a systematic presentation of St. Thomas' metaphysics. — D. D. O.
- GRENET, P. B. *Ontologie*. Paris: Beauchesne et Fils, 1959. 215 pp. N. F. 9,90—This book belongs to a series of small volumes presenting uni-

versity students with a systematic course in Thomistic philosophy. Though intended as a text, the book departs from the usual tiresome format associated with textbook ontologies. By concentrating on central issues the author has managed to organize a wealth of doctrinal and historical information in a little over 200 pages. — D. D. O.

GUNTHER, G. *Idee und Grundriß einer nicht-aristotelischen Logik. Band I: Die Idee und ihre philosophischen Voraussetzungen.* Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1959. xxii, 417 pp. Paper, DM 56—An ambitious effort to examine the philosophical presuppositions and implications of non-Aristotelian logic. In particular, the author tries to systematize the results of rejecting the so-called Laws of Thought by many-valued logics. — D. D. O.

HABER, F. C. *The Age of the World, Moses to Darwin.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1959. xii, 303 pp. \$5.00—A very readable contribution to the history of ideas. A brief introductory discussion describes the change from a cyclical to the linear view of time. The main part of the work analyzes the gradual rejection of the mosaic linear view and its replacement by an evolutionary conception. — K. H.

HARTMANN, N. *Kleinere Schriften. Band II: Abhandlungen zur Philosophie-Geschichte.* Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1957. 364 pp. DM 28.00—The second volume in this series gathers up some of Hartmann's studies in the history of philosophy. The greater number deal with the author's creative interpretations of Greek philosophy, but essays on Hegel, Leibniz and a novel and important contribution on Kant are also included. Ridiculously high-priced. — D. D. O.

HAVARD, W. C. *Henry Sidgwick and Later Utilitarian Political Philosophy.* Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1959. viii, 197 pp. \$4.50—A careful discussion of Sidgwick's views on politics and economics, traced to their basis in his ethics. Sidgwick is rightly treated primarily as a critical thinker who sifted the prevalent views of his time against the background of a common-sense hedonism. In view of this, a good part of Havard's book is devoted to the influence of early utilitarian and positivistic thinking on the "climate" of nineteenth century England. — J. B.

JOHNSTONE, H. W., Jr. *Philosophy and Argument.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1959. 141 pp. \$4.00—Johnstone is concerned with the problem of genuine disagreement among opposing philosophical positions. He examines the role of philosophical argument as the only final basis for communication between opposing positions. Philosophical statements by themselves are radically ambiguous, and only take on definite meaning within the context of the arguments adduced both for and against them. Johnstone supports his general theory of philosophic argument by an examination of Hume's argument against causality and by an elaboration of the concept of personality implied by this theory. A well-argued study. — L. S. F.

KAUFMANN, W. *From Shakespeare to Existentialism: Studies in Poetry, Religion and Philosophy*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959. x, 404 pp. \$5.95—This book deals with many interesting topics in a provocative way. Of considerable interest is Kaufmann's vicious counterattack on Popper's treatment of Hegel. Unfortunately there is no over-all unifying theme. The author is obviously erudite and misses no opportunity for pointing this out. — J. E. M.

KROOK, D. *Three Traditions of Moral Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959. xii, 355 pp. \$5.50—An examination of the place and importance accorded to love in the systems representative of the Platonic-Christian, the utilitarian, and humanist world views. By a formal, literary analysis of parts of a major work of each of nine moralists, the author brings out their views on man and love. Despite a rather weak conclusion, and a few somewhat strained interpretations, her argument is clear and her analyses penetrating. — F. E. B.

KRUTHOF, J. *Het Uitgangspunt van Hegel's Ontologie*. Brugge (Belgium): Uitgeverij "De Tempel," 1959. 350 pp. N. P.—A highly competent and technical analysis of the historical and theoretical bases of Hegel's ontology. The first of the book's three sections gives an account of the importance, the history, and the present state of the study of Hegel's philosophy. The second and main section represents an attempt to elicit from Hegel's own texts the basic ontological concepts that form the starting point of the dialectical movement towards the completed metaphysical system. The third section attempts to reach an adequate interpretation of the starting point of Hegel's ontology by bringing together the conclusions of the previous sections. A fine bibliography as well as a number of diagrams and a résumé Français at the end may be of interest and use to those, because they do not know Dutch, are forced to forego the main text of this book. — A. F.

LANGAN, T. *The Meaning of Heidegger, A Critical Study of an Existentialist Phenomenology*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. 247 pp. \$4.50—The author undertakes to prove the 'perfect consistency' of the whole range of Heidegger's thought. He seeks to show that the essays after 1927 must be read as clarifications of the enigmas of *Sein und Zeit* and that they are not, as has often been claimed, departures from the earlier program but a deliberate fulfillment of it. The outlines of a 'philosophy of finite being' emerge with relative clarity. It is up to expert opinion to judge whether this ambitious undertaking has succeeded, but every student of contemporary philosophy will be grateful for this careful and readable work, the only major study of Heidegger in English. — D. D. O.

LUOMA, M. *Die drei Sphären der Geschichte*. Kobenhaven: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1959. viii, 169 pp. Mk. 890—A brief but informative introduction to the work of Alfred Weber. The author seeks to show why scholars like Timascheff and Sigmund Neumann rank Alfred Weber in the company of his more famous brother Max, and with Simmel,

Rickert, Dilthey, and Scheler in the field of historical sociology. The work includes a systematic presentation of Weber's conception of 'historicocultural sociology'. — D. D. O.

MARTIN, R. M. *The Notion of Analytic Truth*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959. xiii, 124 pp.—This is a clearly written account of Martin's views of analytic truth, containing, in addition to the philosophical considerations, some novel formal results. The formal theory offered is shown to satisfy plausible adequacy conditions, and is notable for economy of assumptions—a reflection of Martin's conviction that semantical metalanguages should, so far as possible, be neutral to issues in ontology. But one need not share the author's extensionalist outlook in order to find much of interest here. — A. R. A.

MAYERS, LEWIS. *Shall We Amend the Fifth Amendment?* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959. x, 341 pp. \$5.00—This is a sober, balanced, well-written re-examination of the problems posed by the rules governing the 'privilege against self-incrimination.' The special merit of the study is its careful distinction of cases. The author shows that the meaning and justification for the privilege vary when claimed by a suspect, an accused, or a witness. Further distinctions are required when the privilege is invoked in preliminary investigations of a congressional committee seeking background data for new legislation. The existing rules and practices are subjected to close, well-documented scrutiny issuing in suggestions for reform in each of the distinguished cases. — D. D. O.

MEIKLEJOHN, A. *Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. xxv, 166 pp. \$3.50—An expansion and revision of an earlier work, *Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government*. The author enters a lucid and dispassionate plea for the inviolability of the First Amendment. His work should awaken philosophers to the need for further analysis in the field of legal and political science. — J. E. M.

NAUS, J. E., S.J. *The Nature of the Practical Intellect according to Saint Thomas Aquinas*. Rome: Libreria dell'Universita Gregoriana, 1959. 220 pp.—Thomistic ethics has sometimes been accused of being excessively rationalistic, impersonal, and *a priori*. This study attempts to provide textual support from Aquinas for an interpretation which stresses the primacy of conscience, individual responsibility, and the central importance of the virtue of prudence. The doctrine seems timely and suggestive, but the author's decision to write in scholastic jargon limits the effectiveness of this book for the uninitiated. — D. D. O.

NORTHROP, F. S. C. *The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1959. xvi, 331 pp. \$6.00—These essays,

most of which have been previously published, survey various types of legal theory along with their ethical counterparts. Definitive statements are given of sociological jurisprudence and of philosophical anthropology. The new material constitutes a major contribution to the analyses of legal obligation and international law. A fascinating book which, unfortunately, is not always as clear as one would like. — J. E. M.

PRYOR, C. R. *A Philosophical Theory of Life Before, Present and After*. New York: Vantage Press, 1959. 88 pp. \$2.75—The musings of a retired engineer on the meaning of life. Mr. Pryor offers us a remedy for the troubles of this life, one which will also enable us to specify what sort of future existence we want to have. What is this modest physic? Treatment by hypnosis!—D. D. O.

RANDALL, J. H. *Aristotle*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. xviii, 309 pp. \$5.00—An enthusiastic and not completely implausible attempt to interpret Aristotle as a "thoroughgoing behaviorist. He is, of course, a functional and contextual behaviorist, not a mechanistic behaviorist. For him, life is the power of living and knowing, the power of selective response to the world." Randall sees in Aristotle a disturbing and philosophically inexplicable tendency to "platonize" in the *Organon*, the *De Caelo*, Bk. X of the *Ethics*, and so on. The physical treatises, the *Politics* and *Ethics*, the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*, however, expose the "Aristotelian" side of Aristotle, since they deal with the powers of selective response and the variety of natural processes, as well as offering a method for achieving practical aims.—J. B.

SANDBECK, H. C. *Nature and Destiny, A Theory of Evolution*. Oslo: Oslo, 1959. 353 pp. In this first volume of his work the author attempts to lay the foundations for an understanding of the sense of value by calling attention to a teleological principle governing the evolutionary process. An attempt is made to apply this principle, gained from an analysis of organic structures, to modern art. A suggestive book which would have been better if it had taken into account more of the relevant philosophic literature. — K. H.

SCHACHTEL, E. G. *Metamorphosis. On the Development of Affect, Perception, Attention, and Memory*. New York: Basic Books, 1959. viii, 344 pp. \$6.00—The author seeks to shed light on the changes in man from infant to adult. He rejects Freud's notion of the pleasure principle, arguing that the infant also turns to and enjoys the excitations of the world; on the other hand "ego psychology" is charged with neglecting the developmental factor. In going beyond these views Schachtel makes his contribution to a fuller understanding of the human situation. A clear and well-written book. — K. H.

SMITH, J. E. Ed. *The Works of Jonathan Edwards*. Vol. II: *Religious Affections*. New Haven: 1959. vi, 526 pp. \$7.50—See this Issue pp. 623-641.

SOLER, R. *El Positivismo Argentino, Pensamiento Filosófica y Sociológico*. Panama: Imprenta Nacional, 1959. 305 pp. N. P.—A characterization of the categories and theoretical orientation of Argentine "positivism"—in a broad but classical sense, amounting roughly to the identification of knowledge with the conclusions of experimental science—carried out through an historical study of the origins, development, and doctrines of indigenous philosophical and sociological theories. — L. K. B.

STERN, J. P. *Lichtenberg, A Doctrine of Scattered Occasions*. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1959. xv, 381 pp. \$6.95—In his study of Lichtenberg Stern presents us with a vivid picture of the eighteenth century physicist, astronomer, psychologist. Of special interest to the philosopher are Stern's attempts to show that a certain world view finds its most apt expression in the aphorism. This is illustrated by pointing out parallels between Lichtenberg and Wittgenstein. A collection of Lichtenberg's aphorisms is given in the appendix. — K. H.

WATERMAN, L. *Forerunners of Jesus*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. xii, 156 pp. N. P.—Waterman argues that traditional Christianity has too often ignored its heritage of prophetic moral tradition. His study concentrates on Second Isaiah (Isaiah 40-45) and the continuity of this moral criticism in John the Baptist and in Jesus. His approach is expository and informative, but little attention is paid to the details of Old Testament scholarship. — L. S. F.

WEINSCHENK, J. H. *Synthetical Sonnets*. Fresno: Ficetum Press, 1959. 48 pp. \$1.00—Some forty quite mediocre poems on philosophical subjects. For example: "My trouble is that I was born a slave/to Logic. What a mistress!! Harsh . . . Frigid . . . Rigid . . ./She is gigantique. 'gainst her I am a midget./She is almighty . . . I am her little knave./etc." — J. B.

WOLFF, K. H. Ed. *Georg Simmel 1858-1918*. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1959. ix, 396 pp. \$7.50—This is an able book of essays, written by well-qualified scholars, about an unjustly neglected nineteenth century German philosopher. He is known in this country primarily as the founder of "formal sociology," but much of what he has to say belongs with equal propriety to the philosophy of culture. The aim of the volume is to rehabilitate Simmel's reputation, which suffered much among sociologists from attacks by Abel and Sorokin. The volume also contains about 100 pages of Simmel's own essays in translation: "The Ruin," "The Handle," and "The Aesthetic Significance of the Face," among others. — A. R. A.

BONHOEFFER, D. *The Cost of Discipleship*. Trans. by R. H. Fuller. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1959. 285 pp. \$3.00—This newly revised edition of Bonhoeffer's classic statement of the Christian life contains the full text of Bonhoeffer's *Nachfolge*. — F. E. B.

DA VINCI, L. *Philosophical Diary*. Trans. and with an introduction by Wade Baskin. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 87 pp. \$2.75 —A short collection of random quotations concerning a number of diverse philosophical topics. — F. E. B.

For Roman Ingarden: Nine Essays in Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. 179 pp. Gld. 15.25—Five essays in French, one in German and three in English, honoring the Polish scholar, Roman Ingarden. The essays offer criticisms or develop Husserl, or apply his methods to problems in philosophy, literary criticism, and psychology. — D. D. O.

HEINEMANN, F. Ed. *Die Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert (Eine enzyklopädische Darstellung ihrer Geschichte, Disziplinen, und Aufgaben)*. Stuttgart Ernst Klett, 1959. xii, 600 pp. 34.50 DM—Heinemann argues that we must recognize the existence of a plurality of philosophical alternatives, retaining the ideal of one truth as nothing more than a regulative principle. His encyclopedia contains a 270-page history of philosophy, including contemporary developments. It also contains a systematic section with essays on most of the conventional philosophical disciplines. The results are more pedestrian than the vision. — L. S. F.

Husserl et la pensée moderne/Husserl und das Denken der Neuzeit. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. x, 250 pp. Gld. 16—Papers read at the second International Colloquium of Phenomenology (1956). Contributions include some of the major European representatives of the second generation of phenomenologists: Fink, Landgrebe, de Waelhens, Ingarden, and others. All of the papers (printed in French and German) deal with problems or assessments of Husserl's philosophy. Opinions differ sharply on many matters of substance in the interpretation of Husserl. Of special interest is the story of van Breda's dramatic rescue of Husserl's papers from Nazi Germany in 1938. — D. D. O.

Studia Philosophica, Jahrbuch der Schweizerischen Philosophischen Gesellschaft. Vol. 28. Basel: Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1958. vii, 248 pp. N. P.—This yearbook contains eleven articles in French and German, but unfortunately they are not grouped around a single theme, as some former yearbooks have been, e.g., the Schelling yearbook of 1954. Axelos and Bloch contribute good studies on time. — L. S. F.

Tulane Studies in Philosophy. New Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1959. 121 pp. \$2.00—A centennial number. The outstanding contribution is "On the Nature of Romanticism," by Edward G. Ballard, who is unusually sensitive to the Romantic approach to art and philosophy. The closing essay is a striking discussion by R. C. Whittemore of the "Metaphysical Foundations of Sartre's Ontology," in which he argues that Whitehead provides Sartre's ontology with the metaphysical cosmology it requires, and vice versa. — J. B.

- ANDRAE, T. *Mohammed: The Man and His Faith*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960. 194 pp. \$1.25.
- BERDYAEV, N. *The Destiny of Man*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960. viii, 310 pp. \$1.75.
- BERGSON, H. *Philosophy of Poetry*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 83 pp. \$2.75.
- COLLINGWOOD, R. *The Idea of Nature*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. viii, 183 pp. \$1.25.
- CREEL, H. G. *Confucius and the Chinese Way*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959. xiv, 363 pp. \$1.85.
- GOGUEL, M. *Jesus and the Origins of Christianity*. Vol. I: *Prolegomena to the Life of Jesus*; Vol. II: *The Life of Jesus*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960. xv, 590 pp. Vol. I. \$1.35; Vol. II. \$1.85.
- HEGEL, W. *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, trans. by Dr. G. E. Mueller. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. xi, 287 pp. \$6.00.
- HESSEN, J. *Das Kausalprinzip*. Basel: Reinhardt, 1958. 300 pp. Fr. 17.
- RAWCLIFFE, D. H. *Ilusions and Delusions of the Supernatural and the Occult*. New York: Dover, 1959. 551 pp. \$2.00.
- ROYCE, J. *The World and the Individual*. Intro. by J. E. Smith. New York: Dover, 1959. xxii, 588 pp. \$4.50.
- TIO, T. DE, CARDINAL CAJETAN. *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*. Trans. and ann. by E. A. Bushinsky. Pittsburgh: Dusquesne, 1959. x, 95 pp. \$2.25.
- YOUNG, J. Z. *Doubt and Certainty in Science*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. xii, 168 pp. \$1.50.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Lehigh University has received a grant of \$4,500 from the National Science Foundation for a two-year research project on "Arabic Contributions to Logic." The project will be directed by Professor Nicholas Rescher.

The American Academy of Arts and Sciences offers three Monograph Prizes of \$1,000 each, to be awarded annually to the authors of unpublished monographs—one in the humanities, one in the social sciences, and one in the physical and biological sciences. A monograph is defined for the purposes of these awards as a "scholarly contribution to knowledge, too long for an article in a learned journal and too specialized for a general book." Recipients of these prizes will be expected to make their own arrangements for publication. The final date in 1960 for receipt of manuscripts by the committee on awards is October 1. Announcement of the awards will be made in December. Full details concerning these prizes may be secured on request by sending a stamped self-addressed envelope to the Committee on Monograph Prizes, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 280 Newton Street, Brookline Station, Boston 46, Massachusetts.

The Fifth International Thomistic Congress will be held in Rome, September 13-17, 1960, under the auspices of the Roman Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas. The Congress will be devoted to moral problems; in particular: (1) the foundation and the aids to morality; (2) the preservation and harmonization of the rights of truth and liberty; (3) the true concept of labor. For further information address: Rev. Charles Boyer, S.J., Secretary General, Pontificia Accademia Romana di S. Tommaso, Palazzo della Cancelleria Apostolica, Piazza della Cancelleria, 1, Roma, Italia.

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by E. D. Hirsch

This unusual work develops a fresh overall insight into the Romantic picture of the world. The author elucidates the important Romantic concepts by comparing the poetic vision of Wordsworth with the philosophical thought of Schelling, demonstrating their astonishing spiritual closeness. This study suggests that Romanticism was a single international movement, and it reveals a coherence and unity in Wordsworth's thought that has not before been perceived.

\$4.00

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by Martin Heidegger

It is Heidegger's belief that the whole history of Western thought has been dominated and shaped by man's understanding of being. He investigates the meaning of being as it is recorded in philosophy and poetry and, above all, in the language that underlies them both. The disorientation of modern thought and existence he traces to "forgetfulness of being."

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Edited and translated with commentary by
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Pierce College, Athens, Greece

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MIND *A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy*

Edited by Professor G. Ryle

With the Co-operation of Prof. Sir F. C. Bartlett and Prof. C. D. Broad

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R. M. HARE

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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